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ABSTRACT 
MUSIC, AESTHETICS, PERIPHERALITY: 
NOTES ON A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
OF LATIN AMERICA MUSIC (1910-1973) 
Stephan Hammel 
Dr. Jairo Moreno 
 This dissertation is a theoretical treatment of the history of Latin 
American music in the twentieth century. It’s central claim is twofold. First, the 
progressive development of a Latin American music was made possible and 
meaningful by the region’s economic, political and cultural peripherality vis-à-vis 
the (neo-)colonial metropole: Western Europe and the United States. That 
peripherality was manifest as an attempt to find in Latin American particularity 
the grounds for universal significance. Reading this attempt in Kantian terms of 
conceptual determination, it appears as an aesthetics. Given the failure of 
imported concepts to adequately schematize the stuff of Latin American 
experience, that which was native to the region could only be determined 
reflectively in light of sense-data alone. Throughout the last century, musical 
compositions, genres, and practices sought to complete that process of 
determination, or else transcend it altogether. The second part of my claim is that 
those musical responses to the aesthetic problem of Latin American peripherality 
were ultimately consumed by the very duality of universality and particularity 
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they sought to overcome. They share an aporetic structure proper to the eruption 
of geographical difference onto the historical plane. 
 The dissertation revolves around three case studies. The first focuses on 
the composer Carlos Chavez, making perspicuous the stakes of his stylistic 
development in light of the peasant revolution of 1910. The second traces the 
intellectual history of the musical gauchesca, understanding this genre as turning 
on the contradictions of Argentine modernity in its identification with song and 
Nature as such. Finally, the last case study takes up Chilean Nueva Canción as it 
appeared in the years before the 1973 military coup. It represented a musical 
movement that sought out a place for aesthetics in the context of a socialist 
revolution. These three cases form a counterpoint to a philosophical discourse on 
the history of Latin America - one that demonstrates the shape and import of an 
idealist musicology. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LATIN AMERICAN MUSIC 
 In a 1977 essay called “América Latina en la confluencia de coordenadas 
históricas y su repercusión en la música,” the Cuban novelist, music critic and 
intellectual, Alejo Carpentier, argues that the history of music of Europe differs 
from that of Latin America. While the former follows a traceable line of 
development from the beginning of musical notation in the ninth century to the 
avant gardes of the twentieth, Latin American musical development was non-
linear, disjunct. European music history, he claims, enjoys such clarity and 
coherence that even those composers whose more recent gestures to break 
convention in favor of thoroughly modern sonorous expression could not help 
but make explicit reference to history. Here Carpentier has in mind Schoenberg 
and Stravinsky, the twin pillars of twentieth century composition, who both seek 
some kind of historical precedent for their innovations. Schoenberg, for example, 
overtly places himself in a culminating position with respect to the arc of central 
European musical development which has led to his systematic critique of 
harmony with what the Cuban critic calls historical ‘necessity.’ By contrast, the 
Latin American composer cannot tie himself to any such narrative. “Cuando nos 
enfrentamos con la música latinoamericana, en cambio, nos encontramos con 
que ésta no se desarrolla en función de los mismos valores y hechos culturales, 
obedeciendo a fenómenos, aportaciones, impulsos, debidos a factores de 
crecimiento, pulsiones anímicas, estratos raciales, injertos y trasplantes, que 
resultan insólitos para quien pretenda aplicar determinados métodos al análisis 
!1
de un arte regido por un constante rejuego de confrontaciones entre lo propio y lo 
ajeno, lo autóctono y lo importado.”   The claim is that the relationship of 1
European culture to that of the former colonies in America is not merely one of 
contrasting histories, but of opposed - perhaps even complimentary - 
historicities. The content of past musical events, the relevant figures, technical 
processes and stylistic !  tendencies, are no doubt distinct in Latin America. 2
Carpentier, however, goes further, pointing out that the course of European 
music emerges from a certain Reason (at one moment even suggesting the term 
‘dialectical’). On the other hand, the Latin American composer - Carpentier’s 
example is Heitor Villa-Lobos - appears spontaneously, without precedent, 
without necessity. In this argument, historical spontaneity, the marker of a 
historicity proper to Latin America, is the result of the conceptual duality of the 
native and the imported. Every musical product which is not simply in Latin 
American but of Latin America confronts this duality and rehearses the conflict 
between them. Ruled by the dualism, Latin American music history is denied 
historical necessity and closure. The divide that rules musical development at the 
level of history also determines the structure and meaning of music at the level of 
the individual composition. Whatever the role of ‘nationalism’ or ‘folklore’ in a 
Latin American work, “se percibe siempre un dejo nacional, más o menos 
marcado, tras del medio de expresión escogido.” This is not strictly speaking a 
formal observation: “En partituras al parecer ‘cosmopolitas’ por el aspecto 
!2
!  Alejo Carpentier, “América Latina en la confluencia de coordenadas históricas y su repercusión 1
en la música” in Isabel Aretz, ed. América Latina en su música (México D. F.: Siglo XXI, 1977), p. 
8.
exterior, corre sangre de tal o cual país de nuestro continente. Es, aquí, un modo 
de usar la percusión; es, allá, el impulso rítmico; es, más allá, el asomo de una 
escala, de una cadencia característica, de una sonoridad peculiar; o bien, el 
‘collage’ revelador, la índole del trazo, el humorismo del decir, la melancolía de 
un clima.”   Lest one mistake this as positing some kind of essence for Latin 2
American music, a special substance working behind the scenes of history to lend 
coherence to a musical repertory, it is worth recalling that it is precisely a lack of 
coherence that Carpentier is attempting to highlight. Unable to decide its 
constitutive conceptual dialectic, Latin American music cannot help but bear the 
trace of being, somehow, out of place. 
 What makes Carpentier a particularly valuable source is that unlike nearly 
all other writers on this subject, he presents the material in question in terms of a 
philosophy of history. He is not simply concerned with a reconstruction of past 
events for its own sake, but the conceptual mechanisms of art in history which 
have repercussions in multiple registers. In doing this, he finds himself in a line 
of thinking about art that has its roots in a philosophical tradition going back to 
German Romanticism. While he is far less ambitious than Schelling in his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Art of Hegel in his Lectures on Aesthetics, the key 
move made in both of these grander tomes is the same, namely, the separation of 
the work of art from the concepts individual works both employ and determine. 
Just as there is a difference between Greek tragedies and the tragic, or between 
the Bildungsroman and the bourgeois subject, there is a distinction to be made 
!3
!  Ibid. p. 9.2
between Latin American compositions and an opposition and identity, proper to 
coloniality, of the native and the imported. The mining of artworks, in all their 
materiality, for conceptual determination is just what signals a philosophy of 
history of art. 
 The present project follows in this tradition, but by virtue of the 
peculiarities of the subject matter, must distinguish itself at the level of method. 
Taking seriously Carpentier’s insistence that Latin American music does not 
determine, nor is determined by, a single developing concept such as the tragic, 
but rather by a conceptual opposition/identification constantly rehearsed in 
various guises, what follows is not a successive history. Rather, I pick up specific 
episodes in the history of Latin American music and distill the conceptual 
dynamic at play. In this way, I hope to make better understood, not just the stuff 
of Latin American music, but something of its stakes and meaning. 

 This chapter stands apart in that it lays out a theoretical thesis about the 
historical progress and nature of the conceptual duet in effect - “que rige” in 
Carpentier’s language - in Latin American music history. Building on the 
commitments of nationalism in the region, I outline a theoretical matrix that ties 
the contradictions of regional dependency to the historical possibility of 
conceptual determination. Multiple dialectical pairs manifest themselves in what 
follows: national particularity/cultural universality, folk modality/Western 
tonality, place/space, center/periphery, independence/dependence. By treating 
all as versions of one another and of Carpentier’s contradictory logic of the native 
!4
and the imported, I avoid positing a ‘master’ dialectic from which the rest follow 
genetically, as it were. The point is to shed light on the aporetic structure of Latin 
American music history as such. The New World specificity of the aesthetic is 
found in precisely the constituent gap(s) in this structure. 

The Stakes of Musical Nationalism 
 In a Forward written for the 1972 edition of his 1945 Music of Latin 
America, still the most ambitious English-language monograph on the topic, 
Nicolas Slonimsky lamented the passing away of musical nationalism in Latin 
America: “Just as adolescent Americans of European national extractions feel 
reluctant to use the language of their parents, many young Latin American 
composers, having tested the intellectual wine of avant-garde techniques, 
abandoned their national allegiance in favor of more refined, more scientific 
cosmopolitan trends.”   For the Russian musician, turning away from national 3
rootedness “disregards the loss of collective originality and the concomitant 
increase of stylistic entropy inherent in the abdication of national art.” “Even 
when a Latin American composer exploits ethic resources,” he continues, “native 
melorhythms become morphologically or topologically altered, resulting in a 
coded message which can be deciphered only by obtaining the key to these latter-
day enigma variations.” Slonimsky’s disappointment could be chalked up to 
conservative taste if, indeed, his taste was conservative. His concert tour of Latin 
America that inspired the book included a performance of Schoenberg’s Op. 33a 
!5
 ! Nicolas Slonimsky, Music of Latin America (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), p. ii-iii.3
at every stop. He partially credits himself with giving the foreign musicians he 
met on his trip that intoxicating ‘taste of avant-garde techniques.’ There is more 
than a little irony in a Russian émigré to the United States on tour in South 
America writing with disdain of cosmopolitanism. 
 There is, however, sense to be made of Slonimsky’s sentiments. The 
cultivation of ‘scientific,’ international music in the developing world forecasted 
the exhaustion of the bourgeois nationalist project as such. A great deal had 
changed in the region since the end of the Second World War. The form 
nationalism had taken since the nineteenth century had given way to its socialist 
counterpart from Santiago de Cuba to Santiago de Chile. The threat of Soviet 
influence in the Americas had become received wisdom for politicians in the 
United States and it was by that point undeniable that the battlegrounds of the 
Cold War were to be found in countries like Guatemala and Nicaragua. In sum, 
the nationalism that Slonimsky was so excited by in the 1940’s was now hard to 
distinguish from a fantasy of the hotel gift shop. Some of the heads of state he 
takes great pride in meeting or communicating with while in the region were long 
deposed or overthrown by the early 1970’s. While he does not say so explicitly, 
the aging pianist’s reflections strongly imply that the project he undertook three 
decades earlier had inadvertently taken stock of a relatively brief moment in 
music history, one that had evaporated because the concepts it relied on for its 
intelligibility - national essence, authentic primitivism, bourgeois cultural 
autonomy - had either been discredited or made irrelevant. 
!6
 It is, in fact, as largely unintelligible that musical nationalism presents 
itself today. Slonimsky’s concerns appear quaint at best. It is not simply that few, 
if any, composers today consciously attempt to bring about a distinctly Mexican, 
or Peruvian, or Chilean art music: the impetus can no longer really be felt. What 
compelled such an ideal is mysterious; and this is so even while the nation-state 
persists and continues to throw off cultural avatars. Globalization has won out 
over the force of nationalism in contemporary music. 
 There is, therefore, some recovery work to be done. Nationalism, while not 
in any sense presently absent, no longer enjoys normative force in Latin 
American art music (the “world music” market being a wholly different matter). 
This is to say that it can no longer be the kind of reason for composition it was for 
most of the last century. Nationalism is also no longer an obviously legitimate 
standard by which to judge a composition. The term is far from meaningless, but 
its referent’s meaningfulness is changed. At issue is musical nationalism’s 
amounting to something, mattering. And to the extent that a concept’s mattering 
is a part of that concept, musical nationalism itself is changed, perhaps even 
decayed. As such, recovering the concept involves an archeology in the sense of 
ἀρχή, origin and power. First, the concept of nationalism proper has be to 
isolated and then explicated with respect to its manifestation in Latin America. 
Second, nationalism has to be framed as an aesthetic problem so that it might tell 
us something about music. 
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Nationalism as Modern 
 Perhaps the most important thing to point out about nationalism is its 
modernity. In Eric Hobsbawm’s view, it is “the basic characteristic of the modern 
nation and everything connected with it.”   The concept as well as the ideas and 4
practices commonly associated with it are all of relatively recent vintage. This is a 
fact necessarily denied by nationalism itself. Nations present themselves as 
quintessential first causes, inherently reducible to essential properties and 
underwritten by substance outside of history. There will always, it has been said, 
be an England. While it is rather easy to deny that today’s nations, often simply 
conflated with nation-states, are somehow metaphysically substantial, it is 
significantly harder to pinpoint the historical birth of the nation. To some extent, 
it depends on what the historian’s criteria for nationhood are. The candidates, 
however, are all modern: German Romanticism, the French Revolution, the 
English Civil War, and of course, Latin American independence.   In terms of 5
temporal position alone, then, nationalism’s modernity is secure. The nations 
recognizable as such are native to a world after the breakdown of absolutism and 
under the sway of political and economic liberalism. 
 It is, in fact, only in the terms that classical liberalism describes that 
contemporary nationalism can be interpreted. The sovereignty of the individual is  
grafted onto groups. The multiple aspects of a nation that are called on to stand 
in for its identity, whether linguistic or geographical, cultural or political, are 
!8
4 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 14.
5 I have borrowed this list from Craig J. Calhoun, Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997).
aspects of an object assumed to exist independently of these groups. Ernest 
Renan makes this point in his celebrated essay on the nation concept: “A nation 
is a soul, a spiritual principle.”   With a national soul comes unity and 6
independence. Actually existing political independence is nothing without its 
spiritual principle. He goes on to write that “the nation, like the individual, is the 
culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacrifice, and devotion.”   Nations have 7
something like personal histories. A world of nations is a world of peoples and 
places existing in themselves and apart from others, just as individuals ideally do 
in Smith and Ricardo’s Robinsonades. 
 This brings us up against the most significant aspect of nationalism’s 
modernity for our purposes: its relation to the principle of autonomy. Indeed, 
nationalism is just a special kind of autonomy, one that extends beyond the 
individual person. Arguably the most influential recent analysis of nationalism’s 
concept is offered by Benedict Anderson. He defines nationalism as the 
reproduction of the nation and the nation as an “imagined community.”   He 8
emphasizes three features. The first is the ideal nature of nationalism: it is 
“imagined.” By this, Anderson does not mean to downplay the “reality” of the 
nation or nationalism, but rather means to distinguish it from a concrete 
interpersonal relationship. “All communities larger than primordial villages of 
face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” in Anderson’s sense. 
!9
!  Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha (London: 6
Routledge, 1990).
!  Ibid., p. 19.7
!  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 8
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1982), p. 6-7.
The key feature of imagining here is its ability to conceive of generalities. Specific 
instances that are encountered in practical situations can through the 
imagination be understood in terms of their kind. To the extent that nationalism 
has normative force, this aspect is essential. The second feature Anderson 
mentions is that of limitedness. All nations are communal, but they are 
nonetheless necessarily particular. “No nation,” he writes, “imagines itself 
coterminous with mankind.” Nationhood is a kind, but not an only kind. If this is 
true, then the concept of the nation is in troubling contradiction with itself. It 
cannot both be substantial and relative. As will be demonstrated throughout what 
follows, this is precisely the contradiction that drives the history of nationalism. 
Anderson’s last structural feature is nationalism’s communal character. It’s parts 
- the persons of the nation - are homogenous inasmuch as they are of the nation. 
Nations are interpersonal rather than personal, to be sure, but Anderson is right 
to highlight the abstraction at work here. Nations depend on having members, 
but not on specific members. There is no member, for example, without whom 
the nation would disappear. In fact, the disappearance of the Spanish king into 
Napoleon’s custody was used as a justification by Latin American advocates of 
independence for removing authority to the ‘people’ of the various prospective 
nation-states.   9
 We can now take from Anderson’s three features our own set of conceptual 
determinants. The nation is both “imagined” and a “community,” and both of 
!10
!  Enrique Dussel insists that this political move represents one of Spanish America’s first 9
contributions to philosophy.
these are abstractions. The nation’s being “limited” names its particularity. 
Nationalism, then, is a particularizing abstraction and, therefore, intriguingly 
paradoxical. 
 If above is found a brief analysis of nationalism as an ideology, its 
complement would treat of nationalism’s material and social efficient causes and 
contexts. Ernest Gellner interprets the relationship among nationalism’s ideas 
and its, in this case economic, material context as one of strict determination: 
We do not understand the range of options available to industrial 
society, and perhaps we never shall; but we understand some of its 
essential concomitants. The kind of cultural homogeneity 
demanded by nationalism is one of them, and we had better make 
our peace with it. It is not the case [...] that nationalism imposes 
homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, 
inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the 
form of nationalism.   10
Gellner’s position derives from his analysis of the growth of industrial societies 
from agricultural ones. The diversity found in the latter must be stamped out in 
order to fulfill the economic needs of the former. It is economic determinism 
rather pure and simple. He even refers to a ‘surface,’ which is his analog for 
Marxist ‘superstructure.’ 
 There are good reasons to distance ourselves from Gellner on this point as 
Anderson and others explicitly do. There is, however, a kernel of truth to his 
conclusion. Nationalism is a bourgeois phenomenon. This is not to say that only 
the industrial bourgeoisie authentically supported or benefited from ideological 
nationalism; in fact, it was often a powerful tool of Left populism. The point is, 
!11
!  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 40.10
rather, that only with the emergence of the capitalist world could nationalist 
ideology take on its form. A Lukacsian move is required to avoid Gellner’s 
conclusion without dismissing his insight. Without either ideology or economics 
determining the other as if from outside, we can understand these as parts of a 
whole. They are as complementary parts of a unified historical movement. The 
conceptual framework of ideology, however contradictory or apparently counter-
factual, only exists inasmuch as it is socially effective and can refer to the material 
world of natural things. Nationalism is mediated by the people, geography and 
languages it pulls into its framework. The character of each nationalism is 
marked by this mediation. French nationalism is nothing without its bourgeois 
revolution and Russian nationalism disintegrates without its historical rural 
peasantry. At the same time, without the ideological frame, none of the brute 
matter of the national holds together as itself. The Russian rural peasant becomes 
nothing but a rural peasant and rather abstract. 
 It is already clear from this crude example that the bourgeois character of 
nationalism is not seen in its ability to give meaning to the decidedly capitalist 
aspects of the world. An immense diversity of things is interpreted in terms of 
their national status. Indeed, in principle, all things are susceptible to this 
interpretation. It is often pre-capitalist life that is held as typically national. Think 
here of the characteristic novel. The justificatory nature of nationalism is 
ultimately its reflection of bourgeois life. The national grounds aspects of social 
life in terms of a purposive relation to a concept. In other words they are given 
something like final causes. The need for this justification arises from the 
!12
fragmentation of a preexisting and hitherto undisputed order of things. With the 
rise of capitalist society and its ideological counterpart, the European 
Enlightenment, autonomous justification became a pressing concern. With 
Lukacs, we read this transformation as a result of the alienation endemic to the 
commodity form.   Emergent with capitalism is the making commensurate of 11
naturally distinct things: this yardage of linen for so many bushels of wheat, this 
much work for this much bread. This requires the introduction of a third thing 
common to both objects, inherent in them such that it can be made a point of 
contact between them. The good Marxist knows this as value.   Each potential 12
commodity has a value and this quality must, in turn, be made quantitative such 
that exchange can occur. The labor theory of value classically holds this to be 
“socially necessary labor time.” 
 Noteworthy is the abstraction here. The natural thing is divorced from a 
part of itself and bound with another. Commodities, however, cannot be traded at 
their value. If one does not dispense with the labor theory, then there are no 
meta-valuative criteria with which to decide on a price. Who is to decide in an 
instant, and for every instant, what the socially necessary labor time required to 
produce any given product is? Price, then, the particular, cannot accurately 
reflect value, or at least can only do so accidentally. This is the gesture of 
particularization. Particularization here is, as it is in nationalism, expressive and 
necessarily unsatisfactory. It is always open to doubt in a way the simple concept 
!13
!  The obvious reference here is to Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney 11
Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971).
!  The labor theory of value as a model for the abstractive nature of commodities is most clearly 12
articulated by Marx in the Grundrisse.
of value cannot be without exchange itself collapsing. Unsatisfactoriness and 
doubt will be seen below to be at the heart of the properly aesthetic problem of 
nationalism. For the moment, though, the argument above is meant to show that 
the ideological structure of nationalism at its most basic theoretical level is 
reflective and expressive of an economic reality ‘on the ground,’ as it were. 
Gellner is right in pointing out the bearing of the material on nationalism even if 
the material is not so clearly divorced from the conceptual as it at first seems it 
ought to be. Commodities, like nations, are constituted by ideas along with iron, 
wood, flags, and standing armies. 
 To be clear, the universalization/particularization scheme sketched here 
does not come with any metaphysical or even partly transhistorical baggage. The 
breach between universal categories and the utterly specific material of life is 
specific to capitalist modernity just as the categories used to explicate it are. 

Latin American Nationalism and Aesthesis 
 The story so far would seem to complicate the assertion found in Anderson 
and here that Latin American nationalism is prior to other forms, not only 
chronologically (although there is a strong argument to be made here) but 
conceptually, which is to say that it is paradigmatic for nationalism as such. After 
all, if there is a theme to historiography of Latin America from the eighteenth 
century until today it is the idea of persistence: things have a way of remaining in 
effect. The historian Jeremy Adelman has, indeed, named this ‘the problem of 
!14
persistence.’   Social and historical theses from the Black Legend that allowed 13
eighteenth century British propagandists to frame their neo-colonial incursions 
into the Spanish American market as emancipatory to current accounts of Latin 
American underdevelopment have stressed the backward colonial legacy that 
persisted after the formation of independent states in the region. If it is the case 
that the ideology of nationalism is tied to the rise of capital and the effects of the 
Enlightenment, then Latin America could only have belatedly inherited it. The 
region, after all, yoked by its imperfectly overcome feudalism and Catholic 
stubbornness, anachronistically stood behind European advancement. A 
relatively recent trend in Latin American historiography essentially takes this 
view. It has broken with the once unquestioned account of the wars of 
independence of the start of the nineteenth century and their legacy through to 
the twentieth. An account that concentrated on individual heroes (eg. the 
libertadores San Martín and Bolívar) and a radical break from colonial life and 
politics has been gradually replaced by a narrative that highlights the continuities 
between pre- and post-liberation America.    14
 What is it, though, that is meant to have persisted, and to continue to 
persist? If it is merely a matter of retarded industrialization, then there is an 
argument to be made. Beyond that, however, the matter is far more complicated. 
The thesis that much of Latin America remained feudal after Independence is far 
!15
!  See Jeremy Adelman, ed. Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American 13
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from certain. Indeed, dependency theorists since the 1960’s and 70’s have 
frustrated this claim.   There is no doubt that Latin America participated in the 15
global economic system since its inception. This, of course, is the economic 
meaning of colonialism. That participation was as capitalist as the global system 
in which it formed an essential part. It’s peripheral status hardly changes this. 
Independence did not alter the framework of society overnight, but it did form 
part of the historical emergence of capitalism. And economic modernity is only 
one part of a broader modernity, one whose progress encompasses scientific, 
political and cultural avatars. This progress was, of course, uneven, but not 
always to the disadvantage of the New World states. As has recently been argued, 
if republican modernity - the formation of modern representational government 
as the most rationalized and Enlightened kind of government - is seen as a 
particular kind of modernity, then the Americas can be understood to have been a 
vanguard of progress.   This is certainly how some nineteenth-century lettered 16
intellectuals conceived their political situation. As Sander writes: 
While Europe was embarking on its second great wave of imperial 
conquest, creating colonialism that would define dominant visions 
of modernity until this day, [Mexican liberals after fighting off the 
French invasion] proposed a countermodernity that rejected the 
right of power and equations of civilization with violence. [...] 
Linked with this denunciation of force was a conception of 
modernity in the international arena that downplayed economic, 
technological, and cultural accomplishments in favor of moral and 
political benchmarks.   17
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Rather than take on the separation of economic, technological, and cultural 
modernity from their republican cousin, we might understand each of these 
‘kinds’ of modernity as having been unevenly distributed. This unevenness, 
though, gave priority to Spanish America in the development of republican nation 
states. 
 Each American nationalism, however, traversed its own path to self-
determination. If, as argued above, all nationalisms depend on the creation of 
universal abstractions that form the basis of belonging, then they also include a 
moment at which they are expressed in the form of particular, non-contingent 
elements in the ‘external’ world. Nations have to be seen and felt, not just 
thought. This is the force of the concretion in particularity, which introduces the 
problem of aesthesis. It is in this sense that we ought to understand the nation 
and its attendant nationalism as an aesthetic problem. The arts, of course, are 
only one kind of answer to the need for an aesthetic component to nationalism. It 
was, however, an important and indispensable component. Its fate is what 
ultimately concerns us here. In the spirit of the concrete, then, we can turn to an 
example. It will lead us to see that the aesthetic problem of nationalism in Latin 
America turns on a certain geography and thereby suggests its own analytic 
frame. 

The Musics Themselves 
 In 1926, the Chilean composer Carlos Isamitt Alarcón found himself in the 
Salle Pleyel. He was nearing forty, but still at the beginning of his creative 
!17
development. It would take him another decade to find his way to 12-tone 
technique and garner some fame as the first of his countrymen to adopt the 
method. Like so many Latin American musicians, he had crossed the Atlantic to 
catch up to history and escape the belatedness that was presumed to characterize 
the cultural development of his half of the New World. It was in this historical 
‘present’ of inter-war Paris that Isamitt encountered the work of his former 
composition teacher, Pedro Humberto Allende. He related the story in a journal 
article years later: 
El delicioso pianista, ligado a la gloria de Debussy y Ravel, Ricardo 
Viñes ejecutó cuatro Tonadas de Allende en un programa de obras 
modernas de Hindemith, Rosenthal, Trépard, Ferrond, Fairchild y 
Koechlin. Creo haber sido el único chileno entre la asistencia 
repleta de aquella sala y también la única persona que no batió 
palmas al finalizar la ejecución de las Tonadas. Mi atención estuvo 
dedicada a captar los menores aspectos de la reacción espontánea 
del público hacia esas obras tan singularmente nuestras.   18
The image is a striking one. An applauding public all looking toward the stage 
and a lone figure, a foreigner, staring back at them in rapt attention, attempting 
to make out their spontaneous reactions. His reminiscence makes it clear that he 
perceives the Chilean tonada as away from home. It is a folk artifact on display. 
In this way it resembles the stuff of colonial expositions, the kind that allowed 
Debussy to hear Indonesian gamelan and Gilbert and Sullivan to fantasize about 
Japanese mikados. At the same time, he is one of the elites invited to witness this 
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exotic cultural item. The result is paradoxical. Indeed, he tells the story in the 
context of an article about Allende. It is marshaled as evidence that the latter had 
struck upon authentic musical modernity with his chamber tonadas. That 
modernity carries all the weight of what he himself calls “el camino de la 
universalidad.” (“the road to universality”). 
 A number of issues appear to require further elaboration if they are to be 
taken at all seriously. For example, how are we to understand the status of a 
musical piece that is at once self-consciously particular to a given place and 
paving a road to universality? What kind of modernity does Isamitt have in mind 
when he associates it so closely with universality? And what kind of universality 
might it be that it linked to modernity? Is that universality merely temporal or 
does it carry spatial and global geographical implications? 
 It would be altogether too easy to dismiss Isamitt’s comments here as 
exaggeration. He is not, of course, an unbiased critic of his teacher’s legacy. Still, 
how he chose to praise Allende is not arbitrary. In addition, the stakes of 
universality and modernity in music are hardly low. Both have strong 
consequences for music’s very intelligibility. Isamitt was no doubt well aware of 
this when he turned around in the concert hall that night. The applause had 
confirmed something about the music. As we have seen, however, that something 
is far from obvious. 
 A closer look at the pieces in question might shed some light. Allende’s 
Doce tonadas de carácter popular chileno are a set of twelve two-part 
compositions for piano solo. Each is in its own key and the keys are arranged 
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sequentially, an overt reference to Bach’s Well-tempered Clavier.   An image that 19
accompanied their Sénart publication illustrates the intent. 
 
There is, therefore, an implicit association made between Bach’s prelude and 
fugue forms and the Chilean tonada. 
 The tonada refers to a wide range of musical forms in Chile. The earliest 
usage of the term occurs during the colonial period, when it referred to song in 
general. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the term takes on a more 
specific meaning. For Allende, it would have referred to a strophic song form 
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whose duple guitar accompaniment contrasted with a triple meter in the voice. 
Tonadas of this type are harmonically simple, rarely moving further afield than 
the subdominant. They are also bipartite, consisting of a slow and a fast section 
often in contrasting modes, a feature Allende used to his advantage. The tonadas 
that appear in this set pit a slow section in minor against a fast section in major. 
In this way, Allende is able to get to all twelve major and minor keys. The melodic 
line in the right hand is often doubled in thirds - a reference to folk performance 
practice - but all harmonic simplicity is enriched by chromaticism throughout. 
Finally, the meter shifts often, not just from piece of piece, but over the course of 
each tonada. The effect, however, is often something like notated rubato. 
Asymmetrical signatures are here employed to give the pianist a great deal of 
metrical freedom. The form Allende employs gives him the freedom he requires 
to explore a wide variety of developmental models while maintaining formal 
consistency. 
 With its pliable structure, Allende makes his music into an argument. It is 
as an argument that we should understand the Doce tonadas. They are, like their 
Baroque progenitors, elements of a proof, at once empirical and theoretical.   20
Allende composed them over a seven-year period (1915-1922) while he was trying 
his hand at a number of other formal experiments. There is the cello concerto of 
1915 and a movement in sonata form from the next year. Both of these were 
attempts to master classical European forms. He even sent the former to 
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Debussy, who made minor corrections to the instrumentation. At the same time, 
Allende was busy composing pieces such as La voz de las calles (1920), which 
attempted to pin down the contours of a specifically Chilean musical language 
based on the sound world of everyday life in the rural central valley. Doce 
tonadas is the result of an antiquarian interest on Allende’s part. From about the 
middle of the nineteenth century onward, the tonada had escaped the attention of 
Chile’s emergent urban letrados. The distinctly Hispanic song form was displaced 
by melodies from Italian operas, the kind Chileans elites would have increasing 
access to throughout this period. By the time Allende took up the tonada, it had 
ceased to be of anything but nostalgic interest, and cultivated solely among rural 
musicians. It was this very distance from contemporary interest that gave the 
tonada its Chilean particularity. Allende’s pianistic attempt, then, is a synthesis of 
the peculiarly Chilean and the classically European, the particular and the 
universal. 
 The synthesis is not a mere graft. The Bachian model is not slapped onto a 
character set featuring a stylized regional song form. The major/minor duality is 
an element proper to the tonada itself. The gesture Allende makes is to bring that 
formal feature to the surface of the music. By thematizing a formal element and 
allowing it to be the basis of the organizational structure of the set, its 
particularity dissolves into a figure of musical coherence in general. This is just 
one of a host of abstractions. Mode - and, through mode, key - is abstracted. The 
removal of the voice forces the vocal, narrative genre into self-reference. The 
replacement of the guitar by the piano severs the form from the timbral world of 
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its traditional performance. The effort is one of development. The musical 
elements latent in the tonada’s structure are made tangible. The ‘absolute’ in 
Chilean folk music had only to be unlocked to be heard. 
 Another tool in this process is music writing. This is the abstracting 
gesture par excellence. As ethnomusicologists are quick to point out, inscription 
implicitly assumes that the music being transcribed is amenable to graphic 
representation. This is, arguably, far from the case when confronted with music 
that is native to a purely oral tradition. With the tonada, folk performers have no 
need of music literacy and there is every reason to assume that the narrative 
structure of the form points to the general illiteracy of its intended audience. That 
said, the tonada is the result of Spanish colonial musical culture in which music 
maintained its identity in notation. 
 What links these forms of abstraction is not the way in which they go 
about altering a model, but the way they assume the preexistence of a model to be 
altered. The treatment of tonality in the set is paradigmatic. The reference to 
Bach is, no doubt, in some sense historical. It is also the case that common 
practice tonality (to the extent it can be unproblematically identified at all) is a 
historical development and not immediately thrown up by Nature herself. 
Allende’s work, however, treats cyclic, tonal harmonic organization as an 
ahistorical foundation. The ‘historical’ nod to the Baroque is made, then, in 
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abnegation of History. It almost goes without saying that this is hardly a unique 
position, but the theoretical gesture concerning tonality par excellence.   21
 The status of the Tonadas vis à vis universality appears ambiguous. The 
folk form, a particular, is at once transformed and maintained in abstraction. It 
challenges us to hear its specificity as demonstrating the terms by which all music 
achieves intelligibility. After all, the very title of the set has an ‘Other’ in mind. At 
the same time, the universality Allende’s piece mobilizes becomes particularized. 
The tonada provides roots to the abstraction. The composition can be read as 
interpreting the cold ‘realities’ of tempered tonality as always already elements of 
folk culture, even if not a specifically Hispano-American one. What we are left 
with is a universal-particular, which is equally a particular-universal. The 
ambiguity is unresolvable and the order of the terms determines how the 
meaning of the work is interpreted. The dissatisfaction this result inspires might 
be behind Isamitt’s contention that Allende was merely on the road to the 
universal - he interprets it as a universal-particular. For all its ingenious 
technique and thought provoking self-referentiality, these tonadas are not able to 
resolve the deep aporias of Latin American music on their own. 
 It might be objected at this point that an illegitimate leap has been made. 
A given work in all its contingent finitude can hardly be expected to yield a key to 
‘the deep aporias of Latin American music.’ In fact, it is not clear that they might 
contain very much beyond themselves. Any claim that this music has to 
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autonomy is certainly falsified if its intelligibility depends on cultural debates 
outside of even its own extra-musical references. Furthermore, as the idea that 
there might be degrees of universality as seemingly suggested by Isamitt is, on 
the face of it, an absurdity, we could be encouraged to simply throw out the issue 
in the name of modesty. Over-ambition, scholars often warn us, is a danger in 
itself. There is also the problem of weak hermeneutics. Allende’s Bach reference 
could be used to read this piece as in some sense argumentative, but certainly this 
practice only goes so far. There are no obvious criteria we can hold on to in order 
to keep us from reading too much into the music. It is just music, after all. 
 All these objections share a set of unexpressed assumptions about musical 
ontology. Taking the very objectivity of the concept for granted, music is allowed 
to flit about unharmed in the negative space between subjective experience and 
history. Its aesthetic autonomy depends on the indeterminacy of this space. 
Music is reified, in the sense given to this term by Lukacs - it is a thing. If this is 
assumed, the process by which music became a thing is impossible to see. If all 
assumptions about the ontology of music are abandoned, and the concept is 
sought in the slow labor of history, then nothing of its substance escapes 
mutability. The analysis above was not interested in what Allende’s music 
expressed. This model for hermeneutics uncritically assumes the division of form 
and content. The Doce tonadas are interesting precisely for how they pose the 
question of form and content. The dichotomy is present, but as part of the work’s 
historical burden. By foregrounding form, Allende collapses it into content. He 
does not, however, eliminate the dualism. It is, rather, transformed, or sublated. 
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What Isamitt heard in Paris and what we witness in the score is a historical 
breakdown of previously naturalized musical categories. It is at once the moment 
when they become most relevant, and the moment of their crisis. 
 It is in this vein that we return to the dichotomy of universality and 
particularity. The manner in which this duality is posed and transformed in the 
music must be read as part of a historical process. It is in this way that it achieves 
significance. Allende’s contingent piece, then, is not interpreted per se, but 
understood as a moment in the history of Latin America’s self-understanding. 
Even when music self-consciously claims its autonomy from history (here, in the 
form of universality), history returns to claim autonomy as one of its moments. 
As Adorno might put it, given that musical works ‘precipitate historical relations.’ 
He reminds us that “the unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as 
immanent problems of form.”   Understanding the inner work of a set of piano 22
pieces, then, is a means of confronting the most general socio-historical 
antinomies, perhaps even a privileged means. 
 What Allende’s composition furnishes us with is a position from which to 
approach at least part of what is at stake in Latin American musical aesthetics: 
the question of universality versus particularity is a version of the geographical 
question of centrality versus peripherality. Both of these dichotomies are at work 
in the tonadas inasmuch as the music thematizes its own identity. Following 
guideposts found in the archive, then, we might start working through the 
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geographical meaning of Latin America in order to evaluate its use as a category 
before going on to place aesthetics - and, in particular, musical aesthetics - within 
it. Geography, after all, is what helps map centers and peripheries. It, however, is 
given to grand speculation, so to speak, even in its claims to the concrete - 
oceans, mountains, territories, regions, continents, and so on. 

Speculative Geography 
 A long tradition has it that Latin America is a periphery opposed  - and 
made meaningful only in its opposition - to a (neo-)colonial metropolis. From the 
moment of discovery, the region’s essence has been variously interpreted as a 
treasure chest open to plunder, a virgin world ripe with possibilities, a 
decolonized dependency. No process of decolonization on the continent was able 
to make Catholic Ibero-America into an entity wholly unto itself. Even when, in 
the post-Independence era, lettered intellectuals sought to forge a discourse of 
national belonging, they could not abandon an external, inevitably European 
position from which to do so. As was the case in the Allende example, music in 
the region bares what Antonio Candido called - with respect to literature - a 
“placental link” to its European parent.   The challenge is to understand 23
peripherality as more than just a natural fact or a banal, if devastating, socio-
economic reality. This is to say that there is a ‘meaning’ to Latin America’s 
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peripheral status. In an effort to unpack this meaning, we can pilfer from an 
existing tradition. 
 In a ground-breaking work from 1958, the Heideggerian Mexican 
intellectual Edmundo O’Gorman sought to debase the myth that America had 
been ‘discovered.’ He held it had, rather, been invented. America represented a 
set of newly forged discursive constructs that were hardly waiting out on the 
other side of the Atlantic for European Man to happen upon “one fine day in 
1492.” Further, this invention constituted a key stage in the Enlightenment of the 
West. America becomes in O’Gorman another name for the Copernican Turn, 
indeed, for the humanist conception of responsibility itself. “For this story [of the 
discovery],” he writes “is the first episode in the liberation of man from his 
cosmic prison, from his ancient servitude and impotence [...] American man was 
the new Adam.”   The force of discovering a New World was to cause a reflective 24
reaction on the part of its discoverers. Suddenly positioned face to face with a 
wholly new and unexpected negation, Europe could not help but re-discover 
itself. 
 However convincing one finds O’Gorman’s talk of new Adams and 
European progress, his key insight is that the continent is not a mere geographic 
reality, but an event in the history of Reason. The discovery is revealed to be the 
first scene in a speculative process. His work points us toward developing a 
speculative geography from which reified spatial positions are derived. As 
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O’Gorman’s extensive discussions of early modern map-making demonstrates, 
objective geographical knowledge was shot through with the content of a cultural 
struggle over the identity of Europe’s others. And as with any struggle over 
otherness, the stakes are ultimately over the possibility of satisfied selfhood. 
 While there exists after O’Gorman a Heideggerian tradition that seeks the 
Being of America, more recent work has taken up the problem of the 
philosophical identity of the region from a Hegelian perspective. This comes as 
something of a surprise. After all, it is undoubtedly the case that negatively citing 
Hegel in a discussion of Latin America is a commonplace, even a cliché.   He is 25
used as a foil against which to measure the extent to which an argument avoids 
Eurocentrism. No doubt, there are damning passages about the Americas to be 
found in Hegel; especially so in his lectures on the philosophy of history. The 
Americas are given harsh treatment: 
America is a new, feeble, powerless world. Lions, tigers, and 
crocodiles are feebler there than in Africa, and the same is true of 
human beings. The original inhabitants of the West Indies have 
died out. [...] Those who assert themselves there and sense the need 
for independence are Creoles, just like those in the Free States.   26
Allowing these judgments alone to stand in for an argument against basing a 
philosophical approach to Latin America on Hegelianism is altogether rash. 
Dismissive direct commentary on the weakness of America can be countered with 
elements in the structure of Hegel’s own thought. 
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 In fact, recent work by Susan Buck-Morss has gone some ways toward 
demonstrating the centrality of the American experience to Hegel’s concerns. In 
Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, Buck-Morss demonstrates that Hegel would 
have been well aware of the Haitian revolution and the conditions of slavery that 
existed on the island prior to it. With reference to the by now classic observation 
that all of the Enlightenment’s discourse against human enslavement existed at a 
time of brutal Western slavery, she argues that Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic 
addresses this disparity head-on. That passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit is 
both a moment in his developmental exploration of human subjectivity and an 
implicit philosophical description of actually existing slavery. 
 The consequences of her argument for geography are not fully articulated 
by Buck-Morss herself. She does, however, develop a concept of universal history 
that resists the well-known dangers of universalism. Her way around these is 
through a reevaluation of space for dialectics. “Universal humanity,” she writes, 
“is visible at the edges.” She goes on: 
There is no end to this project, only an infinity of connecting links, 
And if these are to be connected without domination, then the links 
will be lateral, additive, syncretic rather than synthetic. The project 
of universal history does not come to an end. It begins again, 
somewhere else.   27
The quotation points to the avoidance of bad universals by a perpetuation of the 
dialectical process. This process remains successive without being necessarily 
progressive. Most interesting, however, is her sense that such a non-totalizing 
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totality is to be found in geographical relationships. Space does not suffer from 
the binary (forward/backward) structure of time. History moves for Buck-Morss 
because it moves in space. In this model, the Wirklichkeit of the French 
Revolution is a geographically displaced Haitian Revolution. 
 A quick digression about what is meant by the proprietary term 
Wirklichkeit in the Hegelian tradition is in order. The word roughly translates as 
‘actuality,’ but is often - and I believe quite legitimately - rendered as ‘truth.’ If 
Hegel’s system is predicated on the necessary relationships among concepts not 
immediately recognized as being associated, this is an instance of that 
relationship. Not only is it the case over and over again in his dialectical 
demonstrations that the identity of concepts is based on the identity of that 
concept with its opposite (Being is identified with non-being, for example, in the 
opening gambit of the Science of Logic), but oppositions themselves reveal their 
identity with wholly other concepts (Being and non-being are at once each other 
and both present in becoming). Becoming is the Wirkichkeit of Being, its truth. In 
history the logic is akin to an unintended consequence that was nonetheless the 
only result possible: the French Revolution into the Terror, Kantian ethics into 
legalistic hard-heartedness, Christianity into secularism. These examples are all 
conceived in temporal terms. What Buck-Morss ultimately allows us to think is 
the disjuncture in union of this kind of ‘truth’ that manifests itself on a plane 
rather than a trajectory. Something like a non-teleological necessity can be 
conceived of for history. 
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 Allowing space to do some of the work of time in the Hegelian system 
represents a significant intervention. The way the Phenomenology is constructed, 
time is the medium in which the dialectic resonates. While there are references to 
various parts of Europe and Asia in which historical occurrences took place, 
geography is not itself an aspect of Hegel’s argument. Consciousness’s discovery 
of self-consciousness and self-consciousness’s discovery of spirit are all moments 
in a temporal process. The narrative of the book depends on a linear flow, even if 
that flow admits of some pauses and reversals. Hegel’s cryptic reference to his 
own time being one of ‘birth’ in the Preface further puts emphasis on the privilege 
bestowed on time in Hegel’s philosophy. Interpreting Hegel’s productive 
temporal displacements as potentially fully articulated in geographical difference, 
then, puts pressure on the predominant conception of his system, in which 
everything is subsumed into some zero-point of Absolute Knowing. Tensions can 
arise and be sublated laterally and there is in principle nothing that can prevent 
any given dialectical reversal from beginning again precisely where it started. 
 Following Buck-Morss’ account, the Americas become the space of 
radicality. The Wirklichkeit of a given European theoretical constellation 
manifests itself at the edges of Europe’s cultural sphere. In revealing itself there, 
it betrays itself. If Hegel calls the Americas the ‘land of the future,’ we might be 
encouraged to read him as making a strong claim about the speculative identity 
of time and space. The New World exists in a geographical relationship to Europe 
that serves as counterpart, or even a supplement in the Derridian sense, to the 
present’s own futurity. 
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 A robust version of this thesis is to be found in the work of Leopoldo Zea. 
In his extensive output, the Hegelian theme that finds prominence is that of the 
‘Unhappy Consciousness.’ This is the moment in the Phenomenology’s narrative 
that immediately succeeds the Master/Slave dialectic. Consciousness, after 
having garnered a basic form of self-consciousness in the pseudo-recognition of a 
Master, internalizes that mastery. Self-consciousness now worries constantly 
over its inability to live up to its own goals. The Unhappy Consciousness is 
something like that of the Ego with respect to the Superego in Freud. In fact, Zea 
refers to the condition of unhappiness in psychological terms: as guilt and 
disappointment. He writes: 
In spite of all his efforts, however, the Latin American cannot avoid 
comparison of his achievements with those of the world which 
serves him as a model. It is this unavoidable comparison which 
produces disappointment. The new masters, the new Latin 
American aristocracy, were not satisfied; although they tried hard, 
they did not feel like the people upon whom they model themselves. 
[...] They knew they were different, very different from the men who 
belonged to the old established aristocracy of the Peninsula. [..] 
Latin America began to be looked upon as a place of exile.   28
For Zea, geographic displacement, or exile, is the result of Europe’s encounter 
with the American Other. The colonized - in Hegel’s terms, enslaved - are 
condemned to rehearse their own difference as a lack. In Zea’s intellectual history 
of the continent, he demonstrates that Unhappy Consciousness is the motor of 
Latin America’s historical reflections. The region’s self-reflections never escape 
dissatisfaction, ever returning to a new confrontation with an internal master. 
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 The apparent stagnancy of Latin America’s quest for autonomy does not 
lead Zea into pessimism. As in Buck-Morss, the tragic hypocrisy of European 
Enlightenment ideals and the persistence of colonialism do not signal an end of 
history. The spatial logic both thinkers employ precludes such a fallacy. There is 
no moment into which History dissolves. No end of history can exist for the same 
reason that there can be no end of the world.   29
 Zea’s spatial dialectics leads him to interpret the Leftist movements of the 
second half of the twentieth century - from revolutionary Cuba to socialist, 
democratic Chile - in terms of a global process of self-consciousness that has 
independence as its goal. He insists that if any given Latin American movement 
refuses to instantiate the universal in its very particularity, it will fail to attain 
anything like freedom. Or, in the words of Che Guevara he cites at the opening of 
his Dialéctica de la conciencia americana: “La lucha en América adquirirá en su 
momento dimensiones continentales. Será escenario de muchas grandes batallas 
dadas por la humanidad para su liberación.”   We are back to the concepts of 30
universality and particularity, but this time they are given a more satisfying 
account. Particularity need not simply be found in a given place, but can be 
precisely what it means for a given place to be. The particularity of location, in 
turn, is inconceivable without its determinate negation: the universality of empty 
space. Zea’s hope for American emancipation depends on the possibility of the 
sublation of this opposition that would yield a fuller, more satisfying form of 
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universal space. For this, particularity has to reveal its internal universality. An 
artistic analog for this appears in the work we saw being carried out in Allende’s 
folk song experiment. As aspects of the genre’s particularity were manifested as 
structural elements of the set, the work points toward closing the gap between 
rough specificity and smooth generality. If one allows for the short circuit that 
sees a Chilean folk tune stand in for the dimension of place and Allende’s 
modernist abstraction take up the role of ‘empty’ space, the stakes of the 
composition become all the more clear and compelling: the tonadas in their 
Chilean emplaced particularity already contain the empty space that claims 
universality precisely with particularity as its negation. 

 The relationship between space and dialectics is itself part of a historical 
process. In the Critical Theory tradition, this has been largely ignored. Recent 
work by Carlo Galli bucks this trend. In his volume Political Spaces, he 
historicizes space itself, beginning with the ordering of space found in the Greek 
city-state and continuing on to the aporetic, failed identity of place and space in 
the modern nation state.   His argument reveals not just the historical, but the 31
political stakes of spatial dialectics. It is not just the location of history that is at 
issue, but the very status of location itself. The role of the Americas in his 
argument throws a great deal of light on its role in a speculative geography. The 
discovery, for him, was the moment when Europe ceased to be displaced from its 
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own origins. As Rémi Brague has argued, the Roman Empire found itself always 
already exiled from the harmonious unity of Greek ethical life.   The relationship 32
Western Europe had to its past before the Discovery was just as much an instance 
of Unhappy Consciousness as Latin America’s relationship to Western Europe 
after it. As a double figure of temporal alterity - both forgotten past and imminent 
future - America gave identity to Europe. That identity allowed for the invention, 
in strictly O’Gormian fashion, of modern center/periphery space. 
 The Brazilian Darcy Ribeiro gives this same narrative a materialist turn in 
The Americas and Civilization.   In that magisterial work, he gives an account of 33
the entry of the Americas into civilization. The Iberian invasion of America is 
here presented as a byproduct of the geographical extremes of European 
civilization turning to expansionist religious zealotry as a response to the 
Renaissance in central Europe. If the Renaissance brought an increased interest 
in humanist religious reform and empirical science in German- and Italian-
speaking territories, Russia and Spain mounted offenses against early modernity. 
Taking up the task of expelling impurities and restoring conservative order, the 
Peninsula expelled its Jews and dedicated itself to converting a foreign continent 
nearly simultaneously. The tremendous success of this salvationist legacy 
depended on its mercantilist logic. Far from establishing a new feudalism, Spain 
fostered a highly centralized bureaucratic empire whose lifeblood was the 
extraction of raw materials from colonial territories and the transference of those 
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materials to Spanish ports. The development seen on the continent during the 
colonial period was largely unintended. The city of Buenos Aires, for example, 
entirely depended on the silver mines in present-day Bolivia. The inefficiency of 
Spanish plunder sustained the city’s economy through the end of the eighteenth 
century. 
 This very process of colonial extraction created the conditions for the 
eventual dissolution of the mercantilist imperial project. Spain’s great success in 
pouring precious metals and other raw materials into the European economy 
allowed nascent capitalist enterprise to turn those commodities into capital. The 
Spanish state-run economy served as an ideal tool for what Marx called ‘primitive 
accumulation.’ As capital took over Europe with the birth of industry, the 
dependency of colonial and, indeed, post-colonial America remained in place. If 
anything it increased, as capital requires growth in order to sustain itself and that 
growth was never without spoliation. 
 This is the core of ‘dependency theory.’ The usefulness of this theory for 
our current project lies in the material basis it provides for understanding the 
emergence of a new kind of peripheral space. If the Discovery and Conquest was 
the geographical ground upon which Europe built its historical identity vis-à-vis 
its future, the political economy of the process led directly to it. Ribeiro has us 
read the entire development of underdevelopment in the Americas as at one with 
the advance of Europe. “We are faced,” he writes, “with divergent effects of a 
general civilizational process that manifests itself in some cases as stagnation and 
!37
regression and in others a development and progress.”   The unity in this 34
opposition is not only theoretically justified - we are dealing, after all, with a 
positive category and its determinate negation - but made materially present in 
history in the form of crises which affect the entire system. It is in the political 
and economic development of the region that we can locate the emergence of a 
geographical relationship of dependency and centrality. It goes almost without 
saying that centrality is equally dependent. It is, however, unable to admit its 
dependence. Perhaps this goes some way toward explaining Hegel’s refusal to 
allow for the productive difference of space even when he insisted on the same for 
time. 

 The network of writers gathered above, from O’Gorman to Galli, outline 
what we might call a tradition of thinking peripherality historically. This is to say 
that they demonstrate a way of thinking history as space. The center/periphery 
model is at once a result of a historical process and a means of interpreting it. 
What is left is to link this thought to the general problem of universality tout 
court. In order to be relevant to art, it is not enough to demonstrate the 
emergence of ‘universal,’ which is to say homogeneous and infinite, space, or to 
simply denounce it as European perversion but to map the relationship of this 
spatial organization to universality as such. Without this connection, it is not 
clear how it can become a problem for form, even if it has obvious bearing on the 
senses. 
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 The most important modern precedent for this thought is found in the late 
work of Edmund Husserl. In The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology and other works from the 1930’s, the 
phenomenologist constructed an extended historical genealogy for his own 
philosophy. He traced the concerns he found motivating his own work back to an 
originary Greek moment. He did this, however, by strictly separating from its 
Others the lineage he saw himself as completing from its Others. What was 
required was a conception of Western Philosophy that was not tied down to 
territory, indeed, a conception of ‘Europe’ that could not be reduced to 
measurable space. Husserl, therefore, insisted on a ‘spiritual Europe’ that 
transcended national boundaries. What united this spiritual entity was born in 
Greece. In Greece, 
there arises a new sort of attitude of individuals toward their 
surrounding world. And its consequence is the breakthrough of a 
completely new sort of spiritual structure, rapidly growing into a 
systematically self-enclosed cultural form; the Greeks called it 
philosophy. Correctly translated, in the original sense, that means 
nothing other than universal science, science of the universe, of the 
all-encompassing unity of all there is. Soon the interest in the All, 
and thus the question of the all-encompassing becoming and being 
in becoming, begins to particularize itself according to the general 
forms and regions of being, and thus philosophy, the one science, 
branches out into many particular sciences.   35
Spiritual Europe, then, is nothing other than the project of universal knowing. 
The techniques for abstraction developed by Greek philosophy and brought to 
mathematized rigor during the Renaissance are but moments in a trajectory that 
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makes good on the ability of human beings to perform infinite tasks. Of course, it 
is precisely this tendency that Husserl sees as threatening the West. The legacy of 
universality cuts both ways it would seem, undercutting the merits of its own 
venture with the methods it developed to accomplish it. All the same, this 
dialectic is internal to the spiritual space of Europe. “We,” he insists, “if we 
understand ourselves properly, would never Indianize ourselves.”   36
 Space and history meet here in Husserl in a, by now, familiar way. The 
geographical entity known as ‘Europe’ is a speculative space defined by a 
theoretical project. This entity ‘Europe’ is logically prior to the territory that 
appears on a map. Its project allows for the invention, at first in the form of 
Euclidian geometry, of a universalized version of space. 
 With this in mind, we can now return to the problems posed by Allende’s 
piano pieces. The concept of universality that must be assumed in order that the 
composition be intelligible depends in turn on a specific concept of universal 
space that arises in the history of Western Reason. The basis for a harmonic 
scheme that allows in principle for modulation across the spectrum of possible 
pitch centers - but the most obvious abstract universality thematized by Allende - 
is precisely the universal-ideal space that Husserl recognizes in Euclid. The other 
aspect of the pieces, however, their regional particularities, must then exist on a 
different ‘plane,’ one that does not - cannot - share the same genealogy as that of 
the work’s harmonic layout. Put another way, our initial analysis of the work 
made clear that the central problematic for working out the coherence of the 
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compositions lay in the conditions under which they could manifest universality 
in particularity (and vice-versa). A closer look at those conditions, however, 
reveals that this circle might not be so easily squared. The ‘Euclidian’ space of the 
metropole cannot, in principle, admit of the colony’s peripherality as such. This is 
a version of a somewhat familiar trope: Europe is not able to recognize its 
dependence on its colonial possessions in the same way those possessions are 
forced into precisely this recognition. It is, after all, the lesson of the Master/
Slave dialectic. The Master is stuck in his mastery, unable to acquire any 
substantial identity with his actions as they are mediated through the slave. This 
must remain unrecognized by the Master lest he abandon his status. In light of 
the above discussion, it is possible to glimpse the amenability of this logic to 
geography. 

The Aesthetics of Peripherality 
 In Allende’s work we hear a relationship between the twin registers of 
peripherality. This claim has, so far, been implicit. It now requires explicit 
elucidation in order to develop an aesthetics for our historical theory of 
peripherality. The claim is not hermeneutic, an interpretation of the content of an 
artwork beneath its form. It is, rather, an assertion about its nature. This is a 
heterodox starting point, to be sure, but one required in order that the ‘artwork’ 
concept not be hypostatized. Inasmuch as art, with its attendant technicities, 
achieves an identity apart from life, it is able to make claims upon its hearers on 
its own. This represents the work of a historical process - one that ought to be 
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familiar from all reification narratives of the arts since Weber - but it is a peculiar 
one as it is incomplete and, indeed, it cannot ever be completed without the 
erasure of art itself. Nevertheless, it would be a simple misrepresentation of the 
artwork status of Allende’s composition to not take seriously the autonomy of its 
claims. What is at issue below is not the manner in which one ought to interpret 
music from ‘peripheries,’ even specifically Latin American ones. Rather, the point 
of interest is the status of aesthetics when thought of in a theory of peripheral 
space. In other words, the question is: what is aesthetics for peripherality? 
 In a sense, peripherality might be another name for aesthetics as such. So 
far, we have been able to identify center/periphery space with the metropole/
colony relationship. That relationship, in turn, articulated itself in a division 
between the form and content of knowledge. At the moment when the spatial 
logic of Europe stopped being defined by an East/West polarity (Jerusalem 
incessantly pitted against Athens) and began to be reimagined in terms of a new 
colonial experience, the project of European knowing transformed from one 
based on the recovery of a lost knowledge to the project of subsuming aesthetic 
particulars under abstract concepts: the perception of Euclidian space is 
subsumed under “Space.” To the extent that we can identify, as Husserl is at great 
pains to do, conceptual abstraction with Europe, we can also understand 
peripherality as aesthesis. 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, we have arrived at a Kantian moment in our 
dialectical analysis. The epistemological model of subsumptive understanding 
that motivates Kant’s concerns in the Third Critique is itself based on a radical 
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separation of theoretical truth from ethics. The amenability of the natural world 
to the imperatives of fully individual, autonomous ethics requires some guarantee 
for us, if not for the realm of extension in itself. Beauty, and the purposiveness in 
Nature that follows from it, step in to mediate between Reason’s knowing and the 
doing. Part of my own project is to place this thought back into the folds of a 
history of space. Kant’s aesthetics are significant for us because his philosophy 
radicalizes and most fully articulates a shape of consciousness itself shaped by 
history. We can therefore flip the telescope and reread the Discovery through a 
Kantian lens. 
 Columbus’s accounts of the New World are filled with detailed description 
of what he and those under his command encountered there. His is not, however, 
mere description. He very often has recourse to mythical imagery from within 
and without the Biblical tradition. Tropical storms become the floods of Moses 
and the beauty of mermaids is famously put in dispute. His European imaginary 
is simply grafted onto the American landscape. The effect, however, is hardly 
abstract. He deals with specificities. His are empirical mermaids. And consider 
this passage from his letter on the Fourth Voyage: 
Ptolomeo diz que la tierra más austral es el plazo primero, i que no 
abaxa más de quince grados i un terçio. el mundo es poco; el injuto 
d’ello es seis partes, la séptima solamente cubierta de agua. la 
experiençia ia está vista, i la escrivi por otras letras, i con 
adornamiento de la Sacra Escritura, con el sitio del Paraíso terrenal 
que la sancta Iglesia aprueva.   37
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Ptolemy’s careful geometrical work and Holy Writ are both subject to correction 
here. Experiençia is the final arbiter here. The point is not that Columbus was 
forced to invent a new epistemological position from his ship. It is that American 
space is, at the very instant it becomes a part of ‘Western’ history, a space of 
experience. Europe, no longer displaced from its perceived origins, finds itself at 
the center of a world that has formed new joints. 
 This status is maintained through to the nineteenth century, when the 
Americas were invaded by travelers and natural scientists. The importance of 
their writings for Latin America’s self-understanding can hardly be overstated. 
Roberto González Echevarría has likened it to a “second European discovery.” 
The likes of Charles Darwin and Alexander von Humboldt traveled to South 
America in search of data that could be incorporated into a European scientific 
project that sought to progress history by bringing nature fully under the yoke of 
human understanding. About this, Humboldt is explicit: “Two main aims guided 
my travels,” he writes, “to make known the countries I visited, and to collect 
those facts that helped elucidate the new science vaguely named the Natural 
History of the World, Theory of the Earth or Physical Geography.”   In order to 38
collect the necessary data on nature, it seems, one had to step away from Europe. 
Nature could only be truly witnessed at the periphery. 
 That periphery is paradoxically both original - untouched by History and 
therefore an ideal realm in which to investigate that which exists outside of time, 
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whether it be Nature herself or the unchanging qualities of the human being - and 
radically new. Humboldt himself expresses the hope that the future will see great 
cities populated by self-determining Kantian subjects rise up on the banks of the 
wild rivers he navigated. This duality is just the dichotomy of the data of the 
senses, the stuff of experience in this new aesthetic paradigm. That which is 
sensed is always-already present and, in principle, not predictable. It is the 
irrational core of the rational.   This theme is to be consistently found in 39
foundational texts of nineteenth-century Latin America, from Facundo to Os 
Sertões, that take their cue from scientific travel writing. It also haunts modern 
fiction in works like Alejo Carpentier’s El siglo de las luces. In all of these works, 
the contradictory nature of bare experience is mapped geographically. The same 
historical process that made America into a treasure chest of empirical material 
for natural science also made it into an aesthetic realm. 
 If colonial and post-colonial America is another name for the separation of 
art from life, the pre-Columbian takes on all the promise of prelapsarian unity. 
This, at least, is the motivation behind recent musicological works, notably by 
Gary Tomlinson and Olivia Bloechl. Like the protagonist of Los pasos perdidos, 
Tomlinson attempts to peel back the veil of disenchantment and find Song in a 
place - which is also a time - before Music. In his self-consciously stilted terms, it 
is a cantology, which is not a musicology. 
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 In what remains, then, we will consider the consequences of the ‘invention’ 
of aesthetics for art made under the aegis of American space. If America is 
‘invented’ as aesthetics, then all Latin American art is autonomous art. Already 
severed from the good and the true, sensuous immediacy can never find its way 
back to life. This condition, in turn, becomes the central preoccupation of Latin 
American art as such. Latin American art (as distinct from art in Latin America or 
by Latin Americans) is just the material knowing of this preoccupation. In 
response to the dissatisfaction inherent in its condition, this art takes on the task 
of manifesting community. Put another way, it concerns itself with making 
tangible the universal in the particular. This was, after all, what we found in 
Allende’s tonadas. 

 The history of music, along with what we might broadly refer to as 
‘literature,’ in Latin America is the history of the fully modern problematic of 
aesthetic alienation. In this sense, it shares its constitutive conceptual 
constellation with art in the neo-colonial metropole. On the periphery, however, 
the story plays out differently, and with different stakes. Alienation does not 
result in modern ennui as it does in Paris, but in dependency. With little doubt, 
music is currently the primary ideological force in the region.   This 40
contemporary situation, however, has a historical density that is easily missed. 
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The problem of music in Latin America can be written off as mere culture, but it 
is precisely this fact that makes its explication imperative. 

Method 
 We have seen so far that nations are conceived in the modern world along 
the lines of individual subjectivities for whom self-determination is imperative. 
Further, that there is an aesthetic moment of that self-determination. Latin 
American nationalisms determine themselves primarily with respect to place in a 
geographical mapping of center and periphery, a framework that privileges the 
peripheral, which - when run again through the logic of subjectivity writ large - is 
rendered an aesthetics. 
 The following account of musical modernity in Latin America takes off 
from this theoretical matrix. The meaning of musical practices supervene on 
norms that determine their in-placement. These norms have to be made explicit 
in musical practices themselves. This is because, unlike in Europe, the experience 
of modernity in Latin America is one of expropriation and colonial/neo-colonial 
spatial deferral rather than brute rationalization and homogenization. The 
legitimacy of actions (in their theoretical isolation as well as in organized 
concatenations we call practices) depend, then, not only on their role in a 
possible narrative, but in their taking place. The story of musical modernity in 
Latin America, therefore, is the story of its in-placement. This process, however, 
is precarious. Any making explicit of place (here this appears in the form of one 
nationalism or another) is open to challenge, not to mention its being done in 
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concert or discord with the host of similar claims to legitimacy of place that 
inhere in the rest of the social edifice. Put simply, the consequences of any given 
musical practice are uncertain and are open to a logic they cannot of themselves 
control. 
 Tracing that logic is the present project’s task. It is divided into three case 
studies, which are also moments of a non-successive dialectic. The first is the case 
of Carlos Chavez whose musical project was an attempt to in-place music 
immediately, through nationally substantive content. I demonstrate how 
Chavez’s compositions are part of the larger process of post-Revolutionary 
national self-determination in the cultural field and the centrality of aesthetic 
concepts - notably, beauty - in this process. This moment ends by confronting the 
hollowness of the national substance it has to affirm such that it might control 
content. 
 The third chapter takes us to Argentina and traces the development of the 
musical gauchesca as an analog for nationally specific modernity in that country. 
If hollowness was the limit of Chavez’s aesthetics, it is the thematized center of 
the gaucho genre. Ginastera’s own interpretation of his stylistic development and 
his Pampeana pieces are read as self-conscious reflections on the aporia of 
gaucho nationalism. 
 The concluding chapter moves to the Chilean Nueva Canción movement. 
Tracing it from its roots in bourgeois folklore research to its propagandistic 
phase, I show how a political end for music grows from the fundamentally 
contradictory structure of Latin American music history. 
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 Finally, it behoves me to note that this dissertation is neither 
musicological, strictly speaking, nor properly historical. Not musicological, if by 
‘musicology’ we refer to that set of discourses which seeks to make music 
intelligible after that intelligibility can no longer be guaranteed by the music 
‘itself.’ Not historical, if by history we mean an attempt to preserve something of 
the past so that it might survive relatively unharmed into the future. This 
dissertation is, rather, a conceptual inquiry - ultimately about ideas. 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CHAPTER TWO: 
CARLOS CHAVEZ AND 
THE REVOLUTIONARY NEOCLASSICAL 
 Very few figures in Latin American music history enjoy the celebrated 
status and apparent historical importance of Carlos Chavez (1899-1978). 
Distinguishing himself as a composer, conductor, critic, public servant and 
educator, Chavez defined what Mexican musical modernism would sound like, 
largely controlled how it would be interpreted within and without his native 
country, and made his own aesthetic commitments paradigmatic for the 
generation of Mexican composers who came after him. What concerns us in what 
follows are the nature and consequences of his aesthetic commitments as he went 
about elaborating his career-long project of creating a peculiarly Mexican music 
that would nonetheless be universally valid as high art. This chapter will attempt 
to make clear what is at stake for this project and the content of Chavez’s 
contribution. 

Imitation and Expropriation 
 The appearance of national art music in Mexico is far from an inevitable 
development. There is a sense, after all, in which ‘Mexican national art music’ is a 
contradiction in terms. Lettered composition as such - in Mexico and in Latin 
America as a whole - exists as a legacy of the attempted cultural erasure carried 
out by Spanish colonialism. From the colonial Baroque through the 
Revolutionary period (1910-20), we can refer to music in Mexico with more 
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security than we might refer to music of Mexico. If music and musicians were not 
directly imported from the metropolis, form and content, both in church and 
secular composition, were imported for imitation by native-born musicians. The 
post-Independence era saw the rise of opera, both in its Spanish and Italian 
varieties, and piano virtuosos. While a handful of these compositions reference 
Mexican popular music, none before 1910 makes a claim to have achieved 
something like an authentically national compositional practice. The lettered art 
form was disseminated in Mexico as a luxury import when it was not being 
created there as imitation. 
 It is precisely as a commodity that music is best understood before the first 
decades of the last century. The materials of culture in the economic dispensation 
Mexico suffered before the Revolution were simply not the product of local 
manufacture. Existing politically as dependent on foreign investment and 
materially as a field for colonial expropriation, Mexico did not develop culturally 
along the same lines as Western Europe and the United States. Unable to escape 
being conscious of dependency, Mexican elites - who primarily consumed 
imported manufactured goods and thereby lived an approximation of the cultural 
lives of their trading partners - essentially experienced a kind of exile. The first, 
immediate reaction to this in the arts was imitation. As Samuel Ramos, a cultural 
critic and philosopher whose 1934 treatise El perfil del hombre y la cultural en 
México attempted to reconstruct a national psychology, puts the point: 
Carecería de fundamento suponer en México, ya no la existencia, 
sino aun la mera posibilidad de una cultura de primera mano, es 
decir, original, porque sería biológicamente imposible hacer tabla 
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rasa de la constitución mental que nos ha legado la historia. No nos 
tocó venir al mundo aislados de la civilización que, sin ser obra 
nuestra, se nos impuso, no por un azar, sino por tener con ella una 
filiación espiritual. En consecuencia, es forzoso admitir que la única 
cultura posible entre nosotros tiene que ser derivada.   41
So it is that the statue of Cuauhtémoc on the Paseo de la Reforma in Mexico City 
appears in neoclassical grace, draped in a toga. Nineteenth-century Mexican 
positivism, the reigning philosophy before the Revolution, would be derived 
explicitly from its French counterpart. And composers took their cue from 
abroad. To wit, one of best known salon waltzes ever written was penned by the 
Mexican - and full-blooded Indian - Juventino Rosas just before the turn of the 
century.   Nothing about the waltz indicates its place of origin, an aspect, 42
incidentally, that contributed to its wide dissemination as it slipped from 
Mexican salon repertoire to that of North American fiddlers, ultimately appearing 
as a glockenspiel tune heard played by ice cream trucks. 
 It is in the midst of this imitative spirit, proper to a culture marked by 
expropriation, that the young Carlos Chavez was introduced to music making on 
the global periphery. His juvenilia consists of a series of imitative works. There is 
a prelude and fugue, a sonata movement, a set of waltzes, character pieces for the 
piano and song settings. Chavez went as far as to compose his own German lied, 
setting Heinrich Heine’s “Du bist wie eine Blume.” 
 Imitative composition, as Chavez soon discovered, is finally unsustainable. 
It runs aground when it confronts the limits of its own possibility. To make this 
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clear, something about metropolitan musical modernity has to be rehearsed. The 
development of music in Europe involved an increased subjectification on the 
part of musical works inasmuch as they were objectivated in the market. The 
emancipation of composer from the bonds of patronage had long allowed him to 
enter the public sphere as an individual. That individuality, in turn, was used to 
underwrite the intelligibility of the artworks he produced. The paradigmatic 
figure here is Beethoven, whose utter control over the determination of his output 
embodied a version of the emancipated ego proper to the modern, post-Jacobean, 
bourgeois ideal subject. Embodying this subjectivity, of course, involved - in fact, 
relied on - a moment of technical skill and objectivation. The musical work is 
both umbilically tied to its maker’s individuality and able to make a claim to 
autonomous individuality for itself. Inasmuch as this latter claim is convincing, 
the musical work becomes indistinguishable from its peers and, ultimately, from 
all other potential commodities. 
 The dialectic of subjectification and objectivation that characterizes the 
emergence of musical modernity in Europe is reversed in the neo-colonial 
periphery. In the Mexican context, the literate musical work arrives as an alien 
object on the market. It’s moment of objectivation comes first, as it were. The 
church hymn has come from Spain, the opera written by an Italian, the waltz 
imported from a Vienna in cultural decline. When they arrive in Mexico, musical 
works must seek out the subjects suited to them, or else create the kind of 
subjectivity required to understand and reproduce them. There is no kind of 
subjectification under these conditions, however, which is not heteronomous. As 
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culture is imported, it assumes a cultural expropriation. Weber’s modern Man, 
the one found in the metropole, is caught between his individual freedom and his 
self-authored unfreedom. He embarks on a musical project to overcome this 
antinomy. The Mexican modern subject experiences a radically individuated 
reality, but one in which the conditions of that reality have been expropriated. 
The musical project becomes one of overcoming that expropriation. Chavez’s 
compositional career as a whole is just this. 
 Chavez’s First String Quartet, written in 1921, represents an early 
breakthrough in overcoming imitation. The opening movement displays 
remarkable thematic unity and control. A two-bar phrase triumphantly 
announced in unison in the violins at the start is sequenced, expanded, 
contracted, clipped and otherwise developed in every subsequent measure. A 
second theme, derived from the first, is fully articulated at the movement’s 
climax, marked off by a long crescendo leading to a triple forte. This theme is less 
angular than the first and is self-contained while the other suggested the need for 
compliment. Following the logic of an altered sonata-allegro form, the first 
movement bares all the hallmarks of a confident, even Romantic, humanism. It is 
perfectly in line with Chavez’s early imitative technique. 
 All of that changes in the second movement. A single, drawn out pitch 
begins an introductory figure, a series of vertical harmonies set up to accompany 
a melody. This cues the entry of the second motive from the first movement. The 
process, however, is suddenly cut off. The introduction returns again and again, 
but never succeeds in introducing anything. Instead, it itself is sequenced 
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aimlessly before being let go altogether. The Scherzo (marked Vivo) that follows 
replaces motivic development with sheer rhythmic drive. No distinct motives are 
picked out amidst the endlessly repeated rhythmic figures. At one point in the 
middle of the movement the initial motive from the first movement appears, but 
it is truncated and never returns. The concluding Sostenuto ends after 28 
measures. An aimless melody runs throughout. It is accompanied by a recurring 
short figure that recalls the rhythmic profile of the first of the opening 
movement’s motives. This figure, though, veers away from its accompaniment 
role, sounding increasingly dissonant against the first violin’s sweeping line. The 
final three bars have the second violin and viola playing the figure a second apart, 
ruining the final cadence. The quartet, as his most important biographer points 
out, is the “culmination and synthesis” of his early career.   The movements after 43
the first each seek out some way of ceasing to imitate. Each strikes out against 
clear development or borrowed form. Although the result is almost entirely 
negative - a series of subversions of convention - it nonetheless indicates a space 
where a new compositional method might arrive. 
 That same year, Chavez would find the resources for a new compositional 
practice. With his ballet, El fuego nuevo (1921), he would turn decisively to what 
some of his commentators call ‘indianism.’ This version of primitivism fell 
comfortably into a post-Revolutionary aesthetic ideology that sought grounds for 
a properly Mexican art. Because the Revolution itself, as well as its social and 
political aftermath was formative for Chavez and his concerns, we ought to 
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reconstruct the event before turning to the next step in Chavez’s stylistic 
development. Significant for the present purpose is to identify the place and 
relevance of aesthetics in what was ostensibly a political eruption. 

The Aesthetic Phase of the Revolution 
 The Revolution that ended in 1920 was an anti-capitalist revolt largely 
carried out by the peasantry.   It represented the bloody result of the economic 44
shock Mexico sustained in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Before 
that time, the Mexican economy depended on the extraction of metals and a 
handful of agricultural exports to provide the means to buy imported goods. This 
is to say that the basic outlines of the colonial economic system had largely 
remained unchanged by political independence. Indeed, the consequences of the 
Reform period - which saw liberalism, Enlightened and Republican, enshrined in 
Mexican law -  were to expand the latifundia. Territory that had previously been 
owned by peasant communities or under the control of the Catholic Church was 
opened up to speculation. Laws ostensibly designed to provide for the emergence 
of a nation of small-holders prevented that class from emerging altogether. As a 
result, the kind of political “modernity” that someone invested in a particular 
stripe of bourgeois ideology would recognize as proper to a functional, free and 
expanding capitalism never emerged. This has led some historians to deny that 
pre-Revolutionary Mexico was capitalist in the first place. After all, despotic rule, 
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thoroughly associated with what Marx called the Asiatic mode of production 
decidedly prevailed. Major institutional changes of the kind familiar from the 
elevation of England and France out of the inertia of feudal reproduction did not 
appear. Even Marxist historians have come to the conclusion that the Mexican 
Revolution was a bourgeois revolution in the sense that it overthrew the political 
avatar of the feudal mode of production in order to introduce a State apparatus 
that would provide markets (both in goods and labor) as well as primitively 
accumulated capital for a nascent capitalist class. 
 There is some truth to this analysis. One aspect of the economic shock of 
the 1880’s and 90’s was a steep decline in the number of land-holding peasants. 
By the time of the Revolution, roughly 3.5% of the rural population held any land 
at all. Expropriation met with impassioned objection , especially in places where 
indigenous communities had managed to largely preserve pre-Cortesian social 
organization. The paradigmatic case was the state of Morelos, where Emiliano 
Zapata would assume leadership of the peasant revolt, demanding the 
reinstatement of communal ownership. Before the Revolution, this demand went 
unmet. An agricultural proletariat had arrived. These peasants cum proletarians, 
in turn, were exploited by a land-owning bourgeoisie, which produced goods 
primarily in order to reap profits. These shifts were, no doubt, a factor which 
induced the need for political reform, if not outright revolt. However, the 
transition that Porfirio Díaz oversaw did not introduce the profit motive to 
Mexico, nor did it make accumulation the primary goal of land and mine owners. 
In fact, this had been the structural impetus behind production since the last 
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decades of the colonial period. The difference was not between modes of 
production, but between types of capitalist production. Pre-Porfirian Mexico did 
not have the material bases it needed to derive relative surplus from a constant 
technological innovation. Rather, it was forced to reap absolute surplus by 
controlling the price of labor. ‘Asiatic’ despotism was the political face of this 
control. With the arrival of a second, imperial phase of capitalist growth, new 
forms of labor repression were invented. Díaz installed a rural guard and gave it a 
mandate to discipline a laboring population with a long history of resistance that 
had suddenly been dispossessed of its means of subsistence. 
 A rapid, State-driven process to fold the country into the imperial world 
system brought about massive foreign investment in infrastructure, rail, finance, 
and industry. As many historians note, the growth of the railways provides some 
perspective: tracks which covered less than 700 kilometers in 1876 spread over 
20,000 by the turn of the century, effectively uniting a country in which excessive 
distance had previously guaranteed utter isolation. While the first wave of rail 
construction had been carried out with domestic capital, the blossoming that 
occurred at the end of the century demonstrated just how transformative 
European and American capital could be. With the help of French investors, 
Mexico established a network of banks from Monterrey to the capitol, as well as 
its first national bank. Readily available debt sped what Marx called the ‘moral 
decay’ of industrial and agricultural fixed capital (institutions and technologies of 
surplus extraction). New technology, both electrical and hydraulic, rendered 
obsolete within a handful of years great swathes of production methods that had 
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persisted for many decades. The takeover of huge swathes of the Mexican north 
by the Americans in the earlier part of the century had been followed up by a 
move on the part of American capital to invest heavily in Mexico’s border states. 
Production in northern Mexico was dominated by exports, mostly agricultural. 
Domestic capital was diverted to service industries and Mexican stakeholders in 
the region knew well just how ambitious their English-speaking neighbors could 
become. 
 Despite its eventual anti-capitalist profile, the Revolution was catalyzed by 
a split in the bourgeoisie. Modernization had put a great deal of pressure on 
smaller producers and Northern landowners justifiably feared the long-term 
effects of foreign ownership. The sector of the capitalist class that benefited from 
Díaz’s open-door policy with respect to foreign investment grew increasingly 
smaller as the twentieth century progressed, especially after a worldwide 
financial crisis around the turn of the century ate deeply into Mexican profits, 
demonstrating a significant structural weakness of what would be known later as 
dependent development. What might once have been seen by most of the 
Mexican bourgeoisie as a benevolent dictatorship that brought a much-needed 
respite from the political violence that plagued the country since the expulsion of 
the Spanish, was now regarded as a tyrannical regime invested in a model for 
development that harmed domestic capital. A democratic reform movement grew 
up and an opposition leader, a wealthy landowner from a northern state, was 
chosen. When a peaceful solution to the struggle within the bourgeoisie no longer 
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seemed feasible, the opposition turned to the subaltern: the agrarian proletarian 
and the newly minted industrial worker. 
 Both the rural and industrial working classes had been restive and quick to 
strike or revolt. In a sense, then, the massive rebellions carried out by these 
groups during the armed phase of the Revolution were merely the continuation of 
a long history of labor resistance in Mexico. New in 1910 was the class alliance 
that saw labor fall behind one segment of capital against another. As was the case 
during the French Revolution more than a century before, a reform movement 
unleashed the force of popular resistance in order to win a political victory. 
Venustiano Carranza at the end of the civil war was as sure as Francisco Madero 
was at the start that the State would control the majority once its material control 
had been reestablished. In fact, the former was a confirmed reactionary when 
compared to even the Jacobin wing of the revolutionary elite. By 1920, the 
government that had formed relied for support on a landowning bourgeoisie. 
Organized peasants were this class’s natural opposition. Free from discipline for 
the first time in decades, peasant armies systematically dispossessed property 
from landowners. The government that had opposed Díaz now sought the defeat 
of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. 
 The armed working classes were both the key to the fall of Díaz and the 
establishment of a petty bourgeois regime in its place. They also represented the 
greatest threat to that process. Peasantry would hold the upper hand in the 
Revolution for nearly its entire duration. This was made clear and manifest when 
Villa from the north and Zapata from the south captured Mexico City in 1914. 
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However, either because of unwillingness or inability, the two peasant 
commanders failed to build an institutional order to match the strength of their 
military strategy. They were eventually routed, and the tide of the struggle would 
turn in favor of the capitalist classes. The latter were also very successful in 
bringing the industrial working class into their fold.   45
 The end of the armed phase of the Revolution saw both of its peasant 
leaders murdered and the industrial and agricultural factions of the working class 
on opposing sides of the fighting. The petty bourgeois who found themselves with 
the reins of the State fell to the task of consolidating their power. As significant as 
the changes wrought by the Revolution in fact were, the event had not produced a 
binding social order. Military defeat followed by co-optation and clientism had 
done away with an independent working class movement. This, too, would be 
controlled by the swelling State. However, the nature of the defeat and the entry 
of the peasant onto the national stage had forced major concessions from the 
bourgeoisie. Egalitarian demands of workers could be championed without doing 
damage to the protection of private property rights, or so went the assumption of 
the dominant ideology. Before mid-century, extensive land redistribution, 
vigorously opposed by Carranza during the war, had been carried out, and the 
possibilities for social mobility were greatly increased. Perhaps the most 
important achievement of the struggle was the establishment of a mixed economy 
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and the expropriation of a large fraction of foreign assets. The slogan “Mexico 
para los mexicanos” (“Mexico for Mexicans”) bore this meaning most clearly. 

 What fell with the Porfiriato - the reign of Porfirio Díaz which was 
overthrown by the Revolution - was not simply an unsustainable development 
model or a government apparatus or a set of class and labor relations. More 
fundamentally, the reasons that justified and made intelligible all of these were 
altered. The conflicts that gave rise to the taking up of arms were, of course, 
understood in terms endemic to the moment in which they arose. Indeed, to an 
extent they are only understandable in this way. This is especially true when it 
comes to the material pressures and transformations described above. The 
consequences that resulted from the efforts to manage the conflicts of one 
moment, however, opened up conceptual space for another. A strategic turn to 
the subaltern at a decisive moment in the battle against Díaz, for example, had 
significant unintended consequences. And so with the concessions that were 
necessary in order to win over labor to the cause of State consolidation. Even so, a 
new order of political categories and conceptual justifications unsystematically 
drawn up by interested parties in the midst of a struggle could hardly produce 
their historical fulfillment. The sheer diversity of these concepts alone - from the 
version of communal property ownership that justified the governing of the state 
of Morelos under Zapata to the extension of the logic of personal property which 
did the same for the privilege of domestic over foreign capital - precluded this. A 
gap became apparent by the Revolution’s end. Not one between classes or even 
!62
between competing political goals or ideological positions, but between the 
reasons for the founding of a new society and the world(s) that would demand 
their relevance. Without knowing it, an economic and political crisis had 
precipitated a cleavage in the very substance of society. This represents, as it 
were, the speculative payoff of the events on the ground. It is at this level of 
analysis that art might enter the story as part of a world that demanded relevance 
in this society: aesthetics. But it too would come to appear as a gap itself. 
 The phase of the Revolution that followed violence, then, was invested in 
resolving this gap. State consolidation, legislative and economic reform could not 
simply be carried out, rather they required a making explicit of their reasons, if 
not always their reasonableness. These reasons were founded on a new popular 
subject, the post-Revolutionary Mexican citizen, ethnically determined and 
marked by an essential self-consciousness. Every version of the State building 
process included a conception of this authorizing subject. Relating that subject to 
objects, the materials of the new order, involved conceiving of a moment of 
synthesis, a reconciliation of the categorical determinations of an ideal subject to 
the world of determinate objects. This is the key to the resolution of the gap 
produced by the Revolution. We might call this the event’s ‘aesthetic phase.’ And 
it is explicitly in terms of aesthetics that the Mexican State intelligentsia went 
about elaborating practices that would produce a solution to the social fissure. 
Mexican nationalism was rendered as a theory of the beautiful. 
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Mexican Beauty 
“When the middle-class individual and the indigene have the same sensibility in art, we 
will be redeemed culturally.” - Manuel Gamio 

 If the ideal revolutionary subject is at the heart of the speculative stakes of 
the Revolution, the relation of that subject to objects is key to its deployment. The 
quotation above by the anthropologist and public intellectual Manuel Gamio 
spells out that the very coherence of this subject - a synthesis of the new 
dominant class and the authentically indigenous - depends on a relation to art. 
That relation, in turn, stands in for the relation of this subject to all objects. A 
common sensibility is the goal. 
 Lest all this appear overly abstract, we should recall that it is precisely this 
sensibility that Chavez claims to have tapped into with his turn to ‘indianist’ 
primitivism. Reflecting on the composition of El fuego nuevo, Chavez wrote that 
after finding a suitably Mexican subject for the ballet (an Aztec legend) he had to 
create a music of equivalent authenticity. He writes: 
Desde hacía 9 o 10 años, Ponce había puesto de moda la idea de la 
‘música mexicana’ sobre la base de la canción mexicana de origen 
español o italiano, pero la música india era otro mundo. Yo me di 
cuenta entonces qué cerca estábamos de él, aun sin saberlo; cuán 
grande era su presencia en todo, en la sensibilidad, en la plástica, y 
aun en la música, que fue de hecho la primera que yo oí y me 
impresionó, desde los seis años de edad. De golpe, y sin que 
previamente hubiera yo escrito nada parecido, escribí ‘El fuego 
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nuevo,’ por la fuerza subconsciente y natural de las influencias 
recibidas.   46
Chavez’s claim here is one he made repeatedly throughout his career. His early 
exposure to the music of agrarian peasants of indigenous descent - so his story 
goes - gave him the resources he needed to compose, of himself and without 
recourse to ethnographic research, an authentically Mexican music. Chavez’s 
subconscious became his inner Aztec. As a middle class individual offering up an 
indigenous sensibility in art, Chavez embodied Gamio’s cultural redemption. 

 The logic of this redemption ought to be unpacked. It was not a simple 
matter of disseminating ideas with enough frequency that they would eventually 
settle like concrete in the imaginations of suddenly more governable citizens. A 
common sensibility strikes deeper here. Those charged with creating it sought to 
tutor the senses so they might immediately encounter the object domain proper 
to the new State, that is, precisely without the mediation of official ideological 
concepts. A common sensibility is something closer to the foundation of explicit 
prescriptive ideology, a sensing in common that would make prescriptions 
relevant to the world. 
 We would do well at this point to bring this version of common sense into 
proximity with that found in Kant so that its full weight might be appreciated. As 
will become clear in this section, Kant is never far from the thoughts of the 
formidable petty bourgeois intellectuals whose concerns structure this historical 
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moment. In Section 20 of his Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant broaches 
the subject of a common sense. He does so as part of his analysis of judgments of 
beauty (essentially all those that are reducible to “This is beautiful.”) These 
judgments, he argues, are paradoxically subjective and objective at once. They are 
objective in being, indeed, judgments about specific objects in time and space. 
They are, however, nonetheless subjective in their being restricted to the sensing 
of rather than the knowing of objects. We humans witness the beauty of, say, a 
flower, but the beauty is, so to speak, in the flower but not of it. The fact that 
beauty is something like a consciously human contribution to experience (in 
contrast to the ‘unconsciously’ human contribution to the determination of 
experience, made by virtue of the categories) does not stop judgments of beauty 
from being universal, meaning that they demand that all other humans acquiesce 
to the judging. This is the objectivity’s insistence: “the judgment of taste expects 
agreement from everyone; and a person who describes something as beautiful 
insists that everyone ought to give the object in question his approval and follow 
suit in describing it as beautiful.”   The scene that Kant sets up is an odd one to 47
be sure. Two people sense the same object and inasmuch as at least one perceives 
beauty, neither is satisfied until each has independently not only experienced the 
pleasure that would inspire the judgment of beauty, but articulated the judgment 
itself, said it out loud. It is a moment of communication and this is what Kant has 
in his sights. Beauty is in principle universally communicable. In fact, it relies on 
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the assumption of a community in which this communication might occur. No 
such appearance of human otherness and being in common is to be found in 
either of Kant’s two other Critiques. Community is not needed for the cognitive 
synthesis involved in mathematical judgments or the ethical calculus required in 
deliberation about actions according to the categorical imperative. Other people 
show up in Kant, unexpectedly, when contemplating flowers. 
 We have come to the crux of the matter. Beauty cannot be coherently 
judged without a community, and particularly, without a sensing in common. 
Importantly, Kant thinks this is true even if no such community can be found. 
This is the cost of beauty’s subjective ground. Such a community need not even 
have concepts in common: it “differs from common understanding, which is also 
sometimes called common sense: for the judgement of the latter is not one by 
feeling, but always one by concepts, though usually only in the shape of obscurely 
represented principles.”   In the end it is not clear that the community that 48
underwrites the objectivity of beauty could exist for Kant. That judgements of 
beauty include a moment of subjectivity, that principled skeptics can conclude 
that beauty is nothing more than “a mere subjective play of the powers of 
representation” tells us that there is reason to doubt the reliability of any sensing 
in common. As one commentator has explicitly argued, there is a memorial 
quality to Kant’s aesthetics.   The modern world includes much strife about what 49
is beautiful and modern art records this strife on many a purposively shocking or 
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ugly canvass and score (Berg’s ländler scrapes and Picasso’s demoiselles stare at 
us in pieces). When common sense is referred to in Kant, it appears as a kind of 
memory of a moment - perhaps one that never was - when a community sensing 
in common made fully objective our judgements of taste. 
 So it is that a theory of the beautiful might stand in for the question of 
community. In the case at hand, it is the question of a new Mexican state. The 
task at hand was getting Mexicans to articulate the beautiful. The negotiation that 
would follow would reverse engineer the community both present and absent in 
the Third Critique. What was referred to above as a gap between the reasons for 
action (ie., for setting forth a new society after the Revolution) and the world in 
which actions take place hides behind the florescence of art: murals, museums, 
and music. 
 The metaphysical cast given here to the stakes of aesthetic projects after 
the Revolution is not meant to deny that certain manifestations - perhaps most - 
bore a strikingly quotidian character. In 1921 the newspaper El Universal, a 
publication openly committed to the goal of building a powerful central 
government, held a beauty contest.   “El concurso de la india bonita” sought to 50
award a woman of distinctly indigenous racial features. The experiment was a 
thinly veiled argument for a change in the concept of female beauty. If up until 
that moment beauty had been tacitly universal, the contest was to demonstrate 
that beauty could be specific, particular to Mexico. The submissions, however, 
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showed just how little common sense, in an un-Kantian sense, this made 
immediately after the Revolution. Many submissions offered photographs of girls 
in the traditional dress of the pre-Revolutionary rural bourgeoisie. Many had blue 
eyes and light skin. Mexicans had to be taught what Mexican beauty was and, 
more importantly, taught to see it, to sense it in common. The anthropologist 
Manuel Gamio was one of those hired by the paper to help judge the contest. 
While his scientific expertise was the reason he was picked, his interest was 
decidedly aesthetic: the ‘india bonita’ was to replace the Greek ideal of beauty. In 
his own words: 
The classic model of physical beauty, the Greek model, does not 
exist, nor has it ever existed in Mexico. For lack of this aesthetic 
ideal, we have substituted the White physical type of Hispanic 
origin. But this is a crass error because Whites make up only a small 
part of the Mexican population [...] We should not establish 
exclusive canons of beauty.   51
A living member of society, one whose features were like those of the majority of 
Mexicans, would substitute for a cold, white, sculpted Aphrodite. If the Greek 
ideal was abstract and shot through with pagan religious symbolism, the fifteen-
year-old María Bibiana Uribe, barefoot with her hair in braids, is concrete. With 
the girl depicted in a full-page spread, the newspaper reader would have been 
taught to see the beauty in women with strikingly indigenous physical features 
and begin to demonstrate the sensing which is the prerequisite of substantial 
community. 
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 The limits of this effort are found in the role conceptual determination is 
meant to play. Even if it had been the case (which, of course, it was not) that the 
newspaper beauty contest significantly altered the way the average Mexican 
citizen saw beauty, the only way this change could be registered is as a change in 
what objects the citizen would pick out as beautiful: the Indian peasant rather 
than the “ancient Greek goddess.” The contest cannot escape determining the 
conceptual parameters for beauty. Uribe’s concreteness, her social and especially 
!70
her racial status, authorize her ability to serve as an ideal of a beauty that is 
particularly Mexican. 
 The very impetus behind holding the contest is premised on these 
conceptual determinations (race, class, ethnicity). Without them, it is 
unintelligible. The Mexican common sense might indeed manifest itself in a 
sensing of the beautiful in common even if mediated by intersubjective 
negotiation. The ‘Mexicanness’ of that beauty, however, cannot be a condition - 
and, especially, not a guarantee - of that sensing and negotiating. As already seen, 
beauty only demands communal negotiation by virtue of its being pre-
conceptual. This is what allows it to maintain its ambiguous status with respect to 
objectivity. “There can be no objective rule of taste by which what is beautiful 
may be defined by means of concepts,” Kant writes.   If not restricted to 52
subjective sensing, there would be nothing to distinguish aesthetic judgments 
from an objective identification. “She is beautiful” fades into “She is indigenous.” 
A sensing is reduced to a kind of simple knowing. Still, no project to reverse 
engineer a common sense can dispense with objects of sense, necessarily 
determined by concepts. The contradictions inherent to holding up an Indian girl 
who nonetheless must at once stand in for and promote a common experience 
and articulation of beauty are inadvertently expressed by Gamio himself. The 
imported pseudo-Greek ideal of beauty is arbitrary in a place where the majority 
looks nothing like her. This motivates a turn to the specificity of indigenous 
beauty. Sentences later, however, he announces - with Kant - that beauty does not 
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submit to canons. Too remote when undetermined, too present when 
determined, Mexican beauty reveals itself as another name for the very gap its 
evocation was meant to resolve. 

 Chavez’s ‘indianism’ after El fuego nuevo falls pray to precisely the same 
antinomic logic as does Gamio’s beauty contest. Compositions that followed, 
whether they be explicitly ‘indianist’ such as Los cuatro soles (1925) or Sinfonia 
India (1936), or not, would be interpreted in terms of his subjective synthesis of 
bourgeois individuality and indigenous substantiality. The objects that might 
correspond to that synthesis, however, were at once under- and over-determined. 
Commentators were, and indeed still are, able to locate the indigenous elements 
everywhere. In a review of a United States performance of his Piano Concerto in 
1942, a critic wrote, “Indian music harkening back to a remote past obviously 
forms the basic material of the composition,” despite no actual indigenous 
melodies being present in the score. His evidence consists of “unrelieved, acute 
dissonances in every measure” which are repeated with what “might be called an 
obsession.” Finally, there were “strange, brash outbursts of sound, primeval in 
effect.”   The reviewer, Noel Straus, was clearly making the most of stereotype, 53
which in the context of Mexican-Usonian relations during this period could not 
have been devoid of United States triumphalism. 
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 The point here, however, is the ability for Chavez to all-too-easily fulfill the 
role of the ideal post-Revolutionary subject whose creation marked his artistic 
sensibilities as specifically Mexican. For reasons made clear above, there are no 
musical particulars on which this evaluation might rest. This allows for some 
startling conclusions. Consider Aaron Copland’s account of Chavez’s work from 
his Norton Lectures in the mid-1950’s: 
Even without previous knowledge of the Amerindian man, his 
essential nature may be inferred from their scores. The music of 
Chavez is strong and deliberate, at times almost fatalistic in tone; it 
bespeaks the sober and stolid and lithic Amerindian. It is music of 
persistence - relentless and uncompromising; there is nothing of 
the humble Mexican peon here. It is music that knows its own mind 
- stark and clear and, if one may say so, earthy in an abstract way. 
There are no frills, nothing extraneous; it is like the bare wall of an 
adobe hut, which can be so expressive by virtue of its inexpressivity. 
Chavez’ music is above all, profoundly non-European. To me it 
possesses an Indian quality that is at the same time curiously 
contemporary in spirit. Sometimes it strikes me as the most truly 
contemporary music I know, not in the superficial sense, but in the 
sense that it comes closest to expressing the fundamental reality of 
modern man after he has been stripped of the accumulations of 
centuries of aesthetic experiences.   54
Contradictions abound. Chavez’s music is at once fatalistic and uncompromising. 
There is nothing of the Mexican peon, although the peon’s adobe hut appears 
sentences later. The music possesses an Indian quality, one that expresses 
something basic about modern man, although with all of the experiences that 
have made him modern torn away. Copland’s contradictions are hardly the result 
of confusion. He rather clearly pinpoints the constitutive contradictions at the 
core of Chavez’s objectivated double subjectivity. This double subjectivity was the 
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pressing historical problem that aesthetics was called upon to help solve through 
creating a shared sensibility. The possibility of such a creation, however, is 
impossible. Chavez’s compositional practice develops from the negativity of 
imitation in his early works into the impossibility of aesthetic reconciliation of his 
mature oeuvre. 

Ruins of the Aesthetic State 
 We can neither dispense with aesthetics in the Revolutionary aftermath, 
nor in fact with Gamio. Even were he not as influential as he was during this 
period, his dynamic and creative responses to what he saw as the aesthetic 
problem of his place and time are worth unpacking. The best known of these 
responses is to be found in his Forjando Patria of 1916. Written in the last years 
of war before either Villa or Zapata had been killed, Gamio openly calls for the 
creation of an aesthetic State. With no mention of the Central European 
philosophical tradition he is transparently drawing on, our anthropologist 
theorizes the nation as the ultimate work of art. With the emergence of a new 
Mexico out of the ashes of the Revolution, the nation could be a poem, writ very 
large. 
 Gamio’s opening salvo describes the building of a statue. It is a metaphor 
for the creation of what he calls a “patria.” The figurative language is decidedly 
out of place in a text that devotes most of its pages to observations and practical 
suggestions about everything from gender relations to educational reforms. The 
literary quality of this first chapter is nonetheless essential. Every subsequent 
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page of his book is concerned with an aesthetic conception of the nation, and by 
proxy, the State that was emerging around him. The image of the statue is a 
metaphor, but not an idle metaphor. He writes that the building of the statue was 
started in the past only to be followed by dissolution. The generation of 
libertadores forged “con sangre y pólvera, con músculos e ideas, con esperanzas y 
desencantos, una peregrina estatua hecha de todos los metales, que serían todas 
las razas de América.” He tells us that “llegó a vislumbrarse entre resplandores de 
epopeya una maravillosa imagen apenas esfumada de la gran Patria.”   The vision 55
of a united Spanish America planned by Bolívar did not, of course, last for long as 
former viceroyalties became bellicose nation-states in the post-Independence 
period. Gamio’s hope is that the Revolution gives Mexicans another chance to 
build a statue worthy of epic poetry. 
 Poetry’s appearance is hardly by accident. It stands for the harmonious 
Ancient Greek world of ethical coexistence proper to Homeric poetry. This thesis 
about the Greek world has an illustrious lineage. It receives its basic outline by 
Vico in the early eighteenth century and comes to maturity in Hegelian dialectics. 
It runs something like this: Ancient Greek society was an internally coherent 
totality. Who a member of that society was and what they were could not be 
separated. With no room for self-doubt or conscience, the Greek subject’s actions 
were just as much an extension of his person as a physical appendage, and the 
consequences of her actions returned organically in the guise of fate. Religious 
representation took human form because human and divine actions mirrored one 
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another directly. Since actions were always already their meanings, the 
transcendental realm could broach no abstraction or alienation. Indeed, this is 
the key. Greek art is radically integrated while modern art suffers from 
alienation. The Greek sculpture and epic, with its subjects who are both human 
and divine, express a social condition that possesses all the integration of a living 
organism. Life, the form of life, will further haunt any aesthetics that follows from 
this Greek ideal. 
 Gamio has this ideal in mind. He defines patria as a “coherent and defined 
nationality.” In other words, patria is the condition of being determined with 
respect to nation. Determination, however, must be substantial in the strongest 
sense - the language used turns overtly metaphysical. From those who possess a 
true nationality “se levanta el grito solemne de la misma sangre, de la misma 
carne.” He continues: 
pues es la voz de la vida, la fuerza misteriosa que agrupa a la 
materia y se opone a su desintegración. En las almas de todas esas 
gentes hallará los mismos mirajes en que se recrea la suya. De los 
labios brotarán añejos como vino generoso o remozadas y alígeras 
las palabras de un mismo idioma de todos. Cuando así se vive se 
tiene patria.   56
The possessor of a patria lives in such a way with others as to approximate 
participation in an organic whole. Representation and communication are central 
to this way of living. Those of the same nationality must rely on the same 
language and images and must respond to the same “voice.” This is another 
version of Kant’s common sense. There is no conflict between interior and 
!76
!  Ibid., p. 12.56
exterior “images” and therefore no impossible intersubjective demands about the 
presentation of objects. The Greek world that is perfectly commensurate with art, 
the living organism, and common sense refer to one another. Gamio’s call, then, 
is for the creation of a State that approximates the status of art. 
 The role of actual artworks in this creation, however, is murky at best. In a 
telling section of his treatise on “National Literature,” Gamio pulls together 
diverse cultural offerings that could belong under this title: colonial histories, 
popular songs, nineteenth century novels, Aztec literature. None, he concludes, 
could serve as a national literature because each represents the interests and 
expresses the condition of a minority of Mexicans. Pre-Cortesian literature fares 
least well of all as a candidate for a nationally representative literature. Gamio 
relegates its interest exclusively to indigenes and scholars. In the absence of a 
suitable repertory, the author concludes with a list of texts that ought to be made 
more widely available. This, however, is not in order to promote the kind of social 
integration that he thinks is so crucial to fulfilling the promise of the Revolution, 
rather it is to prepare the ground for a national literature that emerges after this 
integration has taken place. Gamio, it seems, has learned his Vichian lesson well. 
Literature is representative, whether of social cohesion, historical spirit, or mode 
of production.   When a nation becomes worthy of a national literature that 57
might compete with Greece it does not do so because a Homer happens to have 
come along. When Johann Joachim Winckelmann, the art historian whose 
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writings on antiquities laid the foundation for the German classicism and Idealist 
interpretation of the ancient world, insisted that the only way that moderns could 
become truly inimitable (and thereby do justice to the promise of the artwork) 
was to imitate the Greeks, he articulated the possibility that Gamio seems to 
deny.   58
 No concrete and individual artwork could do the work of bringing to 
organic fulness the nation it represents because it is at once both inside and 
outside the whole it is meant to stitch together. In order for the artwork to realize 
the social world in which it is disseminated, it must be connected with the 
institutions that make up that world. However, if an artwork is to achieve the 
kind of autonomy commensurate with the aesthetic state it is meant to bring 
about, it must be divorced from all social institutions apart from itself. Closed in 
on itself, it is helpless to make a claim to relevance. Open to the nation, 
representative of its interests and expressive of its condition, it cannot remain 
art. The aesthetic state excludes the very thing that would serve to mark its 
completion: the autonomous artwork. Like Escher’s hands which sketch the 
hands that sketch them, Gamio’s Mexicans (the subjective pole in this relation) 
would have to produce the condition for their own determination (the objective 
pole in this relation), a determination that must be external and objective by 
definition. 
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 In 1932, Chavez stepped into the middle of the matrix of concerns outlined 
here. After writing incidental music for a production of Jean Cocteau’s 
“reduction” of Sophocles’s Antigone, he consolidated what he had written into 
what became his first symphony, Sinfonia de Antigona. After launching his 
nationalist ambitions ten years earlier, he found himself at work reimagining the 
ancient Greek world. At first glance, the composition appears to have nothing to 
do with the ‘indianist’ work so far discussed. That music was meant to objectify as 
coherent something contradictory in an ideal political/aesthetic subject. Chavez’s 
strict adherence to modal writing and consistent avoidance of intervals he 
believed the Greeks understood as dissonances (such as the third), is explicitly 
schooled in exactly the way he claims not to have had to have been to compose 
his ‘indianist’ pieces. The relationship between Chavez and his modes is external, 
inorganic. 
 The manner in which the work approaches its topic, however, suggests 
that it is at least partially concerned with the problem of the aesthetic state. The 
Greek tragedy, after all, is, unlike modern tragedy, expressive of the conflict of 
social norms that threaten to tear apart the social fabric as such. Antigone has a 
religious duty to bury her brother, even after his burial has been forbidden by the 
polis whose government he betrayed. An ancient play that, classically, through 
catharsis represents the resolution of these threatening conflicts (in the case of 
Antigone, through her death) would arguably be an ideal program for a 
symphony, Chavez’s first. Sonata form, with its process of resolving conflicting 
elements, potentially lends itself to just this. Chavez, however, avoids sonata 
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form. Although the texture is consistently contrapuntal, it is nearly devoid of 
easily identifiable motives. A program is not easily provided for this score. It is a 
testament, then, to just how attractive a programmatic reading is that two of 
Chavez’s best commentators opt for a version of it. Rather than hear a sonata-like 
resolution of motives in a full from one tonal area to another (tonic to dominant, 
in the classical model) and back to the first one (tonic, in the model), Stevenson, 
for example, hears contrasting modal tetrachords as symbols for Antigone’s 
conflicting duties. He goes as far as to indicate exactly where in the score the title 
character is meant to shift from the consideration of one duty to that of the 
opposing one.   59
 One does not have to resort to this kind of hermeneutic reading to locate 
importance in this strange piece. Chavez’s austere, un-cathartic composition 
outlines a new compositional strategy on his part. Antigona is utterly objective, 
and does not present itself as an artwork that might be fit for the aesthetic state. 
Chavez’s Greek experiment resembles a fragment of an ancient ruin, 
paradoxically complete in its very incompleteness, and in this sense very much of 
a piece with continental musical modernism. Given the antinomies of the 
aesthetic state, it is hardly a shallow thought. 

 The ruin reappears in the heady intellectual climate of the post-
Revolutionary reconstruction, this time in 1925 with José Vasconcelos’s famed 
essay La raza cósmica. At the time of its appearance, its author had just ended 
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his tenure as Secretary of Public Education. Of all the intellectuals to have come 
to prominence just after the wake of the Revolution, Vasconcelos had the most 
significant influence, from establishing the country’s first network of public 
schools to enthusiastic promotion of muralism. This unusual philosophical 
treatise is his most widely read work. In it, Vasconcelos has a number of 
objectives. The most obvious being to marshall evidence culled from his reading 
of the evolutionary biology of his day against any version of a stable racial 
hierarchy. His denial turns on theorizing the productivity of racial mixture. Soon 
after arriving at this point, however, the text changes course and uses the 
evolutionary model of race as an explanatory force in history. The great 
civilizations (to be sure, the Greeks again make an appearance here) have been 
products of racial mixture, he claims. Thus, due to the interaction of races on the 
American continent, there is a great deal of promise in those places where 
colonizers did not destroy the native populations they found there. Vasconcelos 
outlines the potential rise of what he terms, borrowing from Theosophist 
doctrine, the ‘fifth race’. This people who are to grow to maturity in the Amazon 
would bring about a redemptive transformation in the world. “If the fifth race 
takes ownership of the axis of the future world,” he writes, “then airplanes and 
armies will travel all over the planet educating the people for their entry into 
wisdom.”   This sounds spurious at best, but for the definition that ‘wisdom’ 60
gains in the rest of the text. 
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 Wisdom, for Vasconcelos, is not a knowledge of things, emphatically not 
the positivist goal of a scientific knowing robust enough to effectively manipulate 
the world. Indeed, it is Mexican positivists, who dominated philosophy during 
the Porfiriato, he is writing against in every page of his treatise. Wisdom is 
something closer to accurately judging the beautiful. When the fifth race will have 
attained global hegemony: 
the orientation of conduct will not be sought in pitiful reason that 
explains but does not discover. It will rather be sought in creative 
feeling and convincing beauty. Norms will be given by fantasy, the 
supreme faculty. That is to say, life will be without norms, in a state 
in which everything that is born from feeling will be right.   61
It is a thrilling role for the perception of beauty and what he calls feeling; it has 
taken from reason’s ethical deliberations all authority and appropriated the 
guidance of actions exclusively for itself. Rather than prescribe knowable, fully 
cognitive norms for action, Vasconcelos’s wisdom demands that actions conform 
to feeling, which, not being fully cognitive, cannot provide anyone with norms. 
 It is clear that Kantian aesthetics is at the root of Vasconcelos’s thought 
here. He goes as far as to refer to “taste” when discussing perception as opposed 
to knowledge. The kind of demand that the presentation of beauty makes on the 
perceiver - namely, that all others articulate their perceptions with it - is 
Vasconcelos’s guarantee of subjective freedom even when regulating the actions 
of others. We can read the subversion of the ethical by sentiment here as the 
natural extension of the ‘india bonita’ contest’s attempt to create a common sense 
that would substantiate the cohesion of a community. It even departs from the 
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same intuition that the choice of mate is a key marker of common sense. 
Vasconcelos claims in his text that racial mixture, up until the “aesthetic or 
spiritual stage” of human history, proceeded chaotically and at random. In the 
aesthetic stage, by contrast, procreation would be guided by a sense of beauty 
both universal and subjective. Each would freely choose a mate while conforming 
to the harmonious development of the race. “Life,” he says, “founded on love, will 
come to be expressed in forms of beauty.”   These forms are not to be confused 62
for artworks. Vasconcelos is fully conscious of the limits to determination that 
beauty entails. Bare form, abstracted from the form of anything in particular, is 
all that is left. 
 Most importantly for the analysis here, the messianism of La raza cósmica 
makes explicit the content of the ‘aesthetic phase’ of the Mexican Revolution in at 
least one of its dominant manifestations. The crisis in the interpretation of 
actions opened up by the Revolution was, as we have seen, articulated in terms 
lifted from a European discourse on art. The manner of resolution bore out the 
consequences of this borrowing. Beauty would reveal itself to be empty and 
thereby belie the limits of its usefulness as social intervention. Fashioning the 
State after an ideal of the artwork dissolved a necessary condition for the 
possibility of any and all artworks. Vasconcelos avoids these dilemmas, but at the 
cost of throwing the aesthetic resolution of post-Revolutionary modernity in 
Mexico into a thoroughly ideal future, despite all his protestations. This is rather 
poignantly exemplified in the last paragraph of the treatise. There he tells his 
!83
!  Ibid., p. 2562
readers that the argument of his book was to be symbolized in an artwork 
commissioned for the Palace of Public Education, an institution he himself was 
largely responsible for. Allegorical carvings were to signify the civilizations and 
races of the world whose unification would mark the coming of the final race of 
Man. In the middle, a statue would stand for the progress of humankind through 
to its aesthetic perfection. The monument, however, was not built. It could not 
be. Here is our ruin. The statue could take no form adequate to its determination. 
The project of an artwork that has no identifiable form because it is proper to a 
stage in the evolution of the species that has transcended determination in favor 
of sensibility and creativity is a decidedly adequate image on which to end. The 
faith that Gamio and Vasconcelos project - that there could be, in art, a 
transcendence of the antinomies of modernity, the antinomies of bourgeois 
society - is left unfulfilled. 

What Goes By the Name Neoclassical? 
 Secondary literature on Chavez’s musical style has emphasized an 
oscillation between two tendencies that are apparently opposed. On the one 
hand, the composer explicitly makes use of classical forms and relies on tonal 
harmony, aspects that make him fit for classification as a neoclassical composer. 
On the other hand, his championing of Mexican indigeneity and his references to 
pre-Cortesian musical practices make him an unabashed primitivist. To a 
musicologist such as Gerard Béhague, he cannot properly be both at once. In 
other words, there is no synthesis between tendencies. In Béhague’s own words: 
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While his Sinfonia India is one of Chavez’s more overtly Indianist 
compositions, it has a clear affinity with neo-Classical works by 
such composers as Stravinsky and Copland. Brilliant orchestral 
effects and occasional Impressionist techniques (parallelism, for 
example) more than counteract references to either pre-Columbian 
musical culture or contemporary Mexican Indian music. Yet it is a 
well-integrated work, expressing the exuberant musicality of its 
composer even if remote from the roots of its ideological pretext.   63
The evaluation here is odd. The Sinfonia is well-integrated despite its ‘indianist’ 
traits being “counteracted” by its neoclassical devices. Those devices, apparently 
consist of harmonic parallelism and skillful orchestration (both, incidentally, 
strongly associated in the standard accounts of European modernism with 
French masters Debussy and Ravel). It almost goes without saying that neither of 
these counts as unavoidably neoclassical. The designation, however, follows from 
a well-worn historiographical model that understands the products of twentieth 
century composition as divided between a Germanic, Romantic, expressive line 
that ends in Schoenberg and a anti-German, neoclassical, objective line that ends 
in Stravinsky. The musical avant-gardes that do not follow from the German 
tradition are often grouped together as ‘neo-classical.’ The composers who are 
labelled neoclassical are as varied as Ravel and Hindemith, or indeed as above, 
Copland and Stravinsky. Because the term does not seem to enjoy much of a 
stable definition, one might well throw it out. After all, it does not have so specific 
a reference as, say, ‘serialism’ or even ‘atonality.’ However, this would bypass 
what Béhague is attempted to pick out about Chavez’s mature work. 
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 There are distinct parallels with Stravinsky - even a ‘neoclassical’ 
Stravinsky - to be found in Chavez. We can, therefore, outline what neo-
classicism was for the former so that it can be compared to what is to be found in 
the latter. As Scott Messing demonstrates in his monograph on neoclassicism in 
music, the term neoclassicism appeared in music criticism before the reception of 
Stravinsky’s most celebrated ‘neoclassical’ works, such as the Octet (1923).   The 64
term’s origins are associated with the French attempt to depart from Wagnerian 
musical aesthetics that privileged ‘progress,’ which resulted in a characteristic 
unwieldiness. It was understood that a Romantic drive to embody all the 
expressive force of subjectivity in an artwork had led to decadence. When the 
elder Chavez writes that the rallying call of his youth was “¡Chopin a la silla 
electrica!,” he refers precisely to this. The departure would be some version of a 
return to the principles of a more naive musical practice. What practice that 
ended up being did vary, but the gesture was always the same: modern decadence 
would be combated, subverted, or simply avoided by the clarity, simplicity, and 
immediacy of a borrowed, or restored aesthetic dispensation. The term garners 
more specificity in the context of Stravinsky’s critical reception and subsequent 
defense or degradation of his style in Stravinsky/Schoenberg polemics. In 
particular, the French critic Boris de Schloezer served to give the concept specific 
bearing. For him, Stravinsky’s neoclassical works, 
appear to us as an organic, natural synthesis of many different 
elements, such as Bach and the eighteenth-century masters, 
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sentimental or playful romance of the past era, and the rhythmic 
frenzy of negro-american music. This synthesis, that is our new 
classic style, otherwise called objective. 
It is imperative for Schloezer’s account that this last term be read non-
metaphorically. To that end, he goes on to recall that the conductor Ernest 
Ansermet prefers the term ‘realism.’ 
But it seems to me that this word lends itself to equivocating, and 
suggests, in any case, the idea, evidently false, but difficult to make 
clear, of a certain reproduction or representation of objective 
reality. Now when we oppose romanticism to classicism, we oppose 
two methods of creation or of different aesthetic organization; one, 
subjective, which consists of the artist constructing his work in a 
different function of his state of consciousness which this work is 
destined to express; the other, objective, which consists of 
attributing to a work of art an absolute and completely autonomous 
existence in only causing to intervene in its structure purely formal 
considerations.   65
Realism is an insufficient term for Schloezer, then, because it fails to properly 
distinguish between a representing and a making. The subjective composer 
creates, no doubt, but the creation is expressive of content lent to the creation by 
subjective consciousness. It is representative in this sense. The objective 
composer bypasses this mediation, designing forms directly in the world. 
Ansermet’s term skips over the distinction it is meant to describe. 
 The opposition of subjective to objective composition is tied to a thought 
about the relationship of form to content. If musical form is not expressive of 
inner content, then that form must be its own content, so to speak. That is, the 
‘formal considerations’ that Schloezer mentions must be either the sole 
conditions of what appears on the page and what is heard, or at least a coherent 
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set of such conditions that can stand alone.   This will guarantee ‘objectivity’ on 66
the part of the music. 
 Chavez writes in a similar vein - and specifically referring to Stravinsky - 
as early as 1924: 
It is not possible to separate external from internal form, just as it is 
not possible to refrain from seeing in “the details” the true and 
unique substance of things. External form comes exclusively from 
substance and the only manifestation of substance is external form. 
[...] Some distinguish between technique and meaning. That almost 
obliges us to believe that Stravinsky could have expressed “his 
meaning” using Beethoven’s technique. But if (assuming the 
distinction) Stravinsky had used Beethoven’s technique to “tell the 
world his message,” (!) it would be because the message arrived to 
the former with a blue stamp reading “delayed in transmission.” 
Perhaps we would not even have opened it.   67
Chavez held this position throughout his career. It appears with some frequency 
in his published writings.   68
 The composer’s peculiar humor aside, his position on form is striking. He 
separates form and substance, or content, only to deny the possibility of the 
distinction. The passage almost reads like a moment of dialectics where the 
possibility, even the necessity of terms is simultaneously affirmed and denied. 
For Chavez, art is flattened into its form, which bears no traces of nationalism, 
utopian social engineering, vitalism, or transcendence. Instead it takes 
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responsibility for its own diremption from subjective determination and becomes 
pure, unmitigated objectivity. 
 The question remains, how may this objective determination work in  the 
world, or as I put it, how can it become a relevant world for Mexican society, if at 
all? And if not, what reason does it obey. After all, objective determination cannot 
simply transcend the appeal that the individual Carlos Chavez makes to its power. 
Objective determination remains social, even and particularly when, as is the case 
with Chavez, it is said otherwise. 
 In the thoughts on aesthetics discussed so far the artwork, or beautiful 
thing or person, has been the privileged site of coherence and organic unity. The 
beauty of an indigenous girl could determine beauty and the autonomous state 
could take its cue from autonomous artworks, or at least the judgments of taste 
typically reserved for artworks. In Antigona we have already seen Chavez attempt 
to avoid these characteristic forms of post-Revolutionary aesthetics. If the 
Revolution opened up a breach in the substance of society that could conceivably 
be bridged by aesthetics, Chavez’s vision is altogether more bleak. 
 In his journalistic writing from the decades after the Revolution he bitterly 
mocks simple nationalisms as well as the local avant-garde. Neither, he suggests, 
is fitted to the reality of the Mexican situation. An important article of his 
responds to the insistence of a Spanish musicologist that composers from the 
Americas “americanize” their music. “Americanizaos bien vosotros mismos, 
evitad las inoculaciones europeas,” he paraphrases. Striking at the suggestion 
that relying on European models for composition is a way Latin American 
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composers to protect themselves from their reality, Chavez is quick to point out 
the irony in Europeans, who went to great pains in history to “europeanize” 
America, now “pat us on the shoulder and remind us that we are europeanized.” 
He affirms this: “In the same way that our commerce, our industry, our riches, 
etc. are foreign, our urban music is also foreign. [...] In the same way that we use 
Gillete (sic) razors to shave, we are dependent on European criticism to polish 
our musical impressions and bolster our judgments on the great esthetic-musical 
problems.”   Mexico is radically dependent for Chavez. This empty essence is 69
paradoxically the content of his nationalism. He prefaces his statement: “What I 
will say is probably disheartening, but I say it with tenderness and sadness, for 
those are the fundamental elements of my patriotism.”   70
 Chavez’s ‘neoclassicism’ follows from the insight that lettered composition 
arrives with all the subjective or national authenticity of a Gillette razor. The 
objectivity of the imported commodity cannot be subverted or transcended: the 
Revolutionary hope for art. Art can, however, radicalize objectivity. Chavez can 
have Stravinsky’s neoclassical relationship to the musical past, one that sees it as 
raw material for a compositional method that avoids Romantic aesthetics. 
Chavez’s neoclassicism might be parallel to Stravinsky’s, but its meaning is 
entirely distinct. It is specific to its Mexican circumstance. This was what the 
musicologist Jesús Bal y Gay meant when he wrote that Chavez was a 
“compositor tan stravinskista como poco stravinskiano.”   But the question of 71
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neo-classicism, which is the manifestly recognized face of objectivity, is not fully 
resolved by this admission. 
 In Chavez, pace Béhague, the primitive, Aztec past is the most important 
reference point for the composer’s neoclassicism. Nowhere is this more 
pronounced than in Xochipilli-Macuilzochitl (1940), subtitled ‘An Imagined 
Aztec Music.’ The piece was written for concerts of Mexican music which were 
organized to coincide with an exposition at the Museum of Modern Art in New 
York City called ‘Twenty Centuries of Mexican Art.’ In the published concert 
notes, Herbert Weinstock writes that “Carlos Chavez states clearly that Xochipili-
Macuilzichitl (sic) is not an actual reconstruction of pre-Conquest music, but that 
he believes that it offers a general impression of how that ancient Mexican music 
must have sounded.”   This impression is based on the composer’s study of 72
musical instruments that survive from the pre-Conquest period, the pitch range 
and intervallic possibilities they demonstrate as well as the relationship among 
instruments that appear most likely. Chavez’s own introduction to the concert 
notes includes a very long quotation from Juan de Torquemada, a 16th century 
Spanish missionary whose description of native music Chavez perceives as 
authentic and useful. Chavez is engaged in something between art and crypto-
ethnography here. It bears no traces of subjective engagement. Rather, it is an 
‘objective’ approximation of a pre-modern musical practice, primarily horizontal 
and rhythmic, polyphonic without being properly contrapuntal. The composition 
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is determined by Schloezer’s ‘formal considerations.’ Chavez has given us another 
kind of ruin. 
 Romanticism has been avoided, but not because of its decadence or lack of 
taste or clarity. Rather, the neoclassical rejection of romantic aesthetic unity and 
dialectical closure represents a taking seriously of what is unavailable to the 
composer inasmuch as he is Mexican. This is Chavez’s ‘disheartening’ 
nationalism. Pieces like Los cuatro soles or El fuego nuevo are Chavez’s way of 
moving past simple imitation and contributing to a project that was proper to his 
post-Revolutionary moment. The ‘neoclassical’ Chavez is no less ‘indianist’ in one 
sense, but his departure from the political project of art sees him move past the 
dominant aesthetic ideology which surrounded him. What he gives us in his most 
mature works, such as Xochipilli, is a way of witnessing through art a national 
experience of expropriation and systematic objectivation of expressive material in 
bourgeois society. In this way, Chavez is a quintessentially Mexican composer 
insofar as his music offers an experience of an interrupted Mexican subjectivity. 

The Will for Form 
 This is all to say that Chavez’s compositional conclusions after his early 
nationalist period know something. However, if artworks ‘know’ something, it is 
not clear what they know. The troubled relationship of forms to their 
determination can easily be interpreted as the result of an abstract force. This is 
precisely the tack Octavio Paz takes throughout his prose writings. As a means to 
making Chavez’s musical contribution to the debates on Mexican aesthetics clear, 
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some comparison to Paz’s view is useful. He is at pains to give a ground to the 
historical emergence and dissolution of forms and goes as far as to make this a 
principle of history. In his celebrated speculative account of the essence of 
modern Mexican self-consciousness, The Labyrinth of Solitude, Paz cites 
recurrent crises of expressive form as generating the historical emergence of 
national identity. “The whole history of Mexico, from the Conquest to the 
Revolution,” he writes, “can be regarded as a search for our own selves, which 
have been deformed or disguised by alien institutions, and for a form that will 
express them.”   Indigenous society before the Conquest, sustained by an 73
unforced fitness of religious and political form for the perpetuation of society as 
an ethical whole - but nonetheless resigned to its own catastrophic passing away - 
gave way in the wake of Cortez to a series of social forms tragically unequipped to 
achieve legitimacy even while they were at times able to sustain political stability. 
Insofar as a society conceives of itself as an independent whole (a process Paz 
metaphorically names ‘adolescence’), it must rely on conceptual categories that 
interpret social conditions. The extent to which those categories do not contradict 
one another and, what is more, allow for the intelligibility and reproduction of 
cognitive and ethical norms, is the extent of the formal legitimacy of the relevant 
concepts. For example, the Catholic scholasticism that determined the formal 
coordinates of colonial society frayed at the point at which reason confronted the 
demands of faith. Paz points to the writings of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz as an 
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attempt to reconcile modern natural science with Catholic dogma, reading her 
poetry as offering up creative formal solutions to a crisis in the legitimacy of the 
dominant categories of social reproduction. The nationalism of the post-
Independence period adopted different conceptual schemes to found society, but 
the internal dynamic it experienced did not differ in kind from its colonial 
counterpart. Formal norms and reality fell apart.  
 By interpreting the history of Mexican nationhood in this way, Paz 
elegantly reduces the problem of national self-identity to the problem of 
representation. Art, therefore, attains a social role for Paz, one that responds to 
the question of formal legitimacy, although, as we will see, necessarily without 
the resources it would need to respond successfully. The hope of modern art is 
that it might continue fully conscious that it will keep falling short of its promise. 
It must constantly rehearse its end. It must do this because it is the only way to 
know the will for form beyond any given form. The metaphysics here run deep. 
Paz lays out his position in full: 
Will for life is will for form. Death, in its most visible and immediate 
expression, is the disintegration of form. Childhood and youth are 
the promise of form. Old age is the ruin of physical form; death, the 
fall into formlessness. That is why one of the most ancient and 
simple manifestations of the will for life is art. The first thing man 
did upon discovering that he was mortal was to erect a tomb. Art 
began with the consciousness of death. The mausoleum, since 
ancient times, has been both an homage to the dead and a defiance 
of death: the body decays, turns to dust, but the monument 
remains. Form remains. We are threatened not only by death but by 
time itself, which makes, then unmakes, us. Every sculpture, every 
painting, every poem, every song is a form animated by the will to 
survive time and its erosions. The now wants to be saved, to be 
converted into stone or drawing, into color, sound, or word. [...] 
There is no apparent commonality among the stylized jaguars of the 
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Olmecs, the gilded angels of the seventeenth century, and the richly 
colored violence of a Tamayo oil - nothing, save the will to survive 
through and in form.   74
Art here is in the service of a knowing beyond art. It constantly registers its own 
condition, which Paz deems to be a will in nature acting as a sort of inexhaustible 
libidinal spring in and for history. Death is equated with formlessness, so art 
becomes the human being’s most advanced way of surviving. No determinate 
forms can survive the onslaught of death, thus bare form is all that can. This 
oblique embracing of bare form is Paz’s modernism just as the project of an 
aesthetic utopia was Vasconcelos’s, and indeed, just as disheartening, anti-
Romantic, ethnographic patriotism is Chavez’s. 

 Even if we embrace a ‘knowing’ in and of art as it is appears in Chavez and 
Paz, however, disappointment cannot be averted. Recall that the problem that 
presented itself to the young Chavez, that of getting beyond imitative composition 
and participating authentically as an artist in the building up of a post-
Revolutionary society, has not simply been overcome. Rather, it has been 
displaced. 
 A year after the concerts at MOMA, Chavez spoke to a Mexican radio 
audience about the 1910 Revolution and the role of music in that political 
struggle: 
But do not think that we ought to accept that the greatest degree of 
mexican-ness of our music be the ultimate reason for its supreme 
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beauty or ultimate legitimacy. It is not enough to forge Mexican 
nationality, rather we ought to make a just Mexico. As with art, our 
music ought to be just; just in its broad human sense, in its balance 
of form and content, in its sense of elevation and sublimation. 
Having achieved this two-fold goal [mexican-ness and justice] 
Mexican art will see itself reintegrated into the collectivity that in 
truth nourishes and vivifies it.   75
It is as good a summary of the Revolutionary aesthetic ideal as one can find. It is 
fraught, of course, with contradictions now familiar. In order for Mexican art to 
be ‘reintegrated into the collectivity’ it does not need to have any particular 
degree of ‘mexican-ness.’ This was the antinomy of Mexican beauty. Music’s 
internal balance is necessary in order for it to participate in making a ‘just 
Mexico.’ This is the antinomy of the Aesthetic State. Any honest take on Chavez’s 
output reveals that his own work falls short of these goals. 
 What Chavez did produce was a music that was both specifically Mexican 
and universally valid. He did this by embracing a kind of ‘objective’ composition 
that described the negative space that is substantial mexicanidad. Whether it 
appears as a coldly mechanical, non-contrapuntal polyphony or Paz’s positively 
valanced, life producing void, it is always negative. That negativity is at once that 
of neo-colonial dependency and bourgeois subjectivity. This is, ultimately, the 
‘content’ of Chavez’s contribution to Latin American music. The next chapter will 
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32-33. Pero no se piense que debemos aceptar y conformarnos con que el mayor grado de 
mexicanidad de nuestra música sea la razón suprema de su belleza, ni su justificación última. [...] 
no basta con forjar una nacionalidad mexicana, así, a secas, sino que hay que hacer un México 
justo. Del mismo modo el arte, del mismo modo nuestra música, deba ser también justa. Justa 
por su sentido humano general, por su proporción de forma y contenido, por su sentido de altura 
y de sublimación. Al verse logrado este doble fin, el arte mexicano se verá reintegrado a la 
colectividad en forma que en verdad la nutra y la vivifique.
outline what might be done in the wake of this contribution, what might, in fact, 
be authentic about negativity as such. 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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE METAPHYSICS OF GAUCHO SONG 
 Unlike the previous chapter, the protagonist of this one is not a composer, 
but a musical genre. More specifically, it is the concept of that genre as it tracks 
through the history of modern Argentina. The gauchesca has long been 
understood as the quintessentially Argentine musico-poetic genre: the figure of 
the gaucho himself serving as either patriotic symbol or figure of bad conscience. 
Apart from the actual sung lyric of the historical cowboy of the plains, the history 
of the genre’s concept is that of a set of reflections on the constitutive 
contradictions of peripheral modernity. This chapter will trace those reflections 
from the concept’s initial theoretical formulation in the thought of Domingo 
Faustino Sarmiento, through its crucial elaboration by the philosopher Carlos 
Astrada, on to its version in the compositions of Alberto Ginastera. 

 Before delving into intellectual history, however, something must be said 
about the historical gaucho and his material circumstance. What became the 
Argentine state began with the creation toward the end of the eighteenth century 
of the viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, a crucial component of the Bourbon reforms. 
The new seat of regional authority at Buenos Aires transformed the city into a 
major American port, opening a significant new route for precious metals to 
travel from the mines of Potosí in modern-day Bolivia to the Peninsula. Apart 
from the sliver of land used for this route and the port capital itself, the vast 
territory under Buenos Aires’s control was irrelevant to the Spanish Empire’s 
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economic (and therefore political) interest. For most of the colonial period, the 
large plains that extended west of the river were inhabited by bellicose natives, 
making settling these lands unattractive compared to those which stretched out 
east and bordered with Portuguese territory. The plains, knows as the Pampa, 
were subject to a slow and uneven incorporation into the emerging global 
capitalist system. As that system developed, the regulation of property was of 
increasing concern to the state and to property owners. Nomadic gauchos, who 
lived largely off of the slaughter of cattle, posed a direct threat to that regulation. 
By the end of Spanish rule, gauchos had already acquired their name and were 
subject to all manner of repression, officially sanctioned and not, which included 
military conscription. The very embodiment of class conflict in the region, the 
cowboy was ‘poetized’ - as Ricardo Rodríguez Molas puts it - rather early on. 
Thinking the gaucho became thinking the possibility of economic and political 
modernity in Argentina as such. It is not by accident that along with their means 
of subsistence, gaucho culture was legally restricted. The history of Argentine law 
bears witness to a ban that prohibited “juntas de gentes ni de guitarras.”   The 76
gaucho song, as the rest of this chapter seeks to make plain, is inseparable from 
thinking the contradictions of Argentine dependence. 

Sarmiento’s Musical Outlaw 
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 What follows is premised on an apparent perversity: I take it that whatever 
literary interest it might inspire, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s Facundo is 
primarily - and, fairly transparently - a work of philosophy. A century and a half 
of the book’s reception history has read it otherwise.   It has either been taken to 77
be a work of fiction and therefore more like a novel than anything else, or it has 
been read as a quirky and unreliable work of amateur sociology in whose 
brokenness we might recognize the image of that fractured Reason that is 
claimed to characterize the Latin American condition.   Classifying the work, 78
however, is not a simple matter of correct labeling. What genre we understand 
Sarmiento to be contributing to determines the status of his claims. Given the 
nature of the text, the circumstances that inspired its composition, and the 
central place it enjoys (and suffers from) in the canon of Argentine literature and 
in “Latin America” as a whole, the question of Facundo’s genre status cannot help 
but be a political one. As Ezequiel Martínez Estrada reminds us in his study of the 
author, reading Sarmiento’s text as a novel is an effective way to dismiss its 
insights, one historically deployed by Sarmiento’s political opponents. The 
expected payoff here lies in giving conceptual density to the gauchesca as a music 
genre. 
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 Marginal by definition and only incorporated into the symbolic logic of 
national popular culture at the moment of his dispossession (a classic ideological 
process Josefina Ludmer calls 'demarginalization'), Argentina's gaucho is the 
cultural sign of Southern Cone independence par excellence. He is set off in 
history by a seemingly infinite series of appropriations, both physical (such as 
army conscription and imprisonment) and ideal. The gaucho's historical face is 
blurred by the meanings it is made to bear. Still, there are aspects of his person 
that remain surprisingly consistent. What follows is concerned with the 
identification and development of one of these consistencies. It is, rather, a 
singular thought, namely, that the Argentine gaucho is a musician. This is, no 
doubt, a familiar thought, as it appears frequently and prominently throughout 
gauchesca literature from the first lines of Martín Fierro to the Gounod 
commentary of the Fausto Criollo. That the gaucho belongs to music history is 
also unproblematic. Gauchesca song was adopted by Argentine composers as 
early as the mid-nineteenth century as the basis for an autochthonous national 
style, and in the twentieth it can still be heard regulating folk music aesthetics in 
and for that country. Familiar, then, the thought may be, but I take it that its 
meaning remains opaque. The gaucho’s musicianship is not merely an empirical 
matter. Music was, of course, a part of the historical gaucho’s life as the work of 
Isabel Aretz has convincingly shown, but this research does not shed any light on 
the matter at hand.   The issue for us is accounting for the constitutively musical 79
status of this figure. 
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 Because it is to the concrete figure of the gaucho - the result of speculation 
- rather than to the abstract historical gaucho - the mere product of induction - 
that we turn, the primarily relevant document is Sarmiento’s Facundo. There one 
finds the first and most rigorously worked out version of the thesis that the 
gaucho is a musician. Working out Sarmiento’s thought promises to point us 
toward a coherent position on aesthetics in some sense specific to a philosophical 
conception of America. 
 The description of the gaucho cantor occurs at the heart of Sarmiento’s 
analytical reconstruction of what he calls an ‘order of things’ unique to the 
Argentine countryside. His goal here is to make visible a regime of normalcy that 
reigns among the gauchos of the plains so as to explain how that regime could 
become so powerful and threaten to supplant European progressive society. In 
contrast with the rest of the book,  its first three chapters are barely concerned 
with history or biography. Time in the pampas, it would seem, does not move 
historically in the manner of narrative. Rather, its tendencies are simply 
reproduced and radicalized. Temporal stasis in these passages results from the 
eruption of geography into history.   80
 This occurs at two levels. Geographical determinants are presumed to 
engender social realities that halt the normal course of history. As is well known, 
for Sarmiento, the particular spatial configuration of the pampas, with their 
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monotonous landscape, flat topography and endless sky, made the place and its 
people unsusceptible to change or transformation, let alone historical ‘progress.] 
At the same time, however, those determinants vanish upon inspection. Space 
migrates onto the temporal plane because the geographical makeup of the 
pampas gives itself over to space as such. It is this second level that is often 
passed over by interpretations of Sarmiento that nonetheless emphasize his 
geographical determinism. Geographical determinism it no doubt is, but of a 
conceptual kind. In this light, we can take seriously Sarmiento’s novelistic 
language: “Al sur triunfa la Pampa, y ostenta su lisa y velluda frente, infinita, sin 
límite conocido, sin accidente notable: es la imagen del mar en la tierra; la tierra 
como el mapa.”   The association of the plains with featurelessness and of 81
featurelessness with abstraction is clear. They make of earth the representation of 
earth. Land and water dissolve into one another. One might argue that 
featurelessness is the pampas’ feature. Here, however, the logic of abstraction, 
specifically of aesthetic abstraction, wins out: Characteristics evaporate. 
 At the risk of running over the text’s implicit assumptions, we would do 
well to give historical density to this otherwise de-historicized claim. To wit, this 
space is modern empty space, something approaching Kantian transcendental 
aesthesis. The reference is only somewhat rash, as it is the wages of aesthetic 
abstraction that are ultimately at issue. Sarmiento describes the effects of this 
abstraction on the poet Echeverría: 
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allá en la inmensidad sin límites, en las soledades en que vaga el 
salvaje, en la lejana zona de fuego que el viajero ve acercarse 
cuando los campos se incendian, halló las inspiraciones que 
proporciona a la imaginación el espectáculo de una naturaleza 
solemne, grandiosa, inconmensurable, callada.   82
This could serve as a technical definition of the natural sublime. The poet’s 
subjectivity, in its particularity, is brought into aesthetic contact with the abstract 
universality manifest in nature. If it is true that the quality of both the space and 
the sublime experience of the Pampa are thoroughly modern, sustaining nothing 
of mimetism and in some sense offered up to the domination of Man (an aspect 
heavily emphasized by Sarmiento), then the subjectivity it determines is just as 
modern. And this ought to go for the lettered Echeverría just as much as for the 
illiterate gaucho. It is precisely this ‘ought,’ however, which is suppressed, just as 
much in the nineteenth century as in our own. 
 To the extent that we understand  Sarmiento’s geographical determinism 
in this way, we can recast the central struggle of Facundo - civilization against 
barbarism - as a struggle immanent to modernity itself. The homogenous, empty 
space created by modern colonialism is perfectly reflected in the desert landscape 
and the society fashioned upon it suffers in abstraction. The gauchos are 
immediate masters of nature who do not labor, because they are able to 
reproduce the conditions of their livelihoods without it. To evoke a well known 
dialectic: they are Masters who have no need of Slaves, as Nature herself fills that 
role. He writes: 
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El pastoreo proporciona las mismas ventajas, y la función 
inhumana del ilota antiguo la desempeña el ganado. La procreación 
espontánea forma y acrece indefinidamente la fortuna; la mano del 
hombre está por demás; su trabajo, su inteligencia, su tiempo no 
son necesarios para la conservación y aumento de los medios de 
vivir. Pero si nada de esto necesita para lo material de la vida, las 
fuerzas que economiza no puede emplearlas como el romano.   83
The passage reads like an unwitting critique of Marx. The gaucho merely 
consumes without having to live in alienation from his labor time. He represents 
a leisure class outside the context of any form of class struggle. And as we know: 
for Marx, outside of class struggle means outside of history. We should be careful, 
though, not to reinsert Marx back into Sarmiento’s casual critique. To wit, class 
struggle cannot produce history in a Marxian way not simply because there is 
only one class, but because there is no history on which class struggle could play 
out in Sarmiento’s Pampa. 
 What prevents a society of Masters from creating a civilization is the onset 
of boredom. The gaucho, in his isolation, discovers a characteristically modern 
sentiment: ennui. Sarmiento tells us that the end of a gaucho boy’s maturity is his 
entry into idleness. Idleness here is not different in kind from that which we 
might find in Paris at precisely this moment. Just as it is there, our idle moderns 
of the Pampa fall into nihilism coupled with the addicting innervation of cruelty. 
“Desde la infancia,” Sarmiento writes, “están habituados a matar las reses, y que 
este acto de crueldad necesaria los familiariza con el derramamiento de sangre y 
endurece su corazón contra los gemidos de las víctimas.”   84
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 Mastery, idleness, and cruelty are all symptoms of the radical individuality 
of Sarmiento’s gaucho. Forced by geography to travel lonely distances and live at 
great distances from all others, there can be no substantial social institutions for 
him: 
En las llanuras argentinas no existe la tribu nómade: el pastor posee 
el suelo con títulos de propiedad, está fijo en un punto que le 
pertenece; pero para ocuparlo, ha sido necesario disolver la 
asociación y derramar las familias sobre una inmensa superficie. 
[...] El desenvolvimiento de la propiedad mobiliaria no es 
imposible, los goces del lujo no son del todo incompatibles con este 
aislamiento: puede levantar la fortuna un soberbio edificio en el 
desierto; pero el estímulo falta, el ejemplo desaparece, la necesidad 
de manifestarse con dignidad, que se siente en las ciudades no se 
hace sentir allí en aislamiento y la soledad. Las privaciones 
indispensables justifican la pereza natural y la frugalidad en los 
goces trae en seguida todas las exterioridades de la barbarie. La 
sociedad ha desaparecido completamente.   85
The full realization of the individual Sarmiento describes is the monstrous 
extension of liberal ideals of self-sufficiency and autonomy. If the gaucho is 
anything, he is an autonomous subject. His society, then, can never take the form 
of a city - a polis - but to the extent that his individual interest aligns with those 
who surround him, he can forge what amount to business partnerships and rustle 
up bands of thieves. 
 The idle, nihilistic individual can do nothing but constantly reproduce the 
signs of his own mastery in different forms. Sarmiento is clear that this can be 
done as effectively in a duel as it can in an arbitrary bet. The need for self-
expression that is inherent to his ideal makes it imperative that the gaucho 
externalize his individuality. Despite his isolation, there cannot be such a thing as 
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a man who is but a ‘private’ gaucho: a well adjusted member of a substantial 
community on the outside, but who burns with radical individuality in the depths 
of his spirit. That kind of self-consciousness is impossible as it is dependent on 
the kind of communal existence denied to the gaucho by geography. Even the 
gaucho malo “no es en el fondo un ser más depravado que los que habitan en las 
poblaciones.” “El gaucho malo no es un bandido,” Sarmiento continues, because 
although he steals, it is his “science.”   86
 It is ultimately, I want to argue, on this unusual conception of action and 
agency that the whole of the argument of Facundo rests. It reappears constantly 
throughout the biographical narrative. One famous scene has the youthful 
Facundo Quiroga sparing with a wild tiger. The contrast between the animal’s 
pure brutality and Facundo’s very human bravery is key. In these latter pages, the 
less intuitive, mechanical geographical determinism that appeared so central at 
the start of the text begins to fall away and be replaced by its conceptual avatar. 
Or, to put it more accurately, mechanical determinism reveals itself to have been 
the avatar for a kind of conceptual abstraction at the heart of Sarmiento’s 
concerns all along. 
 The concept of action is roughly as follows: having no spiritual 
community, the individual cannot come to terms with himself as he is in himself. 
Without the negativity at work in the formation of substantial bonds, the gaucho 
is condemned to the pure positivity of his arbitrary actions. He is a merely 
external force.  
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 It has become clear, I hope, at this point that we have finally found 
ourselves returning to aesthetics. For what can the necessarily pure externality of 
the gaucho’s actions be if not art? We should take Sarmiento at his word when he 
states, 
Si de las condiciones de la vida pastoril tal como la ha constituido la 
colonización y la incuria, nacen graves dificultades para una 
organización política cualquiera, y muchas más para el triunfo de la 
civilización europea, [...] no puede por otra parte negarse que esta 
situación tiene su costado poético, y faces dignas de la pluma del 
romanticista.   87
The point appears here explicitly, even if, at the level of the text, its implications 
are obscure. Debates about the genre status of Facundo can find some resolution 
here. Sarmiento moves from descriptive analysis to narrative to proscription, but 
rather than undermine the work’s status as primarily philosophical, we can read 
this oscillation as symptomatic of a fidelity to the link found in ‘pastoral life’ 
between art and science. 
 The association of merely external action and art is best displayed in the 
pairing of the gaucho malo with the cantor. The two figures are versions of one 
another. The adventures of the gaucho, his actions, are amenable to narration in 
song because they are, in essence, already art. The same person can even play 
both roles in succession: “El cantor mezcla entre sus cantos heroicos la relación 
de sus propias hazañas. [...] Tiene que dar la cuenta de sendas puñaladas que ha 
distribuido, una o dos desgracias (muertes!) que tuvo, y algún caballo o 
muchacha que robó.”   88
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 The cantor is the figure in which we are able to see the gaucho’s 
unsustainability and finitude. The pure particularity of his life in the Pampa finds 
itself up against the universality of the European society in Buenos Aires which 
threatens to subsume his lifeworld along with its claim to absoluteness. If the 
gaucho’s life ends up as mere art - mere aesthesis - he disappears into the image 
of himself. His fate, in other words, is Martín Fierro. This liminality is what 
Sarmiento refers to when he identifies the cantor with the medieval bard: “El 
gaucho cantor es el mismo bardo, el vate, el trovador de la Edad Media, que se 
mueve en la misma escena, entre las luchas de las ciudades y del feudalismo de 
los campos, entre la vida que se va y la vida que se acerca.” The point here is not, 
as is so often assumed, that on American soil, two time periods or ‘temporalities’ 
can be found juxtaposed in space. As argued above, there is nothing anachronistic 
about the gaucho in Sarmiento’s account. He is as modern as the city he opposes. 
The cantor is like the medieval bard because the bard is the artist of a 
disappearing lifeworld, the artist of change. Put differently, while in the gaucho 
cantor we do not encounter a historical person as such, we nonetheless discover 
something about historicity in the Pampa. And this is possible because of the pair 
the cantor makes with the lettered poet: “En la República Argentina se ven a un 
tiempo dos civilizaciones distintas en su mismo suelo: una naciente, que sin 
conocimiento de los que tiene sobre su cabeza, está remedando los esfuerzos 
ingenuos y populares de la Edad Media; otra que sin cuidarse de los que tiene a 
sus pies, intenta realizar los últimos resultados de la civilización europea.”   The 89
!109
!  Ibid., p. 9189
particularity of the gaucho is placed alongside the universality of the cultured 
city-dweller and, between them, they participate in what I am tempted to call a 
‘dialectic of Civilization’ to complement a well-known dialectic of the 
Enlightenment. 

Metaphysics in the Plains 
 That song is lost is a premise of Carlos Astrada’s reading of the gauchesca. 
In his brief essay from 1963, “El numen del paisaje: los signos rúnicos del 
silencio,” he characterizes the Pampa as an evacuated space. Originating as a 
geography saturated by the ethical life of its indigenous inhabitants, the plains 
were forcibly removed from their unmediated significance and made empty by 
Spanish conquistadors whose universalizing imperialism destroyed everything in 
its voracious path. Whatever was left of substantial life in the interior was finally 
fully eradicated by what Astrada calls ”statists,” those founding fathers of the 
Argentine Republic who waged war on native populations in an effort to establish 
European-style national sovereignty. In his words, 
Después el silencio, que se vino adensando, cuajó en una runa 
invisible con su secreto sellado, el único monumento del pasado de 
la Pampa. Este silencio, con sus enigmas, con su verbo en potencia, 
esperaba, sin duda, su rapsoda.   90
Astrada’s Rousseauian conception of the musical origin of language is articulated 
in the same essay. The originary song that ordered the seemingly characterless 
geography of the Pampa into something that mattered of itself in the context of a 
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lifeworld has been silenced. Only another singing can retrieve it. The gauchos are 
those who returned to the interminable flatness after fighting off Spanish rule. 
What they heard there was a material determinate negation: silence. The 
evacuation in question, then, has a certain weight, a presence. Something is 
meant to be disclosed or, better, retrieved out of this silence that might redeem it. 
This silence is not a simple absence of sound. It is already mediated. A product of 
a silencing, the acoustic void carries a demand to be filled. Rather than being a 
demand issued from another subject, pampean silence issues its demand from 
out of its mere concept. As a result, the demand is categorical. This is an altered 
version of a Kantian categorical imperative in which the gaucho who does not 
hear the silence of the Pampa and its implicit call - in Heideggerian language, a 
‘harkening’ - misrecognizes it. Part of what it means for the space - I should say 
the place - of the Pampa to exist objectively is for that place to relate to action. 
Remembering for a moment the complexity that action takes in Sarmiento’s 
account, silence may well demand something that cannot be fulfilled. 
 It is precisely this thought about silence that makes Astrada a pivotal 
figure in the self-reflexive history of the gauchesca. The silence left by 
colonialism and genocide is the ontological condition of art in this place. 
Radicalizing the gauchesca and rendering its ontological stakes essentially 
changes how we interpret it. Silence is also the limit art runs up against in its 
struggle to achieve meaning. 
 Silence is one of many terms in Astrada’s work for solitude. Melancholy is 
another: “Todo de su ser es una sombra en fuga y dispersión sobre su total 
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melancolía, correlato espiritual (ontológico) de la infinitud monocorde de la 
extensión.”   If the reading of Facundo offered above is correct, there is nothing 91
in this thought that separates Astrada from Sarmiento. The same modern subject, 
in all its fraught autonomy, is at issue here as it was there. The step Astrada takes 
is to make of this analysis a metaphysics and he does this, importantly, by placing 
art front and center. This is done in two (big) steps. First, the autonomous subject 
is defined by its infinite expanse. There is no outside of subjective experience. 
Everything is encompassed by it and, therefore, it cannot distinguish itself from a 
void. What was merely implicit in Sarmiento’s gaucho is here explicitly claimed 
as the essential structure of properly Argentine subjectivity. The silence of the 
Pampa finds its proper counterpart in the empty, melancholic gaucho. 
 Note the play of universality and particularity here. The Pampa and the 
subjective experience it structures - and, in turn, is structured by it - are moments 
of particularity. The gaucho is nothing if not an individual and the force of seeing 
the plains as the source of specifically Argentine national life relies on those 
plains being particular. Nevertheless, it is the nature of these twined 
particularities to mediate the universal. The subject cannot make out its border in 
the face of a horizon that is constantly receding and thereby slips unwittingly and 
reluctantly into universal objectivity, something like the photonegative of Hegel’s 
universal subjectivity. The subject’s slippage, however, should not be interpreted 
as a debasement into mere thinghood. Quite to the contrary, a universal 
objectivity here demonstrates the cosubstantiality of subject and object. All the 
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ontological commitments, in the strongest sense of this word, are firmly in place. 
The spiritual correlation the subject discovers with extension is, as Astrada 
insists, metaphysical. The Pampa is filled with a silence that can only be 
responded to existentially and the only proper response to its demands are 
universal. If meaning is to be restored, through song or otherwise, to that place 
that appears as nothing but space, it cannot be done partially. Astrada is explicit 
about the urgency that inheres in this geography: 
Proponerse ya el problema tiene, para nosotros un sentido de 
urgencia solícita con respecto a nuestro propio ser y a nuestro 
porvenir existencial y vital. Es, en un dramático esfuerzo por 
recogernos de la dispersión, afanarse, en la Pampa inmensa, por 
una ciudadela espiritual en que fortificar una esperanza contra el 
asedio de la desolación cósmica, contra la presión del témpano de la 
soledad telúrica; es, sobreponiéndonos a nuestro dolor de 
náufragos, decidirse a bracear en este mar monótono y melancólico 
para alcanzar la tierra firme de una certidumbre salvadora, el 
pathos profundo en que hundir y estabilizar raíces.    92
One can clearly make out in this passage the logic of Unhappy Consciousness. 
The Argentine/gaucho subject locates the source of its meaningfulness outside 
itself. It is nothing but a castaway. Astrada prescribes a radicalization of this 
condition as the only solution. So far, however, the manner in which this is meant 
to be carried out remains obscure. 
 The properly metaphysical aspect of this argument, at least, should now be 
clear. The physical expanse and the fragile human beings that inhabit it are not at 
all (or, rather, not any more) themselves. What allows that which appears to 
appear is prior to the gaucho. That distinction accounts for his metaphysics. The 
!113
!  Ibid., p. 17.92
gaucho and his plains are already a second-order reflection. Neither space nor 
subject can but reflect on itself. 
 This is the moment art intercedes. It is Astrada’s second (big) step beyond 
Sarmiento. Where the nineteenth century letrado could only imagine the 
banishment of barbarism through rationalization as a solution to the problems of 
modernity, the twentieth century philosopher cannot avoid skepticism. Song 
appeared in Facundo as the residue of significant action. It was, by definition, 
impotent. Astrada hears in the gaucho song the same barbarism, but recognizes it 
as the return of repressed myth. This is anything but powerless or insignificant. 
Through gaucho song, the binding power of substantial community can be forged 
without giving up on individuality. 
 Astrada believes that this process has already begun with Martín Fierro. 
For him, this poem/song represents the kind of modern myth-making that is 
required: “Martín Fierro es y quiere ser, en la intención originaria de su creador, 
viva encarnación del mito de los argentinos.”   There are two important aspects 93
to this thought. The first is the perfect alignment of intention and result. The 
individual artist has his creativity exhausted in the artwork and it thereby 
acquires the full saturation of his identity. Whatever else Astrada had in mind 
when he suggested the empty Argentine subject might plant root in its own 
infinity, this gesture alone should satisfy him. The materiality always present in 
art just is the root. The ‘tierra firme’ turns out at this moment to have been the 
subject itself. The second aspect has to do precisely with materiality. The poem 
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incarnates myth. The religious reference here should not be glossed over as 
rhetoric. The ultimate incarnation of myth, of course, is the Christian incarnation 
in the figure of Jesus. Christ’s carnal and mortal fulfillment of prophesy (myth) 
completes and, thereby, neutralizes it.   After incarnation, Man is able to find 94
within himself the means of his own salvation. The myth at issue here has no 
divine origin. It is a more perfect means to ground autonomy. The artist genius 
Hernández is an I that is a We. The particularity of an individual’s presenting a 
secular myth as art becomes the basis for a communal life. 
 The point of departure for Astrada’s reading of Hernández is, of course, 
the late Heidegger. There are many differences between the former’s aesthetics 
and the latter’s philosophy of the origin of art, but they both borrow from Kant 
the concept of the creative genius. His struggle to maintain his freedom from 
heteronomy is at the basis of the modern artwork for Heidegger as it is for 
Astrada. In his “Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger writes, “self-assertion of 
nature [...] is never rigid insistence upon some contingent state, but surrender to 
the concealed originality of the source of one’s own being.”   Can we not translate 95
this into Astradian terms? The self-assertion of nature is the equivalent of the 
silence of the Pampa. That silence is the source of the gaucho’s being for himself. 
Just as Heidegger argued that artworks open up a world to which we can give 
ourselves up, Astrada calls upon his fellow Argentines to surrender to their 
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destiny made materially manifest in Martín Fierro. Following a Heideggerian 
usage, we could title this surrender a Lied von der Erde. 
 Having made the question of the gaucho and, significant for us, his art a 
metaphysical, existential puzzle is Astrada’s contribution. It does not, however, 
make up for some of the more troubling limitations to his insights. There is the 
obvious: Hernández’s poem turns out to be merely a poem. Astrada is curiously 
unwilling to concede this. The only reason myth had to take the form of art in the 
modern world was because its essential power had gone the way of the 
indigenous natives Astrada mourns. This, no doubt, opened up art to 
individuality and particularity of a kind presumably impossible in a fully 
enchanted world. But this cuts both ways. Art is bound to its particularity in such 
a way as to make community problematic. The two claims Astrada maintained 
about Fierro do not line up. The artwork can either be the complete realization of 
the artist’s creative intention or the grounding of intersubjective experience. The 
philosopher leaves us with no argument as to how these can be identified. He is, 
in short, not speculative enough to give us the identity of identity and non-
identity we would need in order for Astrada’s claim to make sense . 
 The gaucho genre, then, is incomplete at this point. The experience it 
tracks has not yet run out. We can now follow Astrada’s impulse to look at art for 
a clue to solving the riddle of what he calls ‘our sphinx,’ without however ending 
up with nineteenth century poetry. The gaucho is a modern figure by virtue of his 
self-reflective identity. He belongs essentially to the (metaphysical) problem of 
modernism in the arts, that is, to the problem of disenchantment. If modernity 
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pins its stakes on art - or has in some sense become art - then it is to modern art 
that we must now turn. 

Ginastera’s Transcendental Deduction 
 By the late 1960’s and well into his mature career the composer Alberto 
Ginastera had developed a periodization scheme for his own output. Ostensibly 
meant to clarify something about his stylistic development, the map presents 
more mysteries than it dispels. To wit, the rather flimsy sketch has inspired a 
secondary literature all its own in the relatively small world of Ginastera 
scholarship.   It first appeared in an interview with Pola Suarez Urtubey 96
published in 1967 and is roughly as follows: the period from his first performed 
work, composed in 1937, to his Pampeana No. 1 (1947) represents what he terms 
his “objective nationalism.” Folkloric music served then as material to be 
referenced directly, which is to say, on the music’s surface. With the first 
Pampeana, a period of what he calls “subjective nationalism” begins. While he 
dispenses with overtly ‘national’ musical cues, his pieces in this period 
nonetheless evoke “the Argentine character.” After the third of his Pampeanas 
(1957), his “neo-expresssionist” period follows directly. Nationalism appears to 
evaporate as an element of style in his composition at this point, and he declares 
himself a dodecaphonic composer. 
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 A number of suspicions arise immediately from this classification. It is, for 
example, altogether too neat. Could his development as an artist really have 
occurred in tidy ten-year stints: 1937, 1947, 1957, 1967? Why has the evolution 
stopped? The terms appear curious, as if carefully chosen, yet decidedly opaque. 
What technical or thematic difference inherent to the works that comes under 
these headings could possibly correspond to the distinction between objectivity 
and subjectivity? Are these metaphors or literal descriptors? And whatever 
‘subjective/objective nationalism’ refers to, it cannot lie evenly with ‘neo-
expressionism,’ a third wheel, indeed. At the end of the interview, Ginastera lists 
a number of prescriptions intended for younger composers. Among these is the 
demand that their practice correspond to a “logic of history.” Assuming Ginastera 
took his own advice, what historical logic does his style periods track? 
 Needless to say, Ginastera’s aesthetic claims - at least the ones made in 
words - require both reconstruction and extension if we are to understand them, 
let alone take them seriously. A first move in this direction plausibly begins by 
unpacking the category of “subjective nationalism,” because it appears to be the 
key to the whole. It is the borders of this period that articulate the transitions in 
his model. More compellingly, he himself cites the first and third Pampeana 
pieces as watersheds. Other, more popular works were composed and premiered 
between 1947 and 1957, including Variaciones Concertantes (1953). Still, it is the 
two chamber pieces and one orchestral work that ultimately carry the weight of 
their composer’s stylistic claims. 
 Taking a closer look at Ginastera’s description: 
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La segunda etapa, o período subjetivo, tiene como punto 
culminante la Pampeana No. 3 para orquesta. En esta obra, así 
como en el Primer Cuarteto de Cuerdas, en las dos primeras 
Pampeanas un estilo que, sin abandonar la tradición argentina, se 
había hecho más amplio o con una mayor ampliación universal. Ya 
no estaba como en la etapa anterior ligado a temas o ritmos 
genuinamente criollos, sino el carácter argentino se creaba 
mediante un ambiente poblado de símbolos.   97
Here again, a by now all too familiar theme: the composer seeks to create a 
national musical style that is both particular and universal at once. What is 
potentially new here is the manner in which Ginastera saw the problem in this 
period. References to folklore have disappeared. National character is now 
present in form rather than content. As he says himself, the key to these 
compositions is the environment (ambiente) in which musical symbols find 
themselves. This was true of Allende’s Tonadas. In both the Argentine and 
Chilean pieces, there is a distinction made on the surface between formal 
manipulation and thematic material. Ginastera’s move is, no doubt, more subtle 
as he is unwilling to reduce the particular to the folk. The gambit of the Tonadas 
is impossible for him. Folklore by midcentury had fully turned into kitsch. 
Bourgeois nationalism was now its own generality, the effect of intensive 
commodification. Folklore, therefore, could not be a symbol for subjective 
nationalism. Its particularity was lost. 
 This loss, I want to claim, is essentially the difference between objective 
and subjective nationalisms in Ginastera. What motivates the transition is what 
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Stanley Cavell would call the avoidance of fraudulence.   The gaucho dance forms 98
on which much of Ginastera’s early work was based turned out to be fraudulent in 
Cavell’s sense. The implicit audience they project, that of an authentic national 
community bound by a common heritage, can no longer be taken seriously.  In 
different terms, this music has its objects for itself. It is not essentially skeptical. 
It is in this sense that we should understand ‘objective nationalism.’ The nation is 
objective, transparently available for genuine representation. The corollary, 
‘subjective nationalism,’ is reflective, skeptical. More accurately, it sees 
skepticism as something to be overcome. Music is now tasked with something 
and has become properly modernist. 
 At the level of the music, this appears as the question of material. The 
engine of the gaucho genre from the beginning has been the dissatisfaction 
incurred by a nature (geography) that has been somehow de-natured. A music 
that can no longer immediately rely on its materials is analogously de-natured. 
Ginastera’s solution is akin to a Kantian Copernican turn. The only way to save 
the objectivity of musical materials is to have them be subjectively justified. It is 
no longer a question of finding a musical language for Argentine composers that 
would make them something more than mere epigones of their European 
counterparts. Style must now be individual. Its specific mode of presentation is 
the responsibility of the composer. Ginastera arrived at artistic modernism with 
all its essential attributes: the composer genius, abstraction, the overcoming of 
skepticism. The road he followed, however, was specific to a peripheral culture. 
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For all its austerity, Ginastera’s subjectivism is still fully in line with the 
gauchesca. 
 That the Pampeanas take up a natural setting as their topic is not an 
accident and the stakes are high. As a response to the challenge of the gauchesca, 
these pieces attempt to incarnate in matter the conditions for the possibility of 
meaningfulness in modernity. Astrada’s mythical poetry is replaced here first by a 
violin and piano (Pampeana No. 1, 1947), then by a cello (Pampeana No. 2, 
1951), then by the orchestra as a whole (Pampeana No. 3, 1954). 
 The second of these works will do as an example. It is arguably the most 
successful and the one that enjoys the most contemporary performances. The 
division of labor between piano and cello is clear. The piano is given a series of 
chords arranged in cells. Rhythmic cells alternate between ones that defy bar 
lines. Some kind of triad is virtually omnipresent in the right hand and most of 
the piano part is strictly homophonous. It is an accompaniment to be sure, but 
not just that. The overwhelming impression is of machinic mindlessness. The 
part trundles along with no clear progressive intent or possible conclusion. Its 
harrowing aspect is countered by a cello line designed after a vocal part. The 
string part swells and swirls, speeding up and slowing down seemingly without 
cause. Repeated notes suggest the articulation of absent words. Constant 
virtuosic tricks indicate that there is something to be expressed or told, but 
without text, this is impossible. What we are left with is a stile rappresentativo 
without any hope of direct representation, merely its conditions.  This is what the 
work thematizes: an un-voiced voice attempting to graft itself onto an overly 
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thing-like frame. The two parts come together at the end. The piano part bends 
toward melody and the cello part gives up much of its rhythmic, metric and 
dynamic flexibility. The gesture makes for a conclusion, but it is hardly 
triumphant. No solution is found, only a kind of broken compromise. Nothing in 
the piece is free from alienation. The cello is all-too-human and the piano never 
works up enough substance to hold our attention independently. 
 How, then, is this work a success? It is, after all, fragmentary and 
disjointed. Its conclusion is too formal to be organic, which veils the wholeness of 
the whole. In other words, it is dead. Its being dead is the substance of 
Ginastera’s success. The life that invigorates every bar of his early songs and 
ballets is replaced here with its determinate negation. We are given life back, to 
be sure, but negatively.  
 The term ‘life’ here is derived from the idea of the organic work of art, but 
it is my word here for meaning. The concept comes with the curious demand that 
we care about it and its preservation. If we do not, it is not exactly life that is, 
finally, at issue. An artwork that is not about death, but is in some inescapable 
way itself dead, nonetheless moves. It is animate. What is animated, however, is 
not a semblance of life, but a dead-ness that points toward life. They are the 
material carriers of the possibility of meaning. And that materiality is key. It was 
Nature, after all, that was threatened in the Pampa. In Sarmiento and Astrada, an 
unnatural geography pushed the subject back into itself. In Ginastera, because he 
is an artist, works upon nature itself to find a key to the subject. The subject has 
to be object as well. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ARTE COMPROMETIDO AND THE ARTISANAL END(S) OF ART 
IN LA NUEVA CANCIÓN CHILENA
 This chapter outlines the history and meaning of the Nueva Canción 
movement as it occurred in Chile from the 1960‘s through the start of military 
dictatorship in 1973. The latter date is of particular significance. A “new song” 
movement grew up in many countries throughout Latin America and the world 
during this period. They demonstrated a shared set of musical elements and all 
displayed an explicit relationship to, while nonetheless experimenting with, ‘folk’ 
forms. The Chilean version was not the first nor did it last the longest. While it 
does distinguish itself at the level of composition and form, Nueva Canción’s 
unusually broad dissemination and high moral stakes are to a great extent the 
result of the political circumstances to which it is bound as well as those that 
determined its end. Salvador Allende’s attempt to construct a modern socialism 
through parliamentary democracy in the wake of Popular Front politics appeared 
to many as the most significant contribution to Latin American anti-colonialism 
since the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The violent repression unleashed to reverse 
the attempt secured for posterity the symbolic importance of those three years of 
Unidad Popular government (1970-1973). The political, however, does not creep 
into music by osmosis by virtue of proximity to profound circumstance. There 
were, to put it somewhat crassly, musical reasons for Nueva Canción’s 
amenability with respect to Left politics. And it is just this amenability that has 
consequences for the larger story being told. 
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The Popular: Baroque, Commercial and Folk 
 That being said, moving from Chavez and Ginastera to commercial 
folkloric music seems an abrupt shift. The work of deeply and self-consciously 
learned composers is placed on the same plane for examination as the homespun 
of self-styled troubadours. What is more, the architectonic that has structured the 
chapters thus far would suggest that something about a ‘conflict’ between Chavez 
and Ginastera’s modernisms is resolved or revealed in Nueva Canción. This, 
however, would be hard to gauge given that the categories that are typically 
employed both to analyze and, indeed, to evaluate a lettered repertoire on the one 
hand and a mass cultural phenomenon on the other would hardly coincide. The 
juxtaposition appears as a category error. 
 One need not throw out this reasoning at first glance, dismissing it 
perhaps as elitist. The objection is, in a sense, correct: There is a real, historical 
divide between art music and folk music repertoires both in terms of their genesis 
and consumption. The divide, however - and this is the key - is historical. The 
concepts do not precede that which falls under them. The divide arises at a 
moment when art is fashioned apart from the quotidian and can establish its 
value at least in part with respect to its difference from the artisanal. What 
conceptually determines art negatively determines artisanry. And as with all 
conceptual determination, it forms an integral part of a material reality: in this 
case, a struggle between a class of owners and consumers, and a laboring class to 
whom are entrusted, by and large, the duties of societal reproduction. As has 
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been emphasized over and over again throughout this study, the history of 
aesthetic diremption and modern artistic self-consciousness is the history of 
capitalist modernity with its characteristic class conflict. The artisanal is the 
product of technicities proper to labor, caught in a matrix of the useful, the 
decorative, and the totemic. The artistic, by contrast, takes its absoluteness from 
its material isolation. It is progressive and enjoys the refinements it inherits from 
past stages of social evolution. 
 This crude - yet historically effective - dichotomy maps onto the native and 
the imported in Latin America. From the period of initial colonization and the 
birth of an America that would be European and non-European at once, what 
arrived with those who arrived from the Peninsula was a division of class and 
labor that would re-articulate itself until our own day. As has been remarked on 
many times before, the fall of the colonial order was not the end of class 
domination, nor did it spell an end to the material reality that authorized the 
difference between the artisanal and the artistic that allowed for a Latin 
American aesthetics to be thought through and invested in in the first place. 
 As Rubén Babeiro Saguier and Miguel Rojas Mix have pointed out, the 
distinction between art and artisanry is complicated by a third concept that 
mediates both, namely the popular: 
Las nociones, pues, de popular y culto han de precisarse dentro de 
la dialéctica “dominación/liberación,” y en el contexto de la 
dependencia. [...] Desde este punto de vista, el arte culto fue, 
originariamente, el arte del vencedor; pero éste, justamente para 
imponer su ideología, necesitó dar al miso un carácter 
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“popular.” [...] Tal es el caso del barroco, arte culto que aspira a 
imponer el poder de Dios y el rey en el nivel popular.   99
What is meant by “popular” here is not what is familiar from a term like ‘popular 
music,’ which is indistinguishable from mass culture and, what is more, oscillates 
between pointing to a brute number of appreciators/consumers and defining 
something about the content of what it describes. Following their example, in 
order for the art of the colonial baroque to become ‘popular’ in the sense meant 
here, it must have a certain relationship to life. It must help organize the social as 
such: the individual’s relationship and participation in a cultural whole and the 
meaning of that totality. The ‘popular’ is both expression of and a regulatory 
device for the ethical life of a community. The ‘national popular’ is just this in the 
context of the modern nation-state. Art must make some claim to the popular just 
as artisanry does. When art makes this claim, it bends towards the reproductive 
tendency at the surface of artisanry. When artisanry makes it, it bends toward the 
self-sufficiency of art. The concept of the popular, then, mediates the divide 
between the concepts such that something of their identity can be glimpsed. 
 It is not clear, however, that artisanry can ever make this claim given the 
relationship of power assumed to be structuring its intelligibility. If it is the 
reality of political domination that allows for a split between the quotidian and 
artisanal, and the artistic in the first place, then art is in a position to call the 
shots, as it were. Indeed, this is the project of art from the moment of the 
Conquest through to the twentieth century. In most of the Spanish colonial 
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possessions, indigenous ‘literature’ was all but entirely destroyed and in the 
Southern Cone where the Araucanian resistance lasted well into Independence, 
there was hardly an opportunity to preserve indigenous oral culture even if such a 
preservation held much appeal. Even missionaries, whose experience in the 
colonial order came closest to native life, literally built Marian hymns with the 
raw material of Quechua words.   American Indians excelled in singing - and 100
then composing - devotional polyphony.   A colonial popular art was fully in 101
force. 
 This period saw the spread throughout colonial society of Spanish 
romances of medieval cast that had been an integral part of both oral and literate 
culture on the Peninsula. The origins of the romance are disputed, but the poems 
that were avidly collected into volumes on the Peninsula at the same time as 
Spanish possessions in America were being consolidated, have deep roots in 
courtly medieval culture, perhaps seeing their birth in epic poetry orally 
disseminated as early as the tenth or eleventh century. Crucially for our topic, the 
romance persisted as a part of popular culture throughout most of the last 
century. What persisted largely, however, were not the epic narrative romances 
or those that depended on classical allegory. Rather, what maintained relevance 
were narratives with religious themes (encounters with the Virgin, for example) 
and tales of harrowing or bloody historical events.   Those poems whose content 102
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had no referents for the colonial were dismissed. Poems in strict octosyllable 
lines and divided into four line verses - in other words, holding all the formal 
pretensions of the literate life of a politically dominant class - regulated popular 
understanding. These poems sustained deformation by virtue of their oral 
transmission and the poems which survived in the rural repertoire were not 
arbitrarily chosen. We ought to conclude that the romance tradition was 
mediated by use and therefore, life. However, the moment of this mediation, that 
is, the moment art finds its place in life, life appears suffused with art-form. The 
popular as such is nowhere to be found. 

 The coming of political independence saw an abrupt shift in the nature 
and ideals of the dominant class. The development of print culture at the close of 
the eighteenth century allowed periodical circulation to make available 
increasingly enlightened literature for lettered elites. At the same time, neo-
classical art and architecture was institutionalized in newly emerging academies 
in the recently emancipated states. Poetry turned from its medievalisms to 
embrace a new mimetic stance associated primarily with Andrés Bello.   The 103
latter’s call, in his silva to the tropics for example, to renew Man’s essential 
relationship to the natural world and to disabuse himself of pompous ornament, 
which is but a cultural and therefore artificial interference in human destiny, is 
an essentially Romantic one. It depends on the dismissal of the style that 
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characterized colonial-period art. Nonetheless, however, for all these changes 
(and they are significant) the dialectic at hand, that between art and artisanry 
mediated by the popular, has not changed. If anything, a newly self-reflective art 
in Bello attempts to bypass the artisanal reproduction of life through its 
immediate appeal to nature. He writes in his Silva: “Oh! si al falaz ruido,/la dicha 
al fin supiese verdadera/anteponer, que del umbral le llama/del labrador 
sencillo,/lejos del necio y vano/fasto, el mentido brillo/el ocio pestilente 
ciudadano!”   What laborer does he have in mind? The agricultural proletariat, a 104
population that will grow with that first century of American independence that 
Bello sends off, is quite casually overlooked here. The laborer he cites is literally 
not able to read his poem. Beginning with the Romantic turn in Latin American 
aesthetics, the ability of art to be popular in our sense is damaged by its own need 
to control the implied relationship. 
 If what I have here called the ‘Romantic turn’ is just a becoming conscious 
of the absence of and the need for a popular art, that is, for a new bourgeois order 
to find expressive force on its own terms, then the modernism - including poetic 
modernismo - that succeeds this moment (logically, if not always in time) is faced 
with an unhappy choice. Either artistic expression can retain its internal 
coherence at the expense of popularity, departing from life, or it could find its 
way to conservative recovery. There emerges a progressive and a regressive 
modern art. The name for the latter is ‘folklore.’ Crucially here, both are products 
of bourgeois ideology. The divide upon which they rely is internal to the class 
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dynamics of capitalist society in which, classically, even laborers are alienated 
from the ‘artisanal’ reproduction of the material of daily life. Folklore is also an 
urban phenomenon. Songs that would be recognized as ‘folkloric’ by Santiaguino 
folk enthusiasts and scholars had been sung on the outskirts of cities like Chillán 
or in the Colchagua Valley presumably since the days of the Spanish colony 
without any claims to nationalism, authenticity, folk genius or conservative 
preservation. 
 The bourgeois folk, however, was not open to all societies and nations 
incorporated into the world system, as Matthew Gelbart points out in his book on 
the genealogy of folk music.   Neither France nor England could stake out much 105
space for elaborate folk traditions, despite each enjoying a rich medieval poetic 
legacy. A truism of the genre is that it is quintessentially German. It was Herder, 
after all, who coined the term Volkslied, or folk song. And it was in terms of a 
specifically German Romanticism that the stakes of the designation must be 
understood. Herder himself was engaged throughout his philosophic life in a 
debate with French Encyclopedists and the version of Enlightened rationalism 
they represented. For all of their secular, empirical exactness they had - and here, 
he simply followed his mentor Hamann - failed to understand the world in its 
concrete specificity. The truth of the French Enlightenment was an abstract one. 
There was something ‘more,’ so to speak, in Nature herself that had to be grasped 
in terms of quality rather than quantity, in its plurality and unity at once. The 
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unity of human life, for example, was manifest in a plurality of qualitatively 
distinct nations delivered up by Nature. The members of these nations, through 
all of their actions and products, expressed what was essential to their kind. The 
nations of Man, in other words, are expressive in precisely the same way artworks 
are expressive. The human being was her own representation of collective 
existence. Collecting and studying the folk song, that is, the unreflective song 
proper to a given human collective and therefore expressive of its substance, was 
just one of they ways the modern subject could come to know the truth of her 
belonging to a people.   This thought, in some form or another, is at the heart of 106
all folkloric traditions (including the one upon which Nueva Canción was built). 
It is not accidental, though, that it should come from a German with his eye on 
events on the other side of the Rhine. As England and France moved toward 
political and economic modernity, the German states remained in relative 
backwardness. With no greater political unity and holding all too firmly to feudal 
and monarchial traditions, Germans came to regard themselves as a peripheral 
people whose cultural unity and modernity could compensate for their material 
underdevelopment: a land of poets and thinkers. This tendency intensified 
throughout the nineteenth century, making its way through the philosophic 
reflections of Hegel to the economics of Karl Marx and Richard Wagner’s 
aesthetics. We can, then, speak of a German model for cultural peripherality, 
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always concerned with finding its way to universality through national 
particularity. 
 It is in this spirit that one finds the Chilean Julio Vicuña Cifuentes 
collecting and publishing folk poetry just as his central European counterparts 
had done. From roughly the turn of the century to the end of its first decade, 
Vicuña sought out recent immigrants to Santiago from the countryside who could 
recite poetry from memory. He also made several journeys out of the capital to 
build his collection. What he found was the remnants of the romancero popularly 
disseminated in the colonial period. As mentioned above, these only survived 
selectively and, in most cases, in clearly corrupted form. Having no originals to 
compare them to, however, the scholar published multiple juxtaposed versions of 
romances that he transcribed from his informants’ recitations. He explains the 
need for his project: 
Es urgente recoger los viejos romances que hay esparcidos en 
nuestros campos y cuidades, antes que el turbión de versos líricos 
de factura moderna que propagan los cantores populares, acaben 
por barrerlos de la tradición, perdiéndose un caudal de poesía que 
no volveremos a encontrar. 
And as if anticipating an objection, he goes on: 
Y esa poesía es tanto de España como de Chile, porque los cantos 
que viven secularmente en un pueblo, toman por si mismos carta de 
naturaleza, con más derecho que otros, nacidos en el país, pero que 
por no corresponder a su idiosincrasia, por no haber penetrado en 
el espíritu de la colectividad, parecen siempre extranjeros.   107
The folkloric claim seems to be clearly laid out. That cultural work that serves as 
natural link to the specificity of the collectivity at hand (in this case, the Chilean 
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nation state) is rescued by the urban man of letters so that artifice will be 
prevented from fully eclipsing spirit. The thesis, however, runs into a number of 
revealing obscurities. The objection Vicuña is presumably anticipating is that the 
romancero is hardly native to Chile, but a remnant of a cultural moment when 
the dominance of a foreign power determined literary production. Even when 
some romances take on content that is specific to Chilean experience, the very 
form is a mark of dependence. Poetry written in the country since the end of the 
colony strikes as a more intuitive choice for the basis of an art practice truly 
‘native’ to the nation. But poetry that is undeniably modern, bearing on its 
surface the self-consciousness of artifice, cannot sustain recoding as a folklore, 
which depends at the very least on the appearance of immediacy of invention. A 
return to Nature, after all, cannot be the result of studied reflection. The popular 
romancero is the best candidate available to fill the German model for peripheral 
particularity. It’s perdurance in rural society - an index of the people’s 
commitment to the form - lent it further credibility. This leads Vicuña to affirm 
the effective reality of appearances: native-born compositions will always seem 
foreign while the Baroque lyrics will take on “carta de naturaleza.” He has 
effectively given the octosyllabic line a passport. 
 The move Vicuña makes should not be confused for a valorization of rural 
laborers through a documentation of their sung poetry. The scholar himself is 
openly hostile to his informants whom he blames for being impatient with his 
work and overall having a taste for the perverse. If the popular romance is being 
saved from the ravages of time, it is also being saved from the ravaging of 
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agricultural laborers, without the consciousness or skill to know the value of what 
they carry in their memories. This attitude is not simply a peculiarity of this 
influential critic. Rather, it is written into the class character of the folkloric as 
such. An authentic relationship to life can be found for art if it is effectively 
borrowed from a time when the separation of art from artisanry was less 
powerfully in force. The goal is not to realize a regression, but to allow for 
satisfaction in the authority of art by controlling the representation of its 
supposed opposite. 

 The web of concepts I have been tracing so far encounters a significant 
complication beginning soon after Vicuña publishes his study: the folk becomes a 
genre of commercial music. In 1940, while she was serving as Chile’s ambassador 
to Brazil, the poet and soon-to-be Nobel laureate Gabriela Mistral published a 
short essay in El Mercurio praising the work of a folk ensemble called Los Cuatro 
Huasos. The group had formed twenty years earlier and represented the first 
such ensemble to professionalize as folk musicians. For Mistral they are not only 
disseminators and salvagers of that which is authentically Chilean, they are 
nothing short of the embodiment of the Bolivarian dream of Latin American 
unity. The first of these accomplishments is achieved through research. “Harto 
les costó rehacer el cuerpo desgranado de la vieja canción chilena;” she writes, 
“mucho tendrían que expurgar; habían visto en bastantes piezas el desgarrón de 
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los giros intrusos; y en otros la adulteración lisa y llana.”   Mistral is suspicious 108
of precisely the same adulterations that Vicuña worried over. The Cuatro Huasos 
are to be commended here for having refined the material they found. The second 
achievement is more subtle, but for the writer, more important by far. Her prose 
is elegant: 
Cuando la fusión de las patrias indoespañolas se logre - ya no son 
los tiempos de decir ‘nunca’ sino de decir ‘mañana’ - se hará el 
recuento minucioso de las herramientas que trabajaron en el duro 
milagro. Sé muy bien que se darán columnas de nombres políticos y 
que tal vez se olvide en el repertorio de la honra a la música popular 
criolla y a sus maestros y ejecutantes. La música, parecida a la luz, 
es divina e inasible y se parece al huésped sin cuerpo que domina a 
todos aunque no se le nea la mano alzada ni se le oigan correr los 
pies del aire. Pero entonces alguien habrá que nombre a la gran 
soldadora de la gente americana, a la que nos probó sin palabras 
nuestra comunidad de pasión, de dolor o de alegría.   109
From the final rendez-vous of victory over the forces of regional dissolution, 
Mistral insists that we will look back on folkloric music in particular as not only 
an expression of that unity, but a force for binding Latin America together. 
 What is described represents a vast expansion of the popular. If folkloric 
music is able to produce the effects Mistral wants to reserve for it, then 
everything that might have separated art from artisanry has disappeared and the 
art that is produced is robustly regulative of life. To be sure, how all of this 
happens is mysterious, but what is important here is the change of stakes for a 
musical folk popular that has taken place. Music has moved from the merely 
expressive to the political realm the moment she allows it a place - even a 
!136
!  Gabriela Mistral, “La música americana de los ‘Cuatro Huasos’” in José Miguel Varas and Juan 108
Pablo González, eds. En busca de la música chilena: Crónica y antología de una historia sonora 
(Santiago: Cuadernos Bicentenario, 2005) p. 211.
!  Ibid. p. 213.109
privileged place - in the realization of a modern, Romantic political ideal of grand 
national unity and independence. The essential conceptual scheme that makes 
the Nueva Canción movement intelligible is all in place here, decades before it 
began. 
 What makes possible Mistral’s excitement about a folkloric popular is the 
commercial success that the Cuatro Huasos enjoyed from the 1920’s through the 
mid 1950’s. In order that the folk might be regulative, it must be accessible to 
broad swathes of the population it is meant to help politically unite. Mediating 
this accessibility is the, at the time, newly burgeoning radio and recording 
industry. By 1927, the group had cut 20 78’s at studios in Argentina and by the 
time that Mistral was writing her article, they had signed with CBS in the United 
States. The 1939 World’s Fair in New York saw them perform as Chilean cultural 
ambassadors. They made famous an approach to the rural lyric, but their 
repertoire included a variety of musical genres from bolero to Swing. In short, 
they demonstrated that the Chilean folk could be marketable: consumed as a 
commodity. 
 Commodification significantly alters the status of popularity. Although 
quantitatively more people are consuming this music, that consumption is no 
longer immediate or potentially participatory. The very medium that allows folk 
music mass dissemination in Chile is that which replaces a musical practice with 
a musical object. It is true that neither the radio or the 78 as technologies nor any 
peculiar agency on the part of the Cuatro Huasos is responsible for this change. 
Neither can be said to have introduced reification or the profit motive to the 
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country. All of that existed already. What changed at this moment, though, was 
internal to the logic of a folk popular: a kind of fulfillment of its representative 
and normative promise. Severed from the lived conditions appropriate to music 
making in the Chilean countryside, the placeless folk could be everywhere at 
once. It’s representation of particularity, referring specifically to a tradition found 
in and proper to a determinate place, is manifested as a generality: national folk 
particularity as such. One such particularity being like another, the Cuatro 
Huasos could take their place singing a tonada next to other nation-state-themed 
tents at a World’s Fair one day and sing a Mexican corrido on the radio the next. 
Mistral sees in this generality in specificity a herald of eventual Bolivarian 
regional unification. It is overly simple and, indeed, false to deny this. Rather, it 
is born of a contradiction she does not see. 
 As one would expect, this contradiction did not remain unnoticed. By the 
time the Cuatro Huasos were wrapping up their three decades of success, 
scholars and musicians increasingly saw them as impostors. The Huasos and the 
other ensembles that modeled themselves off of them such as Los Huasos 
Quincheros were referred to by Nueva Canción musicians and their precursors as 
producers of “postcard” music, fit for the tourist industry. What had made this 
folk music so successful had also made it unable to sustain the robust 
identification demanded by the folk popular itself. Whatever else Nueva Canción 
was, it was an overt attempt to overcome the contradictions endemic to the 
folkloric by means of a radicalization of its claim to popularity. This meant 
changing the status of folkloric popularity with respect to its origins. The 
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traditional was no longer something immaterial to be gleaned from sources and 
carefully refined. Rather, it could be met with outright and adopted directly. 
What began in the research and performances of Margot Loyola came to full 
fruition in the hands of Violeta Parra. They not only sang as their sources did, 
they became indistinguishable from their sources and appeared to be creating the 
music they salvaged spontaneously and of themselves. The movement that would 
give itself the title ‘New’ would overtly take its cue from this more complex 
relationship to the past. In short, the solution found to the ‘falsity’ of what the 
Huasos Quincheros - dressed in bright red and blue ponchos and strumming 
well-tuned guitars to accompany close and crooned vocal harmony - produced 
was to be found in making explicit what was present and contemporary about the 
folkloric. The to some degree unintended consequence of an insistence on the 
present was the emergence of politics, specifically Left revolutionary politics, as a 
privileged basis on which to make a case for contemporaneity. What had, in a 
distant past before the emergence of art, guaranteed the popular, the artisanal, 
was replaced by the political. The political, in turn, would attempt to force an 
abdication by art of its project to control the aesthetic parameters of life, a control 
it could no longer have with the development of mass media consumption. 

What Can Be Consumed During Import-Substitution? 
 There was another material factor that contributed to this change in the 
status of folk art. The Great Depression produced a crisis of capitalism as it had 
formed in the export-led economies. During the war years, Chile, like many other 
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Latin American states whose economies suffered when demand for their raw 
material exports fell, began to invest in industrialization. The development 
model, referred to as ‘import-substitution’ as the new enterprises would 
presumably substitute demand for imported manufactured goods, precipitated 
migration away from the countryside to urban centers, especially Santiago. An 
increasingly modernized agricultural capitalism also pushed rural laborers to 
abandon their livelihoods on the land and seek employment in the city. The very 
campesinos who had been Vicuña’s despised sources had now entered the city in 
the form of a growing mob. New jobs in the capital could hardly keep up with the 
rapid migration and the shanty towns that would become a focus of the Allende 
years began to crop up around mid-century. The ‘import-substitution’ model in 
Chile fell into characteristic difficulties, including limits relating to credit and 
investment and the relative technical efficiency of nascent industry. Industrial 
development appeared, when it did, in a series of small bursts and long lulls.   110
Those who had retained in their memories the Baroque popular now found 
themselves in urban slums, juxtaposed to urban consumers. Spacial proximity 
became temporal presence. 
 Chile was not alone in experiencing either the economic and social 
transformations described or the logical transformations internal to music traced 
above. In fact, as most of the few histories of the movement mention, Argentine 
popular musicians initially served as a model for their Chilean Nueva Canción 
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counterparts. In 1963 a group of Argentine folk musicians that included Armando 
Tejada Gómez, Tito Francia and Mercedes Sosa published a document in the 
press called “Manifiesto del Nuevo Cancionero.” In it, they outlined a set of 
prescriptions for the development of music making that would not fall into the 
illegitimacies that plagued commercial music. In making their case, they called 
up an obvious foil: Tango. Because of this latter genre’s market success and 
identification with an urban audience, it could stand for the dominance the port 
city of Buenos Aires historically held over the rest of the country. The capital had 
in this period developed enough of an industrial sector to support a large middle 
class who, in turn, served as a consumer base for commercial popular music. 
Tango was classed, as it were, responding to specific social tendencies on its very 
surface. The new Argentine folklorists named the dominance of the port city over 
the provinces a “geo-sociological deformation” that could only corrupt music. 
And that corruption came in the form of a diminishment in substance brought 
about through commodification. “Es que el tango,” they write, “merced a su buen 
buerte, ya había caído del ángel popular a las manos de los mercaderes y era 
divisa fuerte para la exportación turística. Fue entonces cuando lo condenaron a 
repetirse a sí mísmo, hasta estererotipar un paía de tarjeta postal, farolito 
mediante, ajeno a la sangre y el destino de su gente.”    111
 All the failures of popular music up until this moment are summed up 
here. Even the characteristic reference to postcards, those mass-reproduced 
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images that are sold to document individual experience, is present. Pointing out 
that Tango had been forced to do nothing but reproduce itself in its own image 
goes to the heart of the critique. What is constantly new in repetition has no 
history or future (neither sangre nor destino), even when its very consistency is 
meant to mark its traditionalism. What Sosa, Tejada and company suggest is a 
coming into self-consciousness, “una toma de conciencia,” for music that would 
be inherent to its development: “El nuevo cancionero [...] no nace por o como 
oposición a ninguna manifestación artística popular, sin como consecuencia del 
desarrollo estético y cultural del pueblo y es su intención defender y profundizar 
ese desarrollo.” They are bringing the organic development of Argentine music to 
its close. The way in which they chose to do so, however, was determined by the 
same migratory pattern as seen in Chile: “debido al auge industrial que se inicia a 
raíz de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la capital, recibió el aporte masivo de 
inmensos contingentes humanos del interior del país. Ellos traían junto a la 
esperanza de una vida mejor en la gran ciudad, sus raídas guitarras.”   112
 Chilean Nueva Canción grows up parallel to Argentina’s Nuevo Cancionero 
and many of the former’s most important musicians benefited from artistic and 
intellectual exchange with their counterparts across the Andes. Chile’s case, 
however, differed from the Argentine. Santiago did not have the relationship with 
the provinces that Buenos Aires had with the Argentine interior. Economic 
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conditions had not produced the port city’s burgeoning middle class. There was 
no equivalent to the Tango. The commercial music that reached Chilean 
audiences was almost entirely of foreign origin and much of it from parts of Latin 
America which had more successfully transitioned to mass urbanization and 
industrialization. After a devastating earthquake that wrecked Chillán and 
Concepción in 1939, Mexico’s Lorenzo Cárdenas sent a delegation of aid and 
cultural figures to Chile as a demonstration of solidarity.   For years afterwards, 113
Mexican commercial popular music, mostly disseminated through film, 
consumed Chilean popular culture, competing at an advantage with American 
and Argentine products. For Nuevo Cancionero musicians, Argentine music had 
to move logically from a commercial to a folk popular. The Chilean Nueva 
Canción, by contrast was attempting a move not only from a false folk to an 
authentic one, but also from a foreign dominated popular to a native one. “Déjate 
de corcoveos,/que no nací pa’ jinete/Me sobran los Valentinos,/los Gardeles y 
Negretes,” sings Violeta Parra, referring to international media starts Rudolph 
Valentino, Carlos Gardel and Jorge Negrete. 
 All the same, both Argentine and Chilean movements responded to the 
problem of consumption under a new economic regime. The market privilege of 
exchange over use value had foundered on a fundamental contradiction of value. 
Without a clear use-value, that is, a concrete role for the commodity in life such 
that it might be desired, exchange-value evaporates. What made the Tango 
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infinitely repeatable and the colorful, upper-middle-class musicians in huaso 
costume exchangeable had also bled them of relevance. This could no longer be 
avoided once the very presence of a campesino labor force demonstrated that the 
rural past was now an urban present. It is this very presence that is the key to the 
contradiction of consumption that music encountered, as it were, of itself. 
 Three years after the Argentine Manifesto appeared in print, Patricio 
Manns, already one of the best known Nueva Canción musicians having been 
celebrated for his song “Arriba en la Cordillera” the year before, published his 
own. Manns’s Primer manifiesto de la nueva canción is at once a complement 
and response to its ultramontane predecessor. Insisting that songs, if they are to 
have any hope of justifying themselves, must do so of themselves and without the 
help of extramusical apologies, he attempts to profile the circumstances that 
accompany the songs in question. His text is poetic and elliptical. Rather than 
provide an account of anything like the Zeitgeist that had made possible Nueva 
Canción, Manns lays a prose poem beside the sung poems of the genre in order 
that they might illuminate one another. The manifesto centers on this passage: 
Ante todo, éste es un libro cantado, un libro que guarda tierra, aire, 
piedra, árbol, elementos. Que atesora elementos desatados 
también: tempestades, relámpagos. Que recorre los caminos de la 
tierra, pero no mirando los caprichos del polvo, sino la evolución 
misteriosa de los pájaros en el espacio y al leñador luchando contra 
un roble que se defiende, que combate crispando todas sus grandes 
raíces mansas y que, sin embargo, sucumbe tronchado por el hacha. 
Y aún antes, es un libro donde se cantan aspectos particulares de la 
gran tragedia humana: están aquí, en estos surcos del disco, que 
vagamente recuerdan el paso humano: están aquí en estos surcos 
del disco, que vagamente recuerdan el paso del arado mecánico por 
la tierra, la miseria: el trabajo suicida; la ley ancha y angosta a la 
vez; el amor amargo, (siempre olvido y ausencia, nunca plenitud); 
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la guerra; la conquista; (nunca la paz pura); la fuga del perseguido; 
pero, por sobre todo, la muerte: la muerte en los pasos 
cordilleranos; la muerte de los mares; la muerte del socavón; la 
muerte en la fría calleja madrugadora alumbrado por él relámpago 
de la cuchilla y, apenas, una sonrisa corta y seca. Es, pues, un libro 
amargo, pero no amargado, y está contado así para sacudir a 
aquellos que prosiguen durmiendo desdeñosamente luego de oír el 
grito que traspasa la noche como un estilete.   114
The imagery is thrilling. A book becomes song before transforming into the stuff 
of the natural world and the markers of rural life and labor. Human tragedy in 
song becomes the very grooves of a long playing record, which are at once the 
grooves of tilled earth. Most importantly, the ‘book’ of Nueva Canción is an echo 
of the scream heard in the midst of lived night. The echo, the scream turned into 
narrative, rather than the scream itself, is what shakes the listener to moral 
response. For Manns, Nueva Canción is primarily a giving meaning to human 
suffering so that it might fulfill a pre-modern artistic demand: the tutoring of 
ethical consciousness. It does so by referring narrative meaning to a certain kind 
of rural life. The reproduction of society in the cordillera, along the plowed fields, 
between swings of the ax, contains within it a weapon against meaninglessness. 
“Esta es una hora de combate,” Manns writes at the end of his essay, “y en un 
combate en que está empeñada la humanidad entera, hasta una canción es filosa 
arma de batalla.” The battle is at once a spiritual and political one. 
 Manns’s early songs, for the most part, are poetic reflections on the 
suffering of rural labor. His best known piece tells the story of a peasant who is 
summarily shot for stealing sheep. “¿Qué sabes de cordillera/si tú naciste tan 
lejos?/Hay que conocer la piedra/que corona al ventisquero.” The octosyllabic 
!145
!  Manns.114
verses that open the song assumes the listener needs to be shown something 
about a world she is removed from, born, as she presumably is, in the city and far 
from the everyday reality of the mountains. One could mistake what happens in 
the song as recuperative. In the midst of urban migration and agricultural 
proletarianization, the lived experience of the campesino must be recovered and 
brought within reach. The meaning of this experience, however, is only relevant 
in terms of the political and ethical conjuncture of Manns’s present. A rapidly 
growing labor movement that is the direct result of import-substitution 
economics demands representation of the ethical stakes proper to it. In other 
words, for Manns - just as was the case for Tejada and Sosa - there is something 
utterly of the moment in folklore. Socio-economic conditions have torn its 
inheritors from an imagined past and placed them in the factories and slums of 
the present. It is already clear how the political begins to be a touchstone for 
presence. Manns does not have to extend Tejada and Sosa’s logic very far - he 
merely makes explicit an ethical commitment implicit in their response to new 
class relations and consumer society - in order to find himself at the doorstep of 
the Latin American revolutionary tradition. 

A Folk Vanguard 
 If the Argentine and Chilean cases are versions of one another, it seems 
that Chile is less representative of the logical progression here. Developing less 
rapidly than its larger neighbor, Chile’s consumer base for music consumption 
was smaller. As a result, Chilean popular music is less easily separated into that 
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meant for middle-class entertainment and the emergent neo-folk. The step from 
Carlos Gardel to Mercedes Sosa is less marked than the step from Los Cuatro 
Huasos to Violeta Parra. The very absence of a Tango equivalent, however, makes 
the Chilean move to neo-folklore more explicitly a move to the avant-garde. It 
was Violeta Parra’s brother, Nicanor Parra, Chile’s most important modernist 
poet since Vicente Huidobro and Pablo Neruda and a writer who constructed his 
aesthetic position in direct response to the latter’s perceived sentimentalism, who 
invited Violeta to the city and encouraged her to seek out the remnants of the 
romancero as a basis for new musico-poetic production. From the time of her 
move to Santiago, Violeta positioned herself as a complement to her brother’s 
take on the avant-garde. 
 To be clear about what this means, something must be said about the 
category of the avant-garde. As a descriptor for art, it is not simply synonymous 
with modernism. Very broadly, modernism can be said to be in place for as long 
as individual subjective autonomy imposes itself as a constitutive principal in 
artistic production. The classic example is, of course, the novel, which 
schematizes the world in terms of the trajectory of an individual life. Musical 
analogs can be found in early modern monody and, later, the symphony. 
Subjective autonomy can hold sway in the realm of art only inasmuch as the 
latter as an institution is severed from all others. This is made possible by the 
development of a market-ordered society. As long as art can be said to be 
‘autonomous’ in these twin senses, it cleaves itself into the halves that make up 
the problematic subject since Descartes: mind and body, noumenal and 
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phenomenal, content and form. The avant-garde emerges as a subset of 
modernism when content and form are no longer reconcilable. The avant-garde is 
a “self-criticism of art.” One might follow Peter Bürger’s insight here: the avant-
garde “no longer criticizes schools that preceded it [such as the criticism the 
theoreticians of French classicism directed against Baroque drama, or Lessing’s 
of German imitations of classic French tragedy] but criticizes art as an institution, 
and the course its development took in bourgeois society.”   To be sure, many 115
incarnations of modernism in art have included a moment of social critique. 
What changes with the avant-garde is the fitness of art to critique in the first 
place. 
 The self-criticism of art is the explicit concern of Nicanor Parra’s poetic 
career. His famed collection from 1954, Poemas y Antipoemas, strikes out at 
poetry in its very title. In order to avoid the absorption of the poem into either 
etherial sentimentality or bleak surrealism, Parra’s ‘anti-poems’ return to the 
quotidian, the emphatically present. He “seems determined to incorporate poetry 
into the fabric of ordinary human existence, to graft that everyday experience 
onto the leisure time of reading, so that the act of reading poetry, too, takes on 
the quotidian significance of doing the laundry, brewing coffee, or eating lunch,” 
writes one critic.   This is a partial, but significant, abdication on the part of 116
poetry of its privilege. Nicanor Parra abdicates, significantly, from within poetry 
itself. The tools the poet uses to avoid poetry vary, but one of them is the 
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adoption of forms from the Baroque popular. His first book includes both an 
octosyllabic “Canción” and a “Madrigal.” He also wrote a number of lyrics meant 
for his sister to set. One of them is “La cueca de los poetas:” 

Pablo de Rokha es güeno 
pero Vicente 
vale el doble y el triple, 
dice la gente 
huifa yai yai 
Dice la gente, sí 
no cabe duda 
que el mas gallo se llama 
Pablo Neruda 
huifa yai yai 
¡Corre que ya te agarra, 
Nicanor Parra! 
Apart from Parra himself, none of the other poets the cueca mentions turned 
explicitly to folk art. The folk lyric, like the other objects of everyday life that 
Parra refers to in his “Advertencia al lector,” is the closest that poetry comes to 
being present and non-transcendent: 

La palabra arco iris no aparece en él en ninguna parte, 
Menos aún la palabra dolor, 
La palabra torcuato. 
Sillas y mesas sí que figuran a granel. 
¡Ataúdes! ¡útiles de escritorio! 
Lo que me llena de orgullo 
Porque, a mi modo de ver, el cielo se está cayendo a pedazos.   117
Violeta Parra welcomed the association of her aesthetic project with that of her 
brother. She went as far as to write a set of “Anti-cuecas” to compliment her 
brother’s “Anti-poemas.” Both enact an overt desublimation of art through 
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recourse to poetry that smacks of the quotidian, the non-refined, indeed, the 
artisanal.   To be sure, Nicanor’s goals differ from Violeta’s. The former has, 118
throughout his career, sought to break molds (“quebrar moldes”) as he himself 
puts it. The ‘anti-poema’ is a formally negative enterprise. Violeta’s 
desublimation of the folk popular is an attempt to create an artisanal art fit for 
life, a project of positive affirmation of life in the here and now itself. 
 Creating an art fit for present life, however, quickly becomes 
indistinguishable from creating a life fit for art, what I have called an ethical 
project in its most basic sense. In 1964 she was interviewed on Swiss television. A 
formally dressed interviewer sits across from Violeta on the floor as the latter 
works on a tapestry. The tapestry is filled with allegorical types figured with brute 
primitivism. Violeta is wearing what appears to be a hand-made dress of quilted 
patterns. She wears no makeup. Her hair is unkempt. She speaks in broken 
French and maintains a childlike demeanor throughout. The interviewer speaks 
to Violeta as an entirely foreign personality, a curiosity from a far away land. 
Parra here has effectively transformed into one of her campesino informants 
while maintaining all the authority of an artist. The tapestry she weaves and the 
songs she is invited to sing on the air are art and artisanry at once. Maintaining 
the indistinction between the two, however, requires her to assume an identity 
not her own. The Violeta that appears on the screen is a naif savant. She speaks of 
how her art flows directly from her sentiments and producing art is simply a 
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requirement of the way in which she lives life. She describes her childhood far 
from the capital and her poverty. These are guarantors of desublimation. Hers is 
neither a high-art nor a refined and nostalgic folk. She is immediately living a life 
fit for art, a piece of Nicanor’s “fallen sky” (“el cielo se está cayendo a pedazos”). 
 When in the mid-1950’s she was invited to record the musical materials 
she collected as a researcher, she included her own compositions alongside those 
of her sources. While Violeta Parra is often praised for salvaging tonadas and 
cuecas that would otherwise have been lost to the ravages of time, it is less often 
mentioned that she rigorously blurred the line between research and self-
expression. She became medium, mediation, and mediator, all in one. On the 
cover for the label Odeon’s eighth volume of El Folklore de Chile, Parra is said to 
be “atrayante por su originalidad espontánea.” Similarly, her treatment of folk 
material “logra traducir con muchísima mayor intensidad el espíritu que les dió 
origen.” Her own compositions serve as a magnifying lens for the Chilean folk 
popular. In a sense, she is her own most authentic source. 
 In the person of Violeta Parra, the folk vanguard reaches an impasse. 
Fashioning a folk that would not inspire dissatisfaction by virtue of its overt 
commodification became a self-fashioning. In order to maintain the presence of a 
musical artisanry, she embodied the life into which art might disappear. Parra 
devoted the last years of her life to building a center for folk art in La Reina, a 
Santiago neighborhood. The creation of ‘La carpa de la Reina,’ a space proper to 
her folk popular was the natural extension of her project. Physical place would 
stand for temporal presence. Largely ignored, it languished. Out of despair at a 
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lost love and facing a Chilean public generally apathetic to her project, Violeta 
Parra shot herself in February of 1967.   119

 Violeta Parra’s influence is not to be underestimated. Osvaldo Rodríguez, 
who founded a peña   in Valparaiso - one that would sponsor some of the most 120
important Nueva Canción musicians beginning in the late 1960’s - writes that she 
was nothing less than “el tronco fundamental de la Nueva Canción Chilena.” The 
Cuban Nueva Trova singer Silvio Rodriguez is quoted in an interview: “Violeta is 
fundamental. Nothing would have been as it is had it not been for Violeta.”  The 
ensemble Inti-Illimani have recorded a cantata narrating her life. Her own son 
and daughter have contributed markedly to sustaining their mother’s status in 
the history of the movement. Nueva Canción musicians generally agree that 
something changes with Parra, even while most are at a loss to say exactly what. 
Patricio Manns, in an interview he gave in 1977, provides a characteristically 
more complicated account: 
Todo el mundo se declara ahora, discípulo de Violeta Parra, 
siempre cerca, fue el tipo que estaba más cerca, fue el tipo que 
aprendió todas sus lecciones, fue el tipo que canta exactamente 
igual. Eso es una gran mentira. Violeta no tiene ni antecesores ni 
continuadores, lo digo yo como analista musical. Sí, en este caso 
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hay que ser experto musical. Y como amigo de Violeta, yo digo que 
ni siquiera yo soy ni antecesor ni continuador de Violeta. No tiene 
seguidores.   121
Despite declaring that one need have musical expertise to understand the claim, 
Manns does not elaborate as to what he has in mind. His statement nonetheless 
rings true. No other musician after Parra or before her was able to occupy both 
the positions of ethnographic researcher and source. The claim she meant her 
own life to elaborate was strictly unrepeatable and definitely without precedent. 
She was the last folk musician to display a decidedly untutored vocal style. Even 
her children, and especially her daughter Isabel, sang with precision and often 
virtuosically. When it comes to composition proper, Parra stuck very closely to 
traditional song forms, only very rarely altering their predictable versification 
and harmonic profile. All the Nueva Canción composers who came after her 
developed personal styles and often employed learned techniques. 
 Apart from all of these reasons for buying Manns’s somewhat polemical 
statement, there is a more important sense in which Parra closes off precisely the 
aesthetic avenue she opens. I have so far sought to demonstrate, first, that Nueva 
Canción’s version of the folk popular grows out of the organic, historical 
development of art music itself and is not part of a parallel history; second, that 
the form it takes at mid-century is conditioned by a determinate social and 
economic experience proper to a new dispensation of the division of labor; 
finally, that the first moment of Nueva Canción, one that is only appropriated by 
!153
!  Colette Campa, “Entretien avec Patricio Manns” Cahiers du monde hispanique et luso-121
brasilien 29 (1977): 209.
its narrative at a later date, corresponds to a vanguardist move to desublimate art 
and return to things that are emphatically present. Parra alone serves to carry out 
this latter moment. However, since a carful cultivation of her personal identity 
served to stitch together a diverse set of aesthetic commitments - to both personal 
and folk genius, to an art practice that is both desublimated and non-alienated, to 
an avant-garde that is also a fierce traditionalism - the absence of her person 
forced those who came after her to position themselves within Nueva Canción 
along different lines. In this sense, Parra does offer what in the end was a clear, if 
contradictory, solution a crisis of folk, one that responded to the exigencies of its 
moment. She could not, however, produce followers. 

Arte y sus compomisos 
 It is worth noting that ‘Nueva Canción’ as a term was not widely used until 
the Catholic University in Santiago organized an event they titled El primer 
festival de la nueva canción chilena in 1969. Invitations went out to a very 
diverse set of musicians. Both those who would be associated with the label and 
those who represented the bourgeois folklore of a different era were present. One 
of the prizes went to a song called ‘Plegaria a un labrador,’ and the award helped 
solidify the reputation of its author, Victor Jara. 

Levántate y mira la montaña 
De donde viene el viento, el sol y el agua. 
Tú que manejas el curso de los ríos, 
Tú que sembraste el vuelo de tu alma. 
Levántate y mírate las manos 
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Para crecer estréchala a tu hermano 
Juntos iremos unidos en la sangre 
Hoy es el tiempo que puede ser mañana. 
Líbranos de aquel que nos domina en la miseria. 
Tráenos tu reino de justicia e igualdad. 
Sopla como el viento la flor de la quebrada. 
Limpia como el fuego el cañon de mi fusil. 
Hágase por fin tu voluntad aquí en la tierra. 
Danos tu fuerza y tu valor al combatir. 
The song takes the form of an inverted prayer. Rather than express the Man’s 
desire for the mercy of the Godhead, Jara’s speaker pleads his fellow Man to 
fulfill her historic - and emphatically not divine - mission. The text even makes 
explicit reference to the Lord’s Prayer: “Hágase por fin tu voluntad aquí en la 
tierra” replaces “Hágase su voluntad en la tierra como en el cielo.” This 
replacement suggests an alternative. If the addressee of this secular prayer is to 
manifest her will, she ought to do in on earth rather than in a projected heaven. 
 ‘Plegaria’ is an emblematic product of Chilean Nueva Canción. It falls into 
a clear folk genre: the tonada canción. Divided into two parts, one is in a slow 
compound duple and in minor, the other in a much quicker tempo and switches 
to major. A traditional hemiola in the fast section is intermittent and the lyric is 
not octosyllabic or divided into ten-line décimas, but enough of the markers of 
the genre are present to make the form of the composition unmistakable. A sung 
prayer is also characteristic of folklore. The velorio del angelito, for example, a 
prayer offered at the passing of a small child was a song genre often cited by folk 
researchers in this period as well as one revived by Violeta Parra.   Jara’s 122
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tonada, however, is not strictly folklore. It does not even present itself as an 
excised part of rural life. In fact, the addressee is an agricultural laborer, one who 
might be integrated into a fundamentally urban political struggle to establish 
socialism in Chile, just as the campesinado had been brought to the revolutionary 
cause in the Soviet Union and China. The traditionalism of folklore is 
compromised by a ‘neo-folk’ popular that points to a political future. In ‘Plegaria,’ 
we have arrived at arte comprometido. The organic quality of the composition 
does not rely on any intrinsic elements. The form is borrowed and rather than be 
perfectly suited to a ‘content’ it might express or embody, the song itself merely 
contains. The differences between it and its model do not constitute a refinement, 
nor does Jara personalize his song, allowing his person to stitch together its 
diverse elements. The case is exactly the opposite. The speaker is anonymous and 
the addressee a nameless worker, the agricultural proletarian as such. What gives 
the piece its organic quality and makes it, ultimately intelligible, is its political 
engagement. 
 Politically engaged art is the step beyond Parra’s personalized folkloric 
vanguardism. During a recorded concert, Jara tells his audience that Violeta 
Parra “marcó el camino y por allí seguimos.” He further describes Nueva Canción 
as “una canción que surgió de la necesidad total del movimiento social en Chile; 
no fue una canción aparte.” Parra had not invented engaged art. Rather, her 
version of folklore and the demands it responded to both from within and 
without the formal development of style, opened a space for engagement and 
made it necessary. This step is made clearer if one compares ‘Plegaria’ to one of 
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Parra’s politically-themed songs. The speaker of “La carta” sings of receiving 
news that her brother has been incarcerated for having backed a recent strike. 
After condemning the magistrate and the brutality of the police, the speaker 
affirms her family’s political commitment in the song’s last line: “También tengo 
nueve hermanos/fuera de él que se engrilló./Y todos son comunistas,/con el favor 
de mi Diós, sí.” At the level of the text, the song describes a personal experience 
that inspires a human, ethical response.   The speaker’s own political 123
engagement is merely hinted at, but even if the implicit commitment were made 
explicit it would still be individual subjectivity and biographical narrative that 
ultimately hold the song together. The setting is sparse and psalmodic. It is more 
chanted than sung. In fact, the form is much like that of a psalm tone, with 
repeated pitches ending in a terminus that indicates the end of the poetic line. 
The accompaniment outlines a scaffold-like progression, I-II-I-II, which by virtue 
of eliminating the root from the dominant lends the song a lilting, unstructured 
quality. Parra’s song is intentionally stays close to basic and ancient traditional 
song form, shot through as it is with the aural culture of Hispanic colonialism. 
“La carta” does not reference folklore, it embodies it. Jara’s composition evokes 
the persistence of the relevance of folklore for the present, but adopts political 
engagement as the piece’s purposive element. “Plegaria” is precisely what Jara 
knew his own music to be: in line with Parra’s folklore, but a step further along 
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the path indicated by the former and no longer itself folklore proper, a political 
container more than the living embodiment of folklore. 
 While it has ceased to be the folk popular itself, Jara’s politically engaged 
songs as well as those of his contemporaries in the Nueva Canción movement 
who adopted the same claim for the organic unity of their output, return to the 
same problematic from which the folk popular arose. It remains an emphatic 
return of art to life. “Plegaria,” unlike “La carta” comes close to propaganda. It’s 
purposiveness is instrumental, although not merely so. Nonetheless, it plays the 
role of Manns’s “filosa arma de batalla” quite well. Indeed, Nueva Canción after 
Parra has often been criticized for being mere propaganda. The Chilean 
musicologist Gabriel Castilo Fadic puts the point clearly in his magisterial study 
of twentieth-century art music in Latin America: 
Née comme une profonde réflexion artistique de reprise du matériel 
populaire ‘authentique,’ la Nueva Canción Chilena coïncida avec 
une accélération du processus de réformes à tous les niveaux de la 
société, aboutissant au gouvernement de Salvador Allende et à 
l’Unité Populaire. Le rôle historique joué par le mouvement comme 
support de l’idéologie officielle de la période lui a valu une 
connotation négative, peut-être irrémédiable, pour que celui-ci 
puisse être étudié dans une perspective esthétique. En fait, les rares 
traveaux connus à présent sur le sujet, centrent son analyse sur une 
sociologie  du message mais ils négligent toute perspective critique 
considérant le rapport de ce message aux contenus formels et leurs 
fonctions.   124
Perhaps irremediable, indeed: the very fitness of Nueva Canción to its political 
moment robs it of its aesthetic detachment, which, troubling for both Castillo and 
myself, is the condition for its study. Nueva Canción takes aesthetic 
!158
!  Gabriel Castillo Fadic, Musiques du XXe siècle au sud du rio Bravo (Paris: Harmattan, 2006), 124
p. 424.
desublimation to a new extreme. A frontal attack on the ability of art to regulate 
life (a move Nueva Canción takes from the avant-garde), it attempts to calibrate 
art to the exigencies of the present. 
 Sergio Ortega’s “El Pueblo Unido” is the most widely known product of 
Nueva Canción. While its text is specific to Chile, the piece has made its way to 
protest movements the world over and has even acquired some fame as the basis 
for a set of variations by the U.S. virtuoso pianist and composer Frederic 
Rzewski. The composition has stripped the legacy of the folk popular from its 
surface entirely. It is a rally march, plain and simple. Despite its obvious 
divergence from the stylistic tendencies of Nueva Canción generally, it 
nonetheless should be heard at the center of the movement’s conceptual motion. 
The song is a tool of political mobilization as well as its result. The piece’s ability 
to self-refer is as undermined as it can be without abandoning itself to cynicism 
or banality. 

 As political engagement took center stage as the organizing principle of the 
genre, individual subjective experience was replaced by that of historical subjects: 
Violeta Parra’s personal voice gives way to Ortega’s united pueblo. The national 
historical experience, in turn, was increasingly traded in for the trans-national 
struggle of a ‘Latin America’ attempting to free itself from neo-colonialism and 
embrace internationalist socialism. This shift induced Nueva Canción to quickly 
assimilate a broader range of extra-national musical forms. The first of these was 
Andean folkloric music. The latter had been cultivated by a number of Chilean 
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bourgeois folk ensembles for roughly a decade. The group Comparsa Sierra 
Pampa, formed in Santiago in 1952 and lasting the next seven years, was one of 
the most successful.   Andean music was so strongly associated with Bolivian 125
and Peruvian folk populars, indeed, the popular expression proper to nations 
with large indigenous majorities, that a case had to be made for the assimilation 
of the quena, the zampoña, and charango into a Chilean folk. The space opened 
up by Nueva Canción’s political orientation and instrumental character provided 
just this. A political popular proper mobilizes folklore on behalf of an 
extramusical struggle. The specificity of the Chilean, which had served to save the 
popular from class, market and foreign determination and domination, could 
easily be abandoned in favor of a ‘Latin Americanist’ specificity which serves the 
same purpose while expanding the scope of the political program. A crossing 
from nationalism in Latin America to a Latin Americanism is a conceptual move 
as old as Independence and a relatively predictable consequence of Nueva 
Canción’s political ambitions. The move is a classically anti-imperialist one and, 
to the extent that anti-imperialism is seen as part and parcel with anti-capitalism, 
a communist commitment. If the dichotomy that regulated both the Argentine 
Nuevo Cancionero and Chilean Nueva Canción was the relationship of rural life 
to urban experience, one that resulted in an insistence on the presence and 
relevance of the former, then the new dichotomy was that between Latin America 
and its neo-colonial masters - most importantly, the United States. Again, 
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nothing about the internal consistency of the movement is changed, merely the 
scope of its perspective. So it came about that iconic groups such as Quilapayun 
and Inti-Illimani would take up Andean instruments and don ponchos in a self-
conscious display of pan-Latin Americanist solidarity. Eduardo Carrasco, 
founding member of Quilapayun recalled in an interview that it was Victor Jara 
who suggested that the ponchos they wore should be black. That is, they should 
reflect no specific national or regional specificity, but represent the continent as 
such. Inti-Illimani’s first album released in Chile was a collection of songs from 
the Mexican Revolution. By the 1970’s, they had music from regions as far apart 
as Chiloé (an island off the Chilean coast) and Cuba in their repertoires. The 
move from an individual to an abstract musical ‘subject’ was complete. 

La Cantata Popular 
 The specificities of the political circumstance into which Nueva Canción 
sees itself emerging shapes the moment of ‘message’ in those songs 
simultaneously closest to life and to propaganda. Left social movements in Chile 
were as old as the century by the 1960’s. Luis Emilio Recabarren had founded the 
Partido Obrero Socialista in 1912 and a decade later the Communist Party had 
general ideological and material control over the labor movement, with support 
from its Argentine counterpart. The class struggle in the early decades was 
centered on the northern mining region, which saw many strikes during this 
period including a general strike in Tarapacá, Antofagasta and Iquique in 1927. 
All were repressed, sometimes with horrific violence. The Chilean Left grew 
!161
before the Second World War quite apart from any influence by the Comintern 
and maintained its relative independence even thereafter.   After the war, when 126
the class struggle had grown to such a degree as to seriously concern Chile’s 
ruling elites, a segment of conservatives in the country turned to a changing 
Catholic Church doctrine as an alternative to the secular, revolutionary Left. The 
Church had been increasingly speaking out on social justice since the Great 
Depression and was an obvious ally in the fight against communism. The work of 
the Jesuit Alberto Hurtado was pivotal in transforming Catholic social doctrine 
into a program to ease class conflict, erecting organizations such as the Acción 
Sindical Chliena in 1947 which posed a direct challenge to the organizational 
model of communists. What began as a fringe movement on the Chilean Right, 
soon emerged as the dominant centrist reform movement in the country. In 1964, 
the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, a longtime confidant of reform-minded 
Jesuit intellectuals, was elected president, beating out Salvador Allende and his 
overtly Marxist coalition. That year, the Christian Democrats introduced the 
slogan “Revolution in Liberty,” playing on the fears aroused by the then recent 
Cuban Revolution. The slogan is telling. Revolution, all seemed to assume, was 
necessary. What was left to struggle over was who would lead it and what the 
political outcome would be. The struggle of Catholicism against Communism that 
characterized the political divide of the decade makes clear the stakes of Jara’s 
post-Feuerbachian prayer and Parra’s suggestion that God looks kindly on the 
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communist labor movement. There are other examples in the Nueva Canción 
repertory that directly takes on the subject of religion.   Most do not advocate 127
simply for any version of atheism. Rather, they often make use of religious 
language in order to allow it to metaphorize the non-religious Left. 
 Religion was contested political territory not just because Chile was and 
remains a predominantly Catholic nation. Catholicism was also an integral part of 
the colonial legacy Nueva Canción actively retrieved and revised. For the arts, this 
meant taking on the legacy of the Baroque. The most imaginative, certainly the 
most startling, reimagining of the Baroque musical legacy was the invention of 
the cantata popular, whose most influential creator was Luis Advis. Advis, a 
university trained, lettered composer was but one of a generation of música docta 
composers to see in Nueva Canción an aesthetic event that was as relevant to self-
consciously learned composition as it was to its supposed opposite, mass music 
production and consumption. There resulted what those involved have 
characterized as a rapprochement [“acercamiento’] of música popular and 
docta.   128
 The 1960’s saw art composers embrace an overt Romanticism. “Creo que 
visto bajo este aspecto [el folklore] se crearía una corriente renovadora en la 
música chilena a la que no se le pueda aplicar el mote de chilenista,” Gustavo 
Becerra, professor of composition at the National Conservatory and Advis’s 
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teacher, told an interviewer in 1964. “El modelo que seguiría,” he reveals, “son los 
trabajos folklóricos de Brahms.”   As I noted in Chapter 1, Brahms is hardly an 129
accidental reference: a composer who famously avoided confronting head-on the 
music historical challenge represented by Beethoven’s symphonic achievement 
and found an alternative to the messianism, represented above all by Richard 
Wagner, in academic music history and nostalgic folklore. Brahms would take up 
both Baroque compositions and the Volkslied, providing each with his own 
revisions. The same basic impetus underwrites Brahms’s interest in both aspects 
of the German musical tradition. They are both ways of returning the past to the 
present. When Advis decides to write a cantata whose musical elements are based 
in the folkloric appropriations of Nueva Canción, he follows the same line of 
thought. He demonstrates the closeness of the Baroque popular to the folk 
popular. The cantata he has in mind is not that which reached the New World 
from Spain in the 18th century. These were relatively simple compositions, often 
for solo voice. Advis’s model is closer to Bach and Handel. In both Advis’s Santa 
María de Iquique and his Canto para una semilla, spoken relatos replace 
recitative. Canciones replace arias and these are interspersed with instrumental 
interludes and choral commentary. The Baroque cantata appears here in 
translation, as it were. 
 The twentieth century Chilean and nineteenth century German cases, 
however, are not simply parallel. The point here is that art music composers who 
knew themselves to be inheriting European historical baggage directly in the 
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urban conservatory system were amenable to influence from Nueva Canción 
because parallel aesthetic commitments were native to the central European 
experience those composers knew so well. Significantly, it was not art music 
composers who first tried out the genre of a folkloric Baroque. Five years before 
Luis Advis premiered his Santa María de Iquique, Angel Parra released his 
Oratorio para el Pueblo which similarly arranged folkloric song according to a 
borrowed historical model. Along with Raúl de Ramón’s Misa Chilena of the 
same year, one sees that a basis in sacred composition is key to this genre.  Even 
when the model is not itself derived from music actually heard or composed in 
the Spanish colony, the colonial legacy is present in the reference to Catholic art. 
In the hands of a Marxist composer, the inversion of the religious message 
appears as central to the political import of a piece. “La ley del patrón rico es ley 
sagrada,” the narrator of Santa María tells us, relating the oppressive conditions 
of nitrate miners in the early century. The status of sacred law is precisely what 
the cantata is meant to displace in its culminating call for brotherhood. 
 Advis’s composition is a paragon of refinement. Musical elements drawn 
from the Andean tradition, including pentatonic melodies and standardized 
rhythms, are written on top of a basso part that runs the whole length of the 
piece. This alone lends the cantata a musical consistency missing from preceding 
compositions. The music is often harmonically complex and unexpectedly 
chromatic. Quenas ring out in imitative counterpoint and charangos strum 
dissonances. Moreover, the narration allows the piece to hold itself together, a 
coherence that is reflected musically as themes recur and transform throughout. 
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The same occurs at the level of the text as lines are recalled and given revised 
content. Despite these aspects, the gifts of lettered music making with its 
emphasis on the organic artwork, the cantata does not escape the instrumental 
logic its Nueva Canción inspiration ultimately demanded. Advis himself, although 
convinced that his elegy to Violeta Parra, Cantata para una semilla, was 
artistically superior, admitted that it would never have the same impact that 
Santa María enjoyed. 
 Santa María was written and premiered at the National Stadium in 1970, 
the year Allende ran successful for office on an explicitly revolutionary platform. 
The performance was essentially a campaign event. The piece tells the story of a 
strike at a nitrate mine in 1907 during which workers rebelled against being paid 
in company store vouchers rather than money, ultimately traveling to the nearby 
port of Iquique and occupying a school called Santa María so that they might 
accrue support for their cause. All those occupying the school including women 
and children, 3000 in all, were shot by military forces sent in to quell the uprising 
under pressure from the North American mine owners. The cantata warns that 
without radical political change, massacres like this one will happen again. The 
warning sounds prophetic in light of the fact that the stadium where the cantata 
was premiered would be turned into a concentration camp by military forces only 
three years later. Victor Jara would be tortured and shot there. 
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Song Is Not Enough 
 Santa María’s self-consciousness with respect to its instrumental 
character compels a kind of abdication by art of its self-sufficiency: “Ustedes que 
ya escucharon/la historia que se contó/no sigan allí sentados/pensando que ya 
pasó/No basta solo el recuerdo/el canto no bastará/no basta solo el lamento/
miremos la realidad.” The artistic movement at its most honed reveals itself 
ultimately to be a movement beyond art. This motion is Nueva Canción last step, 
its final development. Everything that followed the genre’s violent end, the 
careers of those musicians who were lucky enough to continue their work in exile, 
were bound to a different kind of emphasis on the past than that which inspired 
the turn to folklore. Nueva Canción musicians largely turned to keeping alive the 
memory of their own artistic movement. In light of the all too literal demise of the 
Left in Chile, the instrumentality of Nueva Canción evaporated and its self-
perpetuation, the very opposite of development, emerged as critical. Eduardo 
Carrasco, who in 1970 sang with the rest of Quilapayun that “song is not enough” 
would, after years of exile in France, reverse his stance. In his monograph 
retrospective on Quilapayun he claims that it is only in art that authentic 
revolution is finally possible. This is especially true, he notes, after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.   130
 Nueva Canción’s last deep thought - that art can clear itself away as a 
service to political action and progress - is most elegantly summed up in a song 
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written by the Cuban songwriter Pablo Milanés in his 1969 song “Si el poeta eres 
tú.” Reflecting on a line from a poem entitled “Che” that Miguel Barnet published 
two years earlier that reads “No es que yo quiera darte/pluma por pistola/pero el 
poeta eres tú,” Milanes writes: 
Si el poeta eres tú 
-como dijo el poeta- 
[...] 
¿qué puedo yo cantarte, Comandante? 
Aptly, the song is brief. A short reflexion on an end for art in the end of art. The 
artisanal, become political, drives art itself to the limit of its conceptual 
determinacy. This limit, however, is not quite what we might think of as a 
Hegelian aufhebung. The art/life dichotomy is not transcended. The very act of 
abdication on the part of the cantautor demonstrates the necessity of the poet. 
The comandante can only be heard as a poet in the cantante’s song. 

 And so the conceptual evolution of Nueva Canción ends enmeshed in the 
very contradictions which gave it birth. Moving from the Baroque popular to the 
folkloric, from the artistic to the political avant-garde, the genre rehearsed the 
identity in contradiction signaled in the Carpentier essay evoked at the beginning 
of this text. At every moment it sought to overcome its own conditions of 
possibility and in so doing, embodied what is concrete and peculiarly Latin 
American about aesthetic modernity. 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EPILOGUE 
 The preceding chapters represent an experiment in the philosophy of Latin 
American music history. By way of both theoretical exposition and selected 
historical narratives, I have sought to render intelligible the constitutive material, 
conceptual, and aesthetic conditions of an object in a constant state of becoming 
through history. The central theoretical claim of the dissertation as a whole falls 
into two parts. The first is that the progressive development of a Latin American 
music was made possible and meaningful by the region’s economic, political and 
cultural peripherality vis-à-vis the (neo-)colonial metropole, Western Europe and 
the United States. As the first chapter made clear, that peripherality was manifest 
as an attempt to find in Latin American particularity the grounds for universal 
significance. Understanding this attempt in (Kantian) terms of conceptual 
determination, it appears as an aesthetics - one that musical compositions, 
genres, and practices sought to complete or transcend. 
 The second part of my claim is that those musical responses to the 
aesthetic problem of Latin American peripherality were ultimately consumed by 
the very duality of universality and particularity they sought to overcome. This is 
not to say that the music history of the region falls under a trans-historical rule. 
As the case studies make clear, the variety of music and movements that fall 
within the scope of this project makes such a rule impossible. What they do share 
is an aporetic structure proper to the eruption of geographical difference onto the 
historical plane.  
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 As much as this thesis is about music in history, it is equally about music 
as history. From the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution to the construction of a 
modern state in Argentina to the heady last days of the Unidad Popular in Chile, 
certain historical conjunctures have not only produced musical results, but have 
manifested themselves as musical practices. In other words, Latin America in the 
last century saw musical art take on a historical role and mission. The history of 
the region is unthinkable without its musical moments. 

 Calling this dissertation an experiment attests to its many gaps. The most 
glaring is the lack of mention of Heitor Villa-Lobos - the third in the triumvirate 
of Latin American modernists which includes Ginastera and Chavez - and the 
general absence of comment on Brazil, whose rich cultural history stands apart 
from that of Spanish America. Nothing is said about Haiti despite the importance 
for my theoretical exposition of Susan Buck-Morss’s thinking about the slave 
history of that island. The legacy of African chattel slavery in general and its 
many and significant musical consequences, especially in Brazil and the 
Caribbean, are left out here. In order to distill what was structurally significant 
about the relationship of music to the whole matrix of cultural and material 
history, a reductive reading is necessary. The divergent national and regional 
histories in Latin America, the diverse populations are smoothed over in a logic of 
center and periphery, universal and particular. This is done so that a core ‘logic’ 
might be made perspicuous and better understood. The task now is to elaborate 
on that core. For example, while there are important parallels between African 
!170
and Latin American colonialities - indeed, they were intimately tied and are part 
of the same historical process as second and first phases, respectively - neither is 
reducible to the other. In fact, there exists a dialectical relationship between the 
two. Fernando Ortiz, in his classic account of tobacco and sugar production in 
Cuba, elaborated precisely this theme with respect to the division of labor on the 
island. There is also the complexity of the North-South divide. The cultural 
history of the United States is just as much a history of coloniality and 
peripherality. The process by which one former colony comes to colonize other 
former colonies itself deserves theoretical unpacking. Any just account of jazz 
manages just this problem. Jazz is just another name for the contradictory logic 
of a periphery become metropolis, on behalf of which a musical expression rooted 
in racial and social exclusion was spread across the globe, as it were, at 
gunpoint.   As one steps closer to the detailed history of the region, 131
contradictions proliferate. 
 Given this, the ultimate contribution of this dissertation is primarily 
methodological. Academic Musicology in the United States has taken a newfound 
and growing interest in Latin American music.   While a variety of 132
historiographical methods have been employed, this author is not aware of any 
work that attempts to construct a critical method specific to this material. Rather, 
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the prevailing implicit assumption is that Latin American music arrives in 
academic musicology as the result of an expansion of the latter’s “borders”. 
Expanding musicological borders either involves the application of traditional 
methods to new musical terrain, or abandoning restrictive familiar methods in 
order to take in a more expansive object of investigation. Both approaches ignore 
what this dissertation seeks to make plain, namely, that Latin America’s 
peripherality (it’s lying on the other side of a border) makes the very objectivity of 
its music  - perhaps irremediably - problematic. 

 Important political changes have shaken the region in our young century: 
the generally accepted failure of Cold War era revolutionary projects, the rise of 
the Pink Tide and widespread and successful economic cooperation in the region, 
the retreat (if not the disappearance) of U.S. political and military intervention, 
the rise of indigenous rights movements, to name just a few of the most 
significant. While the last few decades have produced a large body of scholarship 
on postmodernity as that concept might apply in and of Latin America, current 
events seem to point to the conclusion that modernity - at least as that term has 
been applied in the present study - is alive and well in the region. The musical 
aspect of that contemporary modernity is harder measure, but given the short 
circuit that has Latin Americanist musical projects spark against dependency and 
underdevelopment, one might well hope for a possible Latin American future in 
which music as such has no role left to play. 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